Armenia’s ratification of the TRIPP project marks a new stage in the regional agenda, moving previously reached political agreements towards the practical implementation of specific institutional, economic and geopolitical commitments. However, the significance of this initiative extends far beyond the opening of an additional transport route. It concerns the formation of a new model of regional connectivity that could potentially reshape the distribution of transit flows, investment opportunities and political influence across the South Caucasus.
The key feature of TRIPP is that its economic rationale is closely intertwined with issues of state sovereignty, the management of strategic infrastructure and competition among external actors. For Armenia, the fundamental question is how to balance state control over its territory with the commercial management of infrastructure, while ensuring that the country can derive long-term economic benefits from the project. For the United States, TRIPP represents an instrument for expanding its economic and strategic presence across the South Caucasus and Central Asia. For neighbouring countries, its implementation means the need to reconsider their own transport priorities and adapt to a changing regional configuration.
At the same time, the emergence of a new route does not automatically eliminate existing contradictions. Russia’s influence over Armenia’s railway infrastructure, Iran’s concerns about changes in the transit balance, Türkiye’s interest in expanding transport links with Azerbaijan and Central Asia, as well as Georgia’s prospects as one of the region’s key transit countries, form a complex system of interconnected interests. Under these circumstances, TRIPP may simultaneously serve as a mechanism for economic cooperation and a new arena of geopolitical competition.
One particularly important question is whether the development of transport connectivity can become a genuine foundation for lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Economic interdependence can create additional incentives for stability, but it cannot replace political agreements, security guarantees or the elimination of mutual distrust. Moreover, the distribution of economic benefits among the project’s participants remains one of the fundamental questions determining its long-term viability.
The central question of CASPIA’s research is whether TRIPP will become the foundation for a new system of economic interdependence and sustainable regional integration, or whether the South Caucasus will acquire yet another infrastructure platform around which competition for influence will intensify. The transformation of a political agreement into a viable economic system will depend precisely on how issues of governance, investment, security and the distribution of benefits are addressed.
As Areg Kochinyan, President of the Armenian Council, points out, the charter of the joint venture, TRIPP Development Company (TDC), the shareholders’ agreement and the terms governing the implementation of individual infrastructure projects have yet to be finalised.
One of the central issues is determining which decisions Armenia will be able to make independently within the framework of TRIPP. According to the expert, it is essential to distinguish between two separate matters: state control over the territory and the commercial management of infrastructure.
Under the framework agreement, the entire territory of TRIPP remains under Armenia’s sovereignty and jurisdiction. This means that border and customs control, security matters, law enforcement activities and state decision-making remain exclusively within the competence of the Armenian authorities.
At the same time, the construction, development and commercial operation of the infrastructure will be carried out by the joint Armenian-American company TDC. The American side will hold 74% of its shares, while Armenia will own 26%. However, as Areg Kochinyan emphasises, this distribution of shares does not mean that the American side will be able to make all decisions unilaterally. The most important matters, including major investments, changes in the ownership structure, the granting of concessions and security-related issues, will require the mandatory consent of both parties.
In this context, the expert also draws attention to the repeated statements by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan that TRIPP will operate exclusively within the framework of Armenian sovereignty and will not involve the presence of foreign armed forces.
Nevertheless, the preservation of state sovereignty must be considered separately from the obligations Armenia assumes in implementing the project. The principal obligation of the Armenian side is to create the necessary conditions for TRIPP’s implementation and ensure the operation of the joint company. In particular, Armenia must provide the relevant land plots and infrastructure development rights initially for a period of 49 years, issue the necessary permits and licences, and agree on special operating rules for TDC.
Fulfilling these obligations may require amendments to, or exemptions from, existing Armenian legislation. This concerns, in particular, the areas of public procurement, the activities of joint-stock companies and cooperation between the state and private companies.
The expert separately highlights the agreement’s provision allowing private operators to participate in providing services at border crossing points. For example, such operators will be able to handle document reception, provide consultations and organise customer services. However, they will not have the authority to independently decide whether individuals or cargo may cross the state border. This authority will remain exclusively with Armenian state bodies. Thus, according to Areg Kochinyan, Armenia retains its state sovereignty while simultaneously assuming long-term commitments concerning the governance arrangements for TRIPP infrastructure.
Another equally important aspect of the project’s implementation concerns the financial obligations and risks facing Armenia. The overall logic of the agreed model is that the main infrastructure investments under TRIPP should come from the American side and from investors attracted to the project. As evidence of this approach, Areg Kochinyan refers to statements by Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan. On 14 January, Mirzoyan stated that Armenia’s main contribution would consist of infrastructure development rights, while the United States would provide substantial investment. During parliamentary discussions on 27 October, he reiterated that the principal investment burden would fall on American partners.
US Vice President JD Vance has also demonstrated a similar interest in attracting private capital. On 9 February, he spoke about considerable investor interest in the project, particularly in the construction of railways and pipelines.
At the same time, Armenia’s own financial commitments related to TRIPP’s implementation have already been identified. The Armenian side must resolve property and land-related issues at its own expense, provide the necessary infrastructure for state services and grant the tax incentives stipulated in the agreement. However, it has not yet been definitively determined who will finance the construction, maintenance, repair and modernisation of individual facilities, or in what proportions. The distribution of these expenses will depend on specific investment projects and future agreements. Therefore, in the expert’s view, it is premature at this stage to determine the precise scale of Armenia’s financial risks.
The question of how dependent TRIPP is on long-term US support also requires separate consideration. According to Areg Kochinyan, American involvement is crucial to the project’s long-term implementation for several reasons.
First, there is the political dimension. The United States acts as a mediator and one of the principal external participants in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process within the framework of what is known as the Washington Process. American involvement in TRIPP is therefore important not only from an economic perspective but also as an additional factor in stabilising relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Washington has a direct interest in preserving the agreements it has itself helped achieve. Consequently, US participation in the project should be viewed not merely as an instrument of economic cooperation but also within the broader context of political efforts to ensure the sustainability of the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement.
Second, the project is driven by the strategic and economic interests of the United States. Washington views TRIPP as part of a much broader policy aimed at developing transport and economic links between Central Asia, the South Caucasus and Western markets.
The significance of the project, however, is not limited to cargo transportation. It also concerns access to the energy and raw material resources of these regions, the development of new supply chains, the expansion of the American economic presence and the creation of additional opportunities for US companies and investors. Thus, TRIPP serves broader American strategic and commercial interests that extend beyond the immediate Armenian-Azerbaijani agenda.
Third, American involvement carries considerable investment significance. The direct participation of the US government, including through the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), increases the project’s attractiveness to international investors.
Such involvement signals political support for the project from Washington, may reduce investors’ perceived political risks and facilitate the attraction of private capital. In other words, US government engagement can become an additional source of confidence in the project for potential participants and investors.
American policymakers have also emphasised TRIPP’s strategic significance. In particular, on 26 May, Marco Rubio described it as an important element of long-term Armenian-American cooperation and part of the Trump administration’s political legacy. Nevertheless, TRIPP’s long-term sustainability depends not only on the position of the current US administration but also on more fundamental factors. Above all, American involvement serves US strategic interests that extend beyond the policies of the current administration.
As Areg Kochinyan notes, the policy of strengthening the US position in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, developing transport routes and expanding access to regional resources was already being pursued under the administration of Joe Biden. In particular, in 2023, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken held a meeting with the five Central Asian countries in the C5+1 format. Later, Biden organised the first-ever summit of this format at the presidential level.
In this regard, there are grounds to assume that US interest in the region will continue even if the administration changes. This makes it possible to view American engagement in TRIPP not merely as an initiative of a particular administration but as part of Washington’s longer-term strategy towards Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
Another equally important factor determining the project’s long-term sustainability is the stability of the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement. If TRIPP remains constantly dependent on political crises and fluctuations in relations between Yerevan and Baku, its investment attractiveness will inevitably decline. In such circumstances, the project could become a permanent source of problems for Washington, increasing the risk of reduced American involvement. Thus, TRIPP’s long-term success depends not only on US strategic interests and its willingness to remain engaged in the project but also on the stability of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.
Another fundamental issue is whether Armenia will be able to attract investors from the European Union, the Persian Gulf countries and Asia. According to Areg Kochinyan, the agreed project model provides for such a possibility.
At the TDC level, Armenian-American participation is envisaged, with the United States holding the controlling stake. However, for the construction and operation of railways, roads, energy lines and other infrastructure, the company will be able to establish separate subsidiaries and attract external investors, contractors and operators. Consequently, European, Middle Eastern and Asian companies may potentially participate in TRIPP’s implementation. This means that the project is not limited exclusively to bilateral Armenian-American economic cooperation but may provide for broader international participation across individual infrastructure sectors.
As evidence of Armenia’s interest in expanding international participation, the expert draws attention to statements by representatives of the Armenian and American leadership. On 14 January 2026, Nikol Pashinyan stated that Armenia was interested in the European Union participating in individual TRIPP projects. On 26 May, Ararat Mirzoyan reported preliminary discussions with several countries and companies interested in construction, equipment supplies and technological solutions. JD Vance also noted that potential investors from various regions of the world had expressed interest in the project. At the same time, the attraction of investors and the granting of relevant rights to them will take place within the framework of decisions made by the joint company and procedures agreed upon by the parties.
At the same time, the agreement explicitly preserves Armenia’s right to independently develop infrastructure projects that do not fall within TRIPP. This provision is important because it preserves opportunities for implementing other infrastructure initiatives and expanding the country’s range of economic partners. Thus, Armenia’s opportunities to diversify its economic partnerships remain intact. However, their practical scope will depend on the terms of individual projects and agreements with the American side.
From the American perspective, TRIPP should be viewed simultaneously as an economic and strategic initiative. As Houman Sadri, an American political scientist and researcher in international relations, notes, official US documents primarily emphasise the development of economic connectivity, the simplification of trade procedures, the diversification of supply chains, and support for regional peace and prosperity. The stated objectives of the project include improving transport links, opening new markets and strengthening economic integration in the South Caucasus.
At the same time, in the expert’s view, it would be unrealistic to completely separate TRIPP’s economic dimension from its geopolitical context. Transport corridors often have strategic implications because they influence the direction of trade flows, the structure of investment relations and political ties between states. By supporting TRIPP, Washington gains a more significant role in promoting regional stability and economic development while simultaneously facilitating the development of transport and economic connectivity between the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Türkiye and Europe. However, Sadri points out that in official US statements, the project is presented primarily as a mechanism for peacebuilding and economic cooperation rather than an instrument of geopolitical competition.
When examining how TRIPP aligns with the long-term national security interests of the United States, the expert identifies several areas in which the project serves Washington’s strategic priorities. These include regional stability, the security of trade routes, supply chain diversification and reducing the vulnerability of Eurasian trade to various disruptions and external shocks. In particular, official American documents explicitly refer to the need to improve transport connectivity between Europe and Asia, as well as to expand access to markets and critical resources.
According to Sadri, American participation in TRIPP’s implementation naturally creates additional opportunities to expand the United States’ diplomatic and economic presence in the region. However, this influence should not necessarily be viewed through the logic of a zero-sum game, in which the strengthening of one party inevitably means the weakening of another.
The declared objective of the project is to facilitate transport operations, trade and confidence-building among regional participants. Furthermore, the agreement explicitly recognises Armenia’s sovereignty and jurisdiction over infrastructure located on its territory. In the expert’s view, this indicates that the United States is seeking to establish a model of partnership rather than direct territorial or political control.
Houman Sadri also pays particular attention to the potential geopolitical implications of TRIPP for Iran and Russia. Officially, the United States presents the project as an initiative focused on transport connectivity and peaceful settlement rather than an anti-Iranian or anti-Russian undertaking. American and Armenian statements consistently emphasise the importance of regional integration, economic development and the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
At the same time, the expert notes that many analysts have drawn attention to the potential impact of new East-West-oriented transport routes on the existing regional infrastructure. The development of such routes could lead to a relative decline in the importance of certain existing transport corridors passing through Russia or Iran. From this perspective, TRIPP could indirectly alter the region’s geopolitical dynamics. However, available official documents do not describe the project as an instrument for containing or restricting the influence of these states. On the contrary, it is presented as a mechanism for creating additional opportunities for regional trade and transport connectivity while encouraging cooperation among neighbouring countries.
Another fundamental issue concerns the readiness of the American administration to provide long-term political and economic support for TRIPP. Given that the project is designed to be implemented over several decades, particular importance attaches to the question of which mechanisms can ensure continuity in American commitments in the event of a change of administration or a shift in Washington’s foreign policy priorities.
According to Sadri, long-term infrastructure projects inevitably face uncertainty, as political leadership and government priorities may change over time. Nevertheless, TRIPP has already moved beyond the stage of a purely political declaration and has been incorporated into formal implementation mechanisms and bilateral agreements. This creates institutional mechanisms that could potentially ensure the project’s continuity regardless of changes in individual administrations.
At the same time, the expert considers the most reliable guarantee of TRIPP’s sustainability to be, most likely, economic rather than political. If the transport corridor generates tangible commercial benefits for Armenia, Azerbaijan, international investors and transport companies, a broad range of stakeholders will have incentives to preserve and further develop the project. Mechanisms for cooperation between states, development institutions and private-sector representatives may also play an additional role in ensuring the sustainability of infrastructure initiatives. Such cooperation can help protect long-term infrastructure projects from the adverse effects of political fluctuations and changes in the foreign policy environment.
Azerbaijan and Türkiye also occupy an important place in the American vision of TRIPP. As Houman Sadri emphasises, both countries are indispensable participants in the project’s successful implementation, since its economic rationale directly depends on establishing broad regional transport connectivity. The corridor is expected to connect transport networks across the South Caucasus and contribute to the development of wider links extending towards Central Asia and Europe. Official US documents have repeatedly emphasised the importance of regional integration, expanding trade and cross-border cooperation.
From Washington’s perspective, Azerbaijan plays a particularly important role, as the project envisages the establishment of direct transport links between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan while creating additional opportunities for broader regional trade. Türkiye, in turn, serves as a crucial transit partner connecting the South Caucasus with European markets. Thus, according to Sadri, the United States appears to view TRIPP as part of a broader economic architecture based on transport connectivity and cooperation rather than exclusively bilateral arrangements.
In the assessment of Iakob Dadvani, a Georgian researcher specialising in international security, defence policy and geopolitical analysis, the TRIPP project should be considered within the context of broader changes in the balance of power in the South Caucasus. Its implementation affects not only relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan but also the interests of Georgia, Türkiye, Iran, Russia, the United States and the European Union.
From Dadvani’s perspective, Russia’s concession to manage Armenia’s railway network is of particular importance for TRIPP’s implementation. Even if the new railway line is managed by a separate Armenian-American entity, Russia will retain influence over the infrastructure required to connect Armenia to this route and establish further transport links with Türkiye. This concerns railway dispatching, rolling stock, tariffs and individual railway sections, including the Yeraskh and Gyumri–Akhurik directions. Consequently, Russian influence may affect not so much Azerbaijan’s ability to benefit from the transport advantages of the route as Armenia’s ability to fully capitalise on the economic opportunities it creates.
For Dadvani, this circumstance is of fundamental importance: the creation of an alternative transport route does not in itself guarantee a country’s full independence in using its infrastructure. TRIPP’s actual effectiveness will depend on how smoothly it can be integrated into Armenia’s existing railway system and other regional communications networks.
At the same time, the expert believes that differences in the foreign policy priorities of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia do not rule out practical regional cooperation. As an example of such cooperation, Dadvani cites supplies of Azerbaijani fuel and transit cargo to Armenia through Georgian territory. In his assessment, Georgia is currently the country benefiting most directly from the existing transit connection between the two states. However, the situation may change in the future as TRIPP and other transport routes develop, including the Kars–Gyumri railway. As a result, Georgia may lose some of its previous transit advantages and will be compelled to adapt to a more competitive regional transport system.
Nevertheless, the expert does not regard the emergence of new routes as inevitably pushing Georgia out of regional logistics. On the contrary, the country’s future position will depend on its ability to maintain the competitiveness of its infrastructure, offer attractive tariffs and create predictable conditions for investors. In this regard, he draws attention to the challenges surrounding the implementation of the Anaklia deep-sea port project and the underwater energy cable across the Black Sea, connecting Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania and Hungary.
Another dimension of the project concerns the interests of Türkiye and Iran. Dadvani notes that both countries are interested in preventing the emergence of Western security forces in the South Caucasus and support the regional 3+3 format. However, their positions differ regarding control over the new transport route passing through Armenia’s Syunik Province.
For Türkiye, TRIPP offers an opportunity to strengthen uninterrupted transport connectivity through Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan towards Central Asia. An important addition to this route is the Kars–Iğdır–Nakhchivan railway, whose construction is being financed by Ankara. For Iran, by contrast, the emergence of a new route could mean a reduction in its transit role in connecting Armenia with external markets and in Azerbaijan’s transport links with Nakhchivan. Tehran is also concerned about the possibility of an American commercial presence emerging near its northern border.
At the same time, Dadvani draws attention to changes in Iranian rhetoric. Alongside descriptions of TRIPP as an extraterritorial “American corridor”, Tehran has also voiced more pragmatic assessments, suggesting that the project could be considered a transport route provided that Armenia’s sovereignty and control over its territory are preserved. This demonstrates that the main source of disagreement is not the development of transport connectivity itself, but rather its political and legal framework and the distribution of influence.
The expert also highlights the distinction between the strategic advantages TRIPP may offer Azerbaijan and the economic outcomes it may generate for Armenia. For Baku, the route could provide an additional connection with Nakhchivan and reduce the need to pursue transport access through political or military pressure. For Yerevan, the benefits primarily lie in expanding transport opportunities and gaining access to regional communications networks. However, according to the expert, the question of how far these advantages will translate into direct revenues for Armenia remains open. He points to the project’s governance structure, the distribution of shares between the American and Armenian sides, and the absence of publicly disclosed guarantees regarding a minimum level of revenue.
Dadvani assigns an important role to the United States and the European Union in TRIPP’s implementation but does not regard Western involvement as an automatic security guarantee. In his assessment, Washington has demonstrated its ability to organise the negotiation process, establish a political framework for settlement and support the development of transport projects. Nevertheless, American involvement has not yet been backed by a permanent military presence in the region or fully secured financing for TRIPP. Furthermore, he points to the personalised nature of American policy: the close association of TRIPP with President Donald Trump’s initiative gives the project political weight but also makes its prospects sensitive to changes in administration. Therefore, the project’s long-term sustainability will depend on whether it can be anchored through actual investment, institutional mechanisms and private-sector participation.
According to Dadvani, the European Union possesses broader economic and institutional instruments, including monitoring missions, support programmes and trade mechanisms. However, the EU operates more slowly and faces the need to coordinate the positions of its member states. Its capabilities are also limited by the absence of hard-power instruments capable of ensuring military deterrence in the region. Therefore, Western involvement in TRIPP should primarily be viewed as a potential economic and institutional foundation for regional connectivity rather than a substitute for independent security mechanisms.
Thus, Iakob Dadvani’s position complements the Armenian and American perspectives on TRIPP by analysing the project’s implications for Georgia and the wider regional transport system. It demonstrates that the emergence of a new route could reshape the distribution of transit advantages, intensify competition among regional and external actors, and create additional economic incentives for cooperation. However, transforming transport connectivity into a sustainable system of regional integration will depend not only on infrastructure construction but also on the equitable distribution of economic benefits, the preservation of sovereignty and the resolution of persistent security challenges.