An increasing part of the political elites in the South Caucasus no longer perceives the region as a rigid hierarchical security system centered around Moscow, while the dominant approach increasingly views the region as an open geopolitical space where competition is conducted over logistical routes, energy infrastructure, transit corridors, regulatory institutions and elite influence mechanisms. The primary risk emerging from the current transformation is not direct interstate war, but the gradual weakening of centralized crisis management mechanisms historically associated with Russian dominance, particularly as no external actor currently possesses the legitimacy, military capabilities or political will necessary to fully replace the centralized stabilization model historically maintained by Russia.

Several low probability but high impact scenarios require close monitoring. These include internal destabilization in Iran affecting regional transit routes, sharp escalation along the Armenia Azerbaijan track, domestic political destabilization in Georgia amid the weakening of European integration mechanisms, serious internal political crisis inside Russia further reducing Moscow’s regional management capabilities and potential attacks against strategic infrastructure connected to the Middle Corridor. Although the probability of these scenarios remains limited in the short term, their regional impact potential remains high due to the weakness of collective stabilization mechanisms.

Despite visible weakening, Russia continues preserving extensive structural influence across the South Caucasus through economic dependency, migration systems, intelligence networks, administrative linkages and energy infrastructure. Internal assessments within regional political circles indicate that Moscow recognizes the impossibility of restoring its previous exclusive dominance over the region and is gradually shifting from a comprehensive control model toward a selective containment strategy focused on preserving key leverage points.

Russian priorities currently include preventing irreversible Western security penetration into Armenia, maintaining political and intelligence influence networks inside Georgia, preserving leverage over Armenia’s logistical and trade dependency, preventing the emergence of anti Russian military infrastructure connected to NATO member states and maintaining influence over regional transportation configurations.

The Upper Lars corridor remains one of Moscow’s most effective indirect leverage instruments over Armenia, as Russian decision making circles understand that Armenia’s logistical dependency significantly limits Yerevan’s geopolitical maneuverability regardless of political rhetoric surrounding diversification. Simultaneously, the concentration of Russian resources on the Ukrainian front continues weakening Moscow’s regional capabilities and, according to several diplomatic assessments, Russia’s South Caucasus policy is becoming increasingly reactive in nature. Although the Kremlin retains escalation capacity, it no longer possesses sufficient resources and operational bandwidth to manage all regional directions simultaneously at the previous level.

Internal political dynamics in Armenia indicate that a significant part of the Armenian political establishment no longer considers exclusive long term dependence on Moscow strategically sustainable, although Armenian elites remain divided regarding the pace and limits of diversification. The main reasons include fears of possible Russian economic pressure, infrastructural dependency and uncertainty regarding practical Western security guarantees. The Armenian leadership increasingly views geopolitical balancing as a mechanism for reducing excessive dependence on a single external center, although part of the current strategic approach appears based on underdeveloped expectations regarding Western political and security support.

Armenian political circles increasingly assume that the internationalization of security risks may function as a partial deterrence mechanism against future escalation. However current Western involvement remains insufficient to fully replace Russia’s previous deterrence role. Armenia continues preserving structural vulnerabilities related to energy dependence, logistical exposure, limited military self sufficiency, fragmented external security guarantees and economic linkage with Russian systems. The deployment of the European Union Mission in Armenia and the expansion of French Armenian defense cooperation are perceived within Armenian political circles not as mechanisms of full security replacement, but rather as political insurance instruments aimed at gradually internationalizing Armenian security exposure.

Although European actors continue expanding political influence and institutional presence in the region, they simultaneously avoid military commitments capable of triggering direct escalation with Moscow. A serious destabilization scenario may emerge if the Armenian leadership accelerates security diversification faster than Western actors are prepared to institutionalize practical guarantees. Current assessments indicate a high probability of gradual deterioration in Armenian Russian relations, while the probability of a complete geopolitical rupture between Armenia and Russia remains low in the short term. The probability of Moscow increasing hybrid political pressure mechanisms against Armenian institutions remains moderate to high.

Türkiye currently represents the fastest expanding external actor in the South Caucasus, with Ankara simultaneously increasing its military, logistical, political and economic presence across the region. Turkish strategic calculations are aimed at transforming the South Caucasus into an integrated transit and connectivity zone linked to the broader Turkic integration framework extending toward Central Asia.

At the same time, Turkish policy demonstrates clear operational limitations, as regional assessments indicate that Ankara seeks to maximize geopolitical maneuverability while avoiding full responsibility for regional stabilization and long term security burdens. Türkiye’s primary model is based on corridor influence, defense cooperation, infrastructure integration, elite coordination and selective institutional expansion.

The weakening of a dominant regional hegemon significantly increases Turkish maneuverability, although this process simultaneously creates friction points connected to transit competition with Russia, overlap with Chinese logistical interests, contradictions with European regulatory ambitions and growing exposure to regional escalation risks.

The European Union is increasingly transforming regulatory and institutional mechanisms into geopolitical influence instruments across the South Caucasus, while Brussels seeks deeper penetration into governance systems, border management structures, cyber security sectors and political institutions, particularly in Armenia and Georgia. However European strategy contains a significant structural contradiction, as the European Union continues expanding its strategic presence without assuming corresponding hard security obligations, while its regional influence expands faster than its willingness to absorb escalation costs.

Regional assessments indicate that European political promises are gradually exceeding Europe’s actual security capabilities. Although the European Union Mission in Armenia represents an important institutional step, European actors continue avoiding developments capable of triggering direct confrontation with Moscow. European influence mechanisms currently include regulatory harmonization, financial dependency, political legitimacy instruments, sanctions leverage, institutional penetration and border governance programs.

Georgia remains particularly vulnerable to European pressure mechanisms due to the central role of European integration within the country’s domestic legitimacy structure, while current tensions between Brussels and Tbilisi indicate that the European track is increasingly functioning as a direct instrument of internal political and elite pressure. Simultaneously, part of the Georgian political establishment increasingly views prolonged confrontation with European institutions as an acceptable cost for preserving domestic administrative control.

Azerbaijan currently possesses the highest degree of geopolitical maneuverability among the South Caucasus states, while the weakening of Russia’s monopolistic dominance increases Baku’s strategic flexibility and reduces the risks of coercive alignment by external actors. Azerbaijan’s current strategy is focused on preserving balanced relations simultaneously with Türkiye, Russia, the European Union, China and Israel while preventing excessive dependence on any single geopolitical center.

At the same time Azerbaijan may face growing risks connected to increasing competition over corridor governance, expanding foreign interest in regional infrastructure, overlapping Turkish, Chinese and European logistical interests and growing exposure to external pressure due to the region’s rising geopolitical significance.

The South Caucasus is gradually transitioning from a rigid hierarchical geopolitical model toward a network based system built on overlapping influence zones, selective partnerships and transactional relations, while during the next three to five years the primary arena of competition will likely shift away from direct military positioning toward corridor governance, infrastructure dependency, institutional penetration, elite influence networks, regulatory control mechanisms and logistical security management.

Although the weakening of Russia’s monopolistic dominance increases maneuverability for regional actors, it simultaneously reduces predictability and weakens centralized escalation management mechanisms. The most probable medium term scenario is not the emergence of a new hegemon, but the formation of a fragmented influence architecture in which Russia preserves veto capabilities, Türkiye expands corridor influence, the European Union deepens institutional penetration, China increases logistical presence and regional states maximize transactional flexibility.