Preparations for the Ankara Summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) are taking place against the backdrop of significant changes in the geopolitical architecture of Eurasia. The Russia–Ukraine war, growing interest in Central Asia on the part of China, the European Union and the United States, and regional states’ efforts to diversify their external ties are creating new conditions for the development of Turkic cooperation. However, increased international attention to the Turkic world does not in itself mean that it has already become an independent centre of power. There remains a considerable gap between geographical potential, political declarations and the actual capacity to influence regional developments. Bridging this gap will be the organization’s principal challenge in the coming years.

The key question is not how far political rapprochement among Turkic states can go, but whether they can establish a sustainable model of cooperation that delivers tangible economic and strategic benefits to every member. This requires more than a convergence of certain foreign policy priorities. It calls for mechanisms capable of reconciling interests even when national economic strategies, relations with external partners and approaches to regional security differ.

The OTS’s main structural challenge lies in the asymmetry of its members’ interests. The member states possess different levels of economic resources, geographical advantages and capacity to influence international affairs. For some, expanding access to European markets may be the priority; for others, the focus may be on attracting investment, developing industry, strengthening ties with Asian economies or maintaining a multi-vector foreign policy. These objectives can complement one another, but they do not automatically align.

The OTS’s future development will therefore depend on whether it can build a system in which cooperation is not perceived as a constraint on national autonomy. This highlights an important distinction between integration as a political objective and integration as an economic process. The former emphasises joint declarations and a shared strategic vision. The latter concerns whether businesses can access neighbouring markets more easily, whether investment conditions are predictable and whether production networks between countries are resilient. It is this second level that can gradually establish the material foundations for deeper cooperation.

Another issue deserving particular attention is which countries will benefit most from the emerging configuration of Eurasian connectivity. The growth of international freight traffic through the region may strengthen the position of states located along key routes. However, transit revenues and long-term economic gains are not the same thing. If a country primarily serves as a channel for the movement of goods produced elsewhere, its revenues remain dependent on external demand, tariff competition and decisions made by major players in international trade.

A more substantial strategic return emerges when transport infrastructure stimulates the development of logistics services, processing industries, warehousing, industrial cooperation and exports of higher-value-added products. In this case, a route becomes more than a channel for moving freight: it provides a foundation for new economic ties.

For the OTS, this creates a broader challenge: turning geographical connectivity into economic interdependence. These concepts are not synonymous. Countries may be linked by transport corridors, ports and energy infrastructure while maintaining limited trade with one another and remaining dependent on external suppliers of technology, capital and equipment. Genuine integration begins when a disruption in one member’s economic system affects the interests of others and joint projects create incentives for sustained, long-term cooperation.

For Central Asian and South Caucasus states, expanding opportunities for cooperation has value in its own right. It allows them to broaden their range of economic partners, strengthen their negotiating positions and reduce dependence on individual external markets and routes. If the organization succeeds in offering economically viable mechanisms for cooperation, its initiatives could attract interest well beyond the Turkic world itself.

At the institutional level, one of the most serious risks is the potential gap between the scale of declared ambitions and the pace of implementation. Regional organizations often find that the number of agreements and areas of cooperation grows faster than tangible results. Over time, this can undermine confidence in joint initiatives and widen the gap between political rhetoric and business expectations.

Over the next three to five years, the most likely scenario is pragmatic but uneven deepening of cooperation. Progress could be relatively rapid in certain areas, particularly transport connectivity, the digitalization of procedures and investment cooperation. The transition to deeper economic integration, however, is likely to be slower, as it requires the harmonization of national legislation, business interests and regulatory approaches.

A second possible scenario is the strengthening of the OTS’s economic role without a comparable increase in its political institutionalization. In this case, the organization would become more significant as a platform for specific projects and intergovernmental coordination without evolving into a unified political bloc. Such a model would not necessarily indicate limited potential. It may, in fact, prove best suited to the interests of states seeking to expand cooperation without abandoning independent foreign policy courses.

A less favourable scenario would emerge if competition for investment, transit revenues and infrastructure advantages began to outweigh the pursuit of mutually beneficial solutions. If members primarily develop national projects without ensuring their compatibility with one another, the region risks ending up with a collection of separate infrastructure routes rather than a unified, economically efficient system. Physical connectivity would increase, but its potential would remain only partially realized.

These scenarios can be distinguished by concrete indicators. If sustainable joint financing mechanisms emerge over the coming years, the number of cross-border production projects increases, and trade and logistics procedures become more predictable, this would signal a transition towards qualitatively deeper cooperation. If, however, the main achievements remain limited to declarations and individual infrastructure projects, the OTS will most likely retain its predominantly coordinating role.

According to Turkish analyst Deniz Koray Attar and Professor Hasan Ali Karasar, an expert in international relations and rector of Cappadocia University, the OTS’s future development will depend on the ability of its members to move from agreeing on common goals to implementing them in practice. The two experts highlight different but complementary dimensions of this process: Attar emphasizes the geopolitical and economic constraints on integration, while Karasar argues that the focus should be on clearly defined priorities, measurable results and improving the effectiveness of existing institutions.

Political commitment to cooperation has already laid the groundwork for further rapprochement. The next stage, in Karasar’s view, should therefore focus on a limited number of priority areas, a clear allocation of responsibilities, defined implementation deadlines and measurable performance indicators. The organization’s maturity will be determined by the extent to which its joint mechanisms enable member states to achieve results that would be more difficult to secure individually.

At the same time, as Attar points out, a shared history, language and culture do not eliminate differences between national interests. OTS members pursue different foreign policy priorities and belong to international organizations with different obligations. Türkiye is a member of NATO and the EU–Türkiye Customs Union, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. These circumstances constrain the scope for establishing a unified political and economic model.

A more realistic prospect, therefore, lies not in the uniformity of foreign policy approaches but in developing cooperation in areas where mutual benefits are clear. Karasar stresses that a strong regional organization does not necessarily have to require the transfer of fundamental state powers to supranational institutions. On the contrary, its resilience can rest on a combination of shared identity, respect for national sovereignty and the ability to coordinate practical action.

One of the clearest examples of this kind of cooperation is the Middle Corridor, which is becoming increasingly important as Eurasian transport flows change. Previously, a substantial share of overland freight traffic between China and Europe moved along the Northern Corridor through Russia. Changes in the international environment have increased interest in alternative routes. Within this emerging configuration, Central Asian states serve as important transit links, while Azerbaijan and Türkiye connect the region to European markets.

For Attar, the Middle Corridor illustrates how geopolitical changes can accelerate institutional and economic cooperation among Turkic states. Its significance lies not only in diversifying transport routes but also in creating additional opportunities for trade and regional infrastructure development. China views the route in the context of its Belt and Road Initiative, while the European Union has an interest in strengthening transport connectivity with Asia.

According to Attar, developing the Middle Corridor requires more than expanding the capacity of ports and railways. It also calls for improved customs procedures, the introduction of digital documentation, the harmonization of transport regulations and the removal of administrative barriers. To make the route more competitive, border-crossing times must be reduced, delivery schedules made more predictable and overall logistics costs lowered. Institutional coordination must complement infrastructure investment at every stage of the transport process.

Azerbaijan occupies a particularly important position in the emerging system. Its location on the western shore of the Caspian Sea enables it to connect Central Asia with Türkiye and, further west, with Europe. The Baku International Sea Trade Port at Alat, the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, and energy projects such as TANAP and the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline provide an important foundation for regional connectivity.

Both experts regard Azerbaijan as one of the key participants in this system. Attar highlights the country’s strategic geographical position and the need for continued infrastructure investment, simplified transit procedures and stronger coordination with Georgia, Kazakhstan and Türkiye. Karasar, in turn, emphasizes that the next step should be to make more effective use of existing transport and energy networks to stimulate production, investment and commercial ties.

Strengthening Azerbaijan’s position, however, requires coordinated operation across the entire transport system. A route’s competitiveness depends not only on infrastructure within the country but also on transport conditions in neighbouring states, customs clearance times and the efficiency of maritime and railway connections. Coordination with regional partners is therefore not merely an additional advantage; it is a prerequisite for the Middle Corridor’s development.

Despite expanding transport links, establishing a common economic space among Turkic states remains a complex undertaking. Attar draws attention to the gap between political affinity and the actual scale of mutual trade. As an example, he cites Kazakhstan’s trade turnover of $27.4 billion with Russia, $5.4 billion with Türkiye and $470 million with Azerbaijan.

These figures demonstrate that Kazakhstan’s economic ties with certain partners outside the OTS are significantly stronger than its trade with some members of the organization. Political rapprochement, therefore, has yet to produce a comparable level of economic interdependence.

Karasar suggests viewing this challenge not only as a constraint but also as an opportunity to establish new production links. Differences in the economic profiles of member states could become a source of complementarity across industry, agriculture, energy, logistics and technology. Rather than attempting to establish a single market immediately, countries could gradually develop an economic environment in which cross-border trade, investment and production become more efficient.

This approach entails moving beyond predominantly bilateral relations towards a broader regional system in which national economies retain their independence while gaining additional advantages through cooperation. Achieving this will require more than developing transport routes. It will also mean creating favourable conditions for joint investment, facilitating businesses’ access to partner markets and encouraging the emergence of regional production chains.

The development of joint investment mechanisms, including the Turkic Investment Fund, could serve as an important instrument for bringing economies closer together. However, the establishment of financial institutions alone does not guarantee stronger economic ties. Their effectiveness will depend on their ability to finance projects that deepen connections between member states and generate long-term commercial value.

At the same time, OTS members must take into account growing competition and the increasing interest of external powers in Eurasia. China is expanding its involvement in infrastructure projects, Russia retains longstanding historical and economic ties with the region, and the European Union is interested in energy, critical raw materials and the diversification of transport routes.

In Attar’s assessment, the multipolar international system offers Turkic states additional opportunities to strengthen their strategic autonomy. Developing relations with several centres of power enables them to attract investment, expand market access and avoid excessive dependence on a single external partner.

Karasar likewise sees no contradiction between strategic autonomy and deeper economic cooperation with China, Russia and the European Union. On the contrary, the ability to choose among different transport routes, investors, technology partners and diplomatic channels broadens the scope for independent decision-making. In this sense, the OTS does not necessarily have to develop as a counterweight to any major power. Its significance may instead lie in helping member states strengthen their own positions while remaining open to cooperation with different centres of power.

The question of institutional development is closely linked to how effectively the organization can use its existing mechanisms. In Karasar’s view, creating a large number of new institutions should not become an end in itself. More practical progress could be achieved by improving cooperation between customs administrations, mutually recognizing transport documents, financing regional projects and expanding academic mobility between universities.

Attar, for his part, emphasizes the importance of maintaining regular summits, ministerial meetings and working groups, as these mechanisms ensure continuity in cooperation amid a changing international environment. Taken together, these approaches point towards strengthening the OTS’s existing institutional foundations without the immediate need to establish a supranational system of governance.

Within this model, the organization’s Secretariat could play a more active role in coordinating joint initiatives, monitoring their implementation and providing technical support. Institutional effectiveness should be measured by the ability to remove obstacles, reduce the costs of cooperation and ensure that agreed decisions are implemented.

According to the experts, the OTS’s key task over the next three to five years will be to narrow the gap between political agreements and their practical implementation. Rather than continually expanding the organization’s agenda, it would be more effective to identify a limited number of priority areas, establish implementation deadlines and assign responsibility to specific member states and government agencies.

The results of this approach should be reflected in measurable changes: shorter border-crossing times, more efficient transport links, increased mutual investment, expanded industrial cooperation and functioning digital systems. Equally important, the benefits of cooperation should be felt not only by government institutions but also by businesses, universities and citizens in their everyday lives.

Ultimately, the prospects for the Turkic world will depend less on its ability to form a unified political bloc than on its capacity to establish a sustainable system of economic cooperation while preserving national sovereignty. For Azerbaijan, this presents an opportunity to strengthen its role as a bridge between Central Asia and Europe while expanding its own participation in regional investment and production projects.

For the OTS as a whole, the main challenge is to translate shared history and political affinity into practical interdependence grounded in trade, infrastructure, investment and institutional coordination. The Middle Corridor provides an important foundation for this process, but its long-term significance will depend on whether transport connectivity can stimulate the development of the region’s economies themselves.

It is precisely the ability to deliver measurable results, maintain continuity in cooperation and strike a balance between shared interests and national priorities that will determine whether the OTS can enter a new phase of development and become a more influential participant in the Eurasian economic architecture.