CASPIA presents an interview with Cyril Widdershoven, an expert on global energy markets, geopolitics, and energy and security risks, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

- How do you assess the causes of the current escalation of the conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran? Were these strikes truly inevitable, or could they have been prevented?

- The main clear drivers at present are several-fold. First, we see a deterrence collapse. The USA and Israel, most probably in combined assessments, have concluded that “warning cycles” were no longer restoring deterrence. This is especially true for missiles, drones, and the nuclear file, where deterrence mechanisms have failed to convince Tehran.

Second, there is the regime threat perception. Iran’s current model continues to rely heavily on regional militia networks and its missile and drone capabilities as an insurance policy for regime survival. In this context, reaching a de-escalation agreement is very difficult, possibly even out of reach, because any compromise would effectively mean strategic disarmament from Tehran’s perspective.

Third, there is a widening target set. So far, reported strikes have not only hit Iran’s military capabilities but have deliberately targeted the regime’s command and security ecosystem around Tehran. This indicates that the escalation is aimed at coercion and paralysis, rather than merely weapons degradation. The main theory behind this strategy is to weaken the regime, after which further actions could be supported by internal Iranian forces to remove the leadership.

Regarding proximate triggers this week, timing has been key. Media and diplomatic reports suggested that diplomacy, particularly efforts via Oman, was active and approaching a breakthrough, potentially even on issues like zero stockpiling, verification, or down-blending nuclear fuel. Striking Iran at this moment indicates that Washington and Israel concluded either that the deal was insufficient, unverifiable, or reversible, or that operational intelligence opportunities were closing. There has also been a noticeable increase in Chinese support for Iran, including high-level missile deliveries, which could have led to additional casualties among US-Israeli forces.

Were the strikes inevitable? Not entirely. Diplomacy still offered plausible off-ramps, such as sequencing nuclear constraints first, then missiles, or a temporary enrichment freeze with intrusive verification. But given the high tension, threats, and aggressive statements from Tehran, taking action became politically and operationally the more likely path. Analysts in Israel and the US increasingly saw Iran approaching a near-zero warning nuclear posture, with signs of preparation for major regional attacks. These factors made military action more probable than uncertainty.

- What were the key objectives of these strikes in terms of the strategic interests of the US and Israel? Were they aimed solely at military targets, or did they also include political objectives?

- There are several layers of objectives. From a military and operational perspective, the primary goal was to degrade Iran’s air defenses, missile infrastructure, drone nodes, and IRGC command-and-control capabilities. This reduces Iran’s ability to target Israel and Gulf bases. Another aim was to pre-empt imminent attacks and complicate or destroy Iran’s capacity for follow-on operations.

Strategically, these actions aim to restore full-scale deterrence for the US, Israel, and allied Arab states by demonstrating the capability to reach the regime’s protected centers in Tehran. This signals to Iran and the IRGC that there is “no sanctuary.” It also reshapes the negotiations baseline, showing Tehran that tighter constraints on enrichment, missiles, and proxies may be unavoidable, with kinetic costs for noncompliance.

Politically, the strikes likely aim to pressure Iran’s leadership and population toward potential regime change in the coming days or weeks. By targeting senior command nodes and symbols of power, the US and Israel send a clear message: the regime must consider significant change. The actions so far fall short of full regime removal, but they clearly have a political coercion element, reinforced by statements from figures such as President Trump encouraging Iranians to overthrow their leadership.

- Should we expect the conflict to expand beyond Iran and Israel—for example, to involve other countries in the region such as the US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, or Qatar?

- The risk of regional war has increased due to Iran’s missile activities in Arab countries, hitting American and Arab targets alike. Iran has targeted Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan. This forces Arab states to choose sides and act to protect their sovereignty. Some countries, including the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, are moving toward a more active stance regarding potential regime change or military action against Tehran.

Several escalation scenarios exist:

• Base-defense spiral: Iran increases missile and drone attacks, provoking more US and Israeli strikes, leading Tehran to broaden its targets, potentially including Arab energy assets, ports, and LNG infrastructure.
• Maritime escalation: Iran may increase pressure on shipping lanes, harass maritime traffic, lay mines, deploy drones at sea, or activate proxies such as the Houthis, Hezbollah, or Iraqi militias, affecting the global economy.
• Direct attacks on Gulf states: Should Iran target energy assets like ADNOC or Aramco, ports, or pipelines, Gulf states would likely respond offensively. Saudi Arabia has already raised its alert level and is thinking proactively.

-What do you think the US and Israel's possible response will be to Iran’s missile and drone strikes on Gulf bases—and how might this affect regional stability?

- Initially, the response will likely involve an expanded air and missile defense posture, alongside strikes on launchers, storage facilities, IRGC Aerospace Force nodes, and command links supporting these operations. Cyber and electronic warfare capabilities may also be deployed to disrupt guidance systems, communications, and drone supply chains.

If US-Israeli or Arab casualties increase, a second tier of response could target IRGC leadership infrastructure and internal security organs, not just hardware. These measures risk destabilizing the region further, as even one missile hitting a civilian area, LNG facility, or desalination plant could escalate the conflict beyond control.

- How will current events affect the possibility of further conflict spread and the risk of a local or global war?

- The risk of a regional war is significant. Iran will use its proxies, while the US and Israel may need to defend Arab countries concurrently. If Iran escalates from symbolic retaliation to economic warfare—hitting energy infrastructure, shipping, or chokepoints—a regional war effectively becomes reality.

Global war risk is lower but not absent. Russian and Chinese naval assets are providing intelligence to Tehran. If removal of these assets becomes necessary, escalation could rise. Protracted military operations lasting weeks would further increase the risk of accidents and unintended conflict expansion.

- What could this escalation mean for negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program and other diplomatic efforts?

- There are two possible outcomes:

1. Diplomacy collapses entirely, as trust between parties erodes.
2. Diplomacy resumes later but under harsher, more realistic terms. Past negotiations focused narrowly on nuclear issues, ignoring missiles, proxies, and terrorism, which allowed Iran to buy time. Any new talks would likely be viewed as capitulation by Tehran, which weakens the regime’s negotiating position.

- How will the conflict impact Iranian society as a whole? Will it provoke internal pressure on the regime or, conversely, strengthen it?

- In the short term, without decapitation or full military defeat, the regime will tighten control, declare a state of emergency, increase arrests, and portray dissidents as collaborators. Nationalism may rise temporarily.

In the medium term, public humiliation of leaders or perceived incompetence could fragment internal cohesion, creating friction between the IRGC, government technocrats, and security forces. Economic disruption may further shift public anger toward the regime. Without direct regime change, we can expect short-term consolidation but medium-term volatility, driven by social and economic factors, and potentially by an organized opposition.

- How do you assess the current perception of the conflict in American society—is support for military intervention growing, or is the desire for de-escalation prevalent? What are the US's long-term strategic goals in the Middle East, and has its position on Iran changed since the latest strike?

- Most Americans currently oppose military action. However, a clear-cut victory could shift public opinion, rallying support behind the administration. If Americans are attacked and killed, the mood could turn strongly anti-Iranian. Polls suggest low appetite for an open-ended Middle East conflict, but perceptions can change rapidly with victories or casualties. Long-term, the US aims to maintain deterrence, protect allies, and constrain Iran’s regional influence, with a position that has become more assertive following the latest strikes.