By all indications, U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus and Central Asia may be entering a new phase. The geopolitical shocks caused by the war and the escalation around Iran, and intensifying strategic competition with China have significantly elevated the importance of both regions in Washington's foreign policy calculations.

For the United States, the South Caucasus and Central Asia are no longer peripheral spaces. They are increasingly viewed as strategically important regions situated at the intersection of major geopolitical fault lines and, crucially, on the periphery of both Iran and China. Building a more advanced political architecture with these regions could substantially alter the configuration of geopolitical processes across Eurasia.

The latest evidence of this strategic thinking is the introduction of the Abraham Accords Expansion Act of 2026 by Congressman Craig Goldman of Texas, co-chair of the House Abraham Accords Caucus. The bill seeks to expand the scope of the Abraham Accords by encouraging the inclusion of nations from Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

As Congressman Goldman stated, the Abraham Accords have already expanded American influence globally and have helped counter the influence of adversaries such as Iran. According to the legislation, the Special Presidential Envoy for the Abraham Accords would be tasked with pursuing membership expansion into both regions.

This initiative demonstrates that Washington has not placed the Abraham Accords on the back burner. On the contrary, influential members of Congress are attempting to develop new geopolitical narratives capable of extending the Accords beyond the Middle East and into Eurasia.

However, such a process will not happen overnight.
It is important to emphasize that the Abraham Accords Expansion Act of 2026 remains only at the "Introduced" stage, which is merely the first step in what is often a lengthy and uncertain legislative process in the United States. Under congressional practice, once a bill is introduced by a member of the House of Representatives, it is referred to the relevant committees—most likely the House Foreign Affairs Committee in this case. Committees effectively act as gatekeepers of legislation. They organize hearings, request assessments from the State Department and other federal agencies, hear testimony from experts and stakeholders, and determine whether the proposal is sufficiently viable to move forward. A considerable number of bills never advance beyond this stage.

If the bill successfully clears committee review, it proceeds to the House floor for debate and voting. Members of Congress can propose amendments, revise provisions, or attach additional conditions. Passage in the House, however, does not guarantee adoption. The proposal must then go through an almost identical process in the Senate, where it is assigned to the relevant committee, subjected to further hearings and discussions, and ultimately brought to a vote. In practice, many foreign policy initiatives spend months or even years navigating these procedural stages, and some fail entirely because of shifting political priorities, partisan disagreements, or concerns over implementation. Here is where the jewish lobby's activity matters a lot.

Even if both chambers of Congress approve the legislation, the process is still not complete. The House and Senate must pass identical versions of the bill. If differences exist between the two texts- a common occurrence in U.S. legislative practice- they must be reconciled through further negotiations and compromise. Only after both chambers agree on a single final version is the legislation sent to the President.

The presidential stage marks the beginning of implementation rather than the end of the process. Upon signing the bill into law, the executive branch- primarily the State Department and the Special Presidential Envoy for the Abraham Accords - would need to formulate practical mechanisms for execution. This could involve diplomatic consultations, negotiations with governments in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, and the development of bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Consequently, even under an optimistic scenario, transforming the Abraham Accords Expansion Act from a congressional proposal into an operational geopolitical framework for Eurasia would likely require months or maybe years of sustained political and diplomatic engagement.

Considering the strategic implications of expanding the Abraham Accords into Eurasia, debates around the proposal are likely to be extensive and politically sensitive.

For Washington, the Abraham Accords represent considerably more than a diplomatic declaration or another signed document. They are the result of a multi-layered framework of political agreements, security understandings, economic partnerships, and strategic commitments among participating states.

Congressman Goldman has already demonstrated his interest in extending this framework beyond its original geographical boundaries. Earlier this year, Goldman, alongside Representatives Ann Wagner, Bill Huizenga, Mike Lawler, Joe Wilson, and Josh Gottheimer, introduced a bipartisan resolution supporting Kazakhstan's inclusion in the Abraham Accords framework.

For many in Washington, Kazakhstan's participation represented a significant achievement of American diplomacy. Reports indicated that senior American figures, including Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, engaged in consultations with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, underscoring the importance attached to this initiative.

Should the new congressional proposal regarding the extension of Abraham Accords eventually become law and be implemented, several important geopolitical developments may follow.

First, one should expect a substantial intensification of U.S. diplomatic engagement across the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The Trump administration would likely increase its political activity in both regions, seeking to institutionalize American presence through bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Second, new economic and investment initiatives could emerge. Washington may seek to promote new large-scale infrastructure, logistics, digital connectivity, energy, and transport projects that align regional interests more closely with the United States and its partners. 

Third, the expansion of the Abraham Accords into Eurasia could facilitate the creation of new platforms for political dialogue and security coordination among participating states. Although these arrangements would not constitute military alliances, they could gradually develop into mechanisms for consultation on regional security, economic resilience, technological cooperation, and strategic connectivity.

From a broader perspective, the initiative suggests that the United States is attempting to construct a more coherent geopolitical arc of influence stretching from the Middle East to Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Recent developments surrounding Iran have only reinforced Washington's perception that regional security can no longer be addressed through isolated bilateral relationships alone.

Instead, the United States increasingly appears to favor the establishment of an interconnected network of partnerships capable of ensuring strategic access, economic resilience, and political influence across regions bordering both Iran and China.