The Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) is often described as a platform for dialogue, confidence building and multilateral cooperation. Such definitions are accurate, but they do not fully explain why CICA matters in the contemporary Asian order. Its significance becomes clearer when it is viewed through the broader process of regionalisation taking place across Asia. Rather than representing an attempt to reproduce European-style integration, CICA reflects a different model of regional cooperation, one based on connectivity, gradual institutionalisation, political flexibility and the preservation of national sovereignty.

This distinction is important. In international relations theory, regionalisation and regionalism are related but not identical processes. Regionalisation generally refers to the intensification of cross-border flows of trade, capital, people and ideas within a geographical space. It can develop from below through markets, infrastructure and social interaction. Regionalism, by contrast, describes the political effort by states to organise this growing interdependence through institutions, rules and mechanisms of cooperation. Scholars of regionalism have increasingly moved away from treating the European Union as the universal model, recognising that regional orders outside Europe can develop according to very different institutional logics.

CICA can be understood as part of this wider evolution. Asia is becoming increasingly interconnected economically, technologically and logistically, yet it remains politically fragmented. Unlike Europe, the continent has no single institutional centre around which regional order is organised. Instead, it contains multiple overlapping structures, including ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Economic Cooperation Organization, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of Turkic States and a range of subregional and bilateral formats. CICA occupies a distinctive position in this landscape because its geographical scope is broader than that of most Asian organisations and because its primary function is not deep economic integration or collective defence, but the creation of conditions under which states with very different interests can maintain dialogue and develop practical cooperation.

That function is increasingly relevant. Asia today is characterised by a paradox. Economic interdependence is deepening at the same time as geopolitical competition is becoming more pronounced. Transport corridors connect previously separated subregions, energy networks cross political boundaries, and supply chains increasingly link Central Asia, the South Caucasus, the Gulf, South Asia, East Asia and Europe. At the same time, strategic competition, security dilemmas and unresolved political disputes remain significant. CICA addresses precisely this gap between material interconnectedness and political fragmentation.

Its value lies partly in its inclusiveness. CICA brings together states with very different political systems, foreign policy orientations and security perceptions. Its membership includes Iran, Israel, Qatar and Türkiye, among many others. The fact that countries whose bilateral relations may at times be strained remain part of the same institutional framework should not be overstated as evidence of political reconciliation. CICA does not eliminate their disagreements, nor is it designed to do so. Its contribution is more modest but still important: it preserves a multilateral space in which states that may disagree sharply on security and regional politics can nevertheless engage on issues where cooperation remains possible.

This is particularly relevant to the concept of confidence building. CICA does not operate through alliance commitments or supranational authority. It does not require its members to adopt a common foreign policy, identify a common adversary or surrender decision-making powers to a central institution. Instead, it works through confidence-building measures across economic, environmental, human, security and connectivity-related areas. This makes CICA an example of what may be described as flexible or soft regionalism, a model in which cooperation develops without demanding deep political integration.

Such flexibility should not necessarily be interpreted as institutional weakness. In the Asian context, it may in fact be one of the conditions that makes broad participation possible. Many Asian states place particular emphasis on sovereignty, strategic autonomy and non-interference. A highly centralised regional structure would therefore be difficult to sustain across such a diverse membership. CICA’s relatively flexible design allows states to cooperate selectively, building institutional habits without requiring political alignment on every major issue.

This also explains why Asia needs an organisation of this kind despite the existence of numerous other regional platforms. The region does not necessarily suffer from a shortage of institutions. What remains limited are mechanisms capable of connecting different Asian subregions within a single framework. CICA can help address this fragmentation. Its potential is less about replacing existing organisations and more about providing an additional layer of regional interaction between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia.

In theoretical terms, this represents an important transition from regionalisation to regionalism. Physical and economic connectivity are already reshaping Asia. Railways, ports, trade corridors, digital platforms and energy infrastructure create practical interdependence before states develop common political institutions. CICA can serve as one of the forums through which these emerging networks acquire a political and institutional dimension.

This is why connectivity may be one of CICA’s most consequential areas of cooperation. Under Azerbaijan’s chairmanship, transport connectivity, digitalisation and sustainable growth have been placed at the centre of the organisation’s agenda. Azerbaijan has also coordinated confidence-building measures in the area of secure and effective transport corridors, while CICA has organised activities on the digitalisation of transport corridors and, in September 2026, convened a Conference of Heads of Ports in Baku focused on port operations, maritime transport, logistics, multimodal connectivity and resilient supply chains.

This agenda is particularly suited to CICA because transport cooperation can generate practical benefits without requiring states to resolve all of their political differences first. A port, railway or digital customs system does not require participating countries to share the same strategic worldview. It requires predictable rules, interoperable procedures and mutual confidence. In this respect, connectivity can function not only as an economic instrument but also as a confidence-building mechanism in itself.

Among CICA’s newer institutional initiatives, the Finance Summit may become one of the most promising. The initiative was originally proposed by Kazakhstan and was formally established under Azerbaijan’s chairmanship in September 2025. Its mandate is to bring together governments, central banks, financial institutions and the private sector in order to strengthen financial connectivity, support investment cooperation and sustainable finance, and mobilise capital for regional development. Its first meeting took place in 2026.

The significance of the Finance Summit lies in its potential to connect CICA’s political dialogue with material economic cooperation. Regionalisation becomes more durable when institutions are capable of supporting investment, infrastructure and private-sector participation. If CICA can gradually develop mechanisms that facilitate financing for connectivity, digital infrastructure, logistics and sustainable development, it would move beyond confidence building as a diplomatic concept and begin translating it into economic incentives. This may ultimately prove more important to the organisation’s long-term relevance than the multiplication of political declarations.

At the same time, CICA should not be judged by the standards of organisations designed for deep integration. Its purpose is not to create a common market, a customs union or a supranational political authority. Its value may instead lie in creating what could be called regional habits of cooperation. Regular interaction among officials, financial institutions, port authorities, universities, business communities and civil society actors can gradually reduce transaction costs and improve mutual familiarity even where higher-level political disagreements remain.

This is consistent with the broader pattern of Asian regionalism. Asia’s institutional architecture has historically developed through overlapping, issue-specific and relatively flexible mechanisms rather than through a single comprehensive structure. Regional cooperation often proceeds through functional sectors first, with stronger institutionalisation following only where states identify clear mutual benefits. CICA fits this pattern particularly well. It represents regionalisation without forced integration and regionalism without strict bloc politics.

Azerbaijan’s role as CICA chair is also relevant to this institutional logic. The country assumed the chairmanship for 2024-2026 under the theme “Stronger CICA: Connectivity, Digitalization and Sustainable Growth in Asia,” with priorities including CICA’s institutional transformation, the implementation of confidence-building measures and stronger interaction with other regional and international platforms. During this period, the Finance Summit and Women Council were established, the Partnership Network of Leading Universities was operationalised, and the organisation continued discussions on its transformation into a full-fledged international organisation.

At the Seventh CICA Summit in Baku on 15 October 2026, the member states adopted a decision extending Azerbaijan’s chairmanship for the 2026-2028 period. It would be too simplistic to attribute that decision to any single factor. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan’s broader foreign policy profile makes it institutionally well suited to a platform such as CICA. Baku maintains active relations across multiple political and geopolitical directions, including with Türkiye, Central Asian states, the European Union, China, the Gulf countries and Israel, while also maintaining channels with other major regional actors. This multi-vector approach does not remove geopolitical contradictions, but it gives Azerbaijan practical experience in working across them.

For an organisation built on consensus and confidence building, such diplomatic positioning can be an asset. The chair must be acceptable to states with very different strategic preferences and must avoid turning the organisation into an extension of one geopolitical camp. The extension of Azerbaijan’s chairmanship was formally approved by CICA member states, while Israel’s president publicly described it as reflecting a high level of trust in Azerbaijan’s leadership of the organisation. Azerbaijan’s ability to maintain relations across competing political centres may therefore have contributed to the perception that it can continue to provide a relatively balanced platform for the next stage of CICA’s development.

The organisation should therefore be viewed less as a project of classical integration and more as an experiment in flexible Asian regionalism. In a continent as politically diverse as Asia, that may represent a more realistic form of regional order than integration in the traditional sense.