A new phase may be emerging in relations between Turkey and Armenia, as discussions around reopening their long-closed border regain momentum. According to recent reports, both sides are nearing technical readiness to launch the Alican–Akyaka checkpoint, raising expectations that a breakthrough could occur in the coming months. Given that the border has remained closed since 1993, such a move would mark a significant geopolitical shift.

For Yerevan, the reopening of the border is not only a diplomatic objective but also a domestic political priority. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan could benefit substantially if progress is achieved ahead of upcoming parliamentary elections, presenting normalization as a tangible success. Beyond politics, Armenia views open borders as a pathway out of economic and geographic isolation, offering direct access to Turkish markets and, indirectly, to Europe—an aspiration increasingly tied to its broader vision of European integration.

However, the process is far more complex than it appears on the surface. A key constraint remains the unresolved normalization track between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Both Ankara and Baku have consistently emphasized that Armenia–Turkey normalization cannot meaningfully advance without parallel progress in Armenia–Azerbaijan relations. From this perspective, any attempt to accelerate bilateral steps without substantive movement on the Azerbaijani track risks undermining broader regional alignment.

Recent diplomatic signals suggest that Armenia may be recalibrating its approach. Notably, Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan held a meeting in Greece with Abdullah Gül, a figure closely associated with the 2008 “football diplomacy” initiative. This shift toward engagement through informal or semi-official actors marks a departure from the earlier format led by special envoys—Ruben Rubinyan and Serdar Kılıç—who have held multiple rounds of talks since 2022.

At the same time, subtle diplomatic signals of dissatisfaction are visible. Armenia’s absence at high-level forums in Turkey, including the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, and the anticipated non-participation of Turkish leadership in events hosted in Yerevan, indicate a degree of mutual hesitation. While both sides continue to formally commit to dialogue without preconditions, the pace and format of engagement suggest underlying friction.

Economically, the incentives for normalization are clear. Trade between the two countries, despite the closed border, has grown steadily through indirect channels, reaching over $336 million in 2024 and projected to approach $400 million in 2025. However, this trade relies heavily on the ground via third countries, particularly Georgia. Direct border opening would significantly reduce transaction costs and expand trade volumes, especially given Armenia’s strong dependence on Turkish imports.

Yet, the core issue remains strategic sequencing. Armenia appears eager to move quickly, driven by economic necessity and political timing. Turkey, however, continues to align its position with Azerbaijan, prioritizing a comprehensive regional settlement. Without tangible progress in Baku–Yerevan normalization, expectations of rapid breakthroughs in Ankara–Yerevan relations may prove overly optimistic.

In this context, the current phase of Armenia–Turkey engagement reflects a broader regional reality: normalization is not a bilateral process in isolation, but part of a larger geopolitical equation. Moving too fast on one track risks destabilizing the entire framework. For Armenia, the challenge is not only to accelerate dialogue, but to align it with the regional dynamics that ultimately determine its success.