The announcement by the United States and Iran of a framework agreement to end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz marks one of the most consequential geopolitical developments in the Middle East in recent years. According to initial reports, the agreement is expected to be signed in Switzerland and will extend the 60-day ceasefire reached in April while committing Washington and Tehran to further negotiations.
At first glance, the deal appears to represent a breakthrough. Yet, beneath the diplomatic optimism lies a series of unresolved contradictions that raise serious questions about its long-term viability. The agreement may have stopped active hostilities, but it has by no means resolved the strategic disputes that caused them.
The most immediate issue concerns the Strait of Hormuz. Shortly after President Donald Trump announced the agreement, Iran's state-affiliated Fars News Agency reported that the deal would include a legal framework for the Persian Gulf under which the Strait would be jointly administered by Iran and Oman.
Geographically, such a proposal appears reasonable. At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is only around 38 kilometers wide, and both Iran and Oman already control its respective shores. However, the issue is not geography but jurisdiction and interpretation.
Nearly one-fifth of global oil supplies, substantial volumes of liquefied natural gas and other commercial cargo pass through this maritime chokepoint. Any changes to its legal regime therefore have immediate global implications.
Only weeks before the agreement was announced, Iran published maps claiming administrative authority over sections of the Strait extending into the territorial waters of the United Arab Emirates and Oman. The move prompted five Gulf states to issue an official warning through the International Maritime Organization, advising shipping companies not to comply with Iranian claims.
Iran had previously suggested introducing transit fees for vessels passing through Hormuz, implying that these would be collected jointly with Oman. Muscat immediately rejected the proposal, arguing that no transit fees could legally be imposed because the Strait constitutes a natural international passage rather than an artificial canal.
Following Sunday's announcement, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei clarified that Tehran intends not to impose duties but rather charge for maritime services provided to vessels transiting the Strait. Although this distinction may seem technical, it illustrates the broader challenge facing the agreement: the two sides often use identical language while attaching entirely different meanings to it.
The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War has already noted that the United States and Iran continue to present divergent interpretations of the framework agreement, making it nearly impossible to determine whose reading most accurately reflects the text.
Indeed, some of the reported provisions appear exceptionally ambitious. According to various sources, the framework envisages a permanent ceasefire across all fronts, including Lebanon; a commitment by Washington not to interfere in Iran's internal affairs; the lifting of the U.S. naval blockade within thirty days; the restoration of navigation through Hormuz in accordance with Iranian conditions; the removal of sanctions on Iranian oil and energy exports; and Iran's reaffirmation that it will not pursue nuclear weapons.
Perhaps the most controversial element concerns reconstruction. According to reported provisions, the United States and its allies would submit plans for Iran's reconstruction amounting to at least $300 billion. Yet President Trump has already publicly stated that the United States has no intention of financing Iran's reconstruction. This contradiction alone demonstrates that the agreement remains largely political rather than operational. The nuclear question remains even more complicated.
For years, Washington has advanced a proposal that, on paper, appears attractive for Tehran: in exchange for verifiable guarantees that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons, the country could gradually return to global markets and receive relief from at least some sanctions.
Economically, such a scenario would be beneficial for Iran. Strategically, however, it is considerably more complex. According to Axios, CIA Director John Ratcliffe recently briefed President Trump and senior administration officials on intelligence assessments suggesting that Iran may not be prepared to make meaningful concessions on its nuclear program. The intelligence reportedly indicated that Iranian officials communicate one set of intentions among themselves and another to mediators and American interlocutors.
These assessments reportedly convinced Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth that Tehran's negotiating posture lacks sincerity. Yet other influential figures, including presidential envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, continued to support the signing of a memorandum of understanding with Iran.
Simultaneously, opposition to the agreement has been growing within Iran itself.
Hardline factions have accused the Iranian foreign minister and the speaker of parliament—both central figures in the negotiations—of betraying the legacy of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed during the opening phase of the U.S.-Israeli strikes on February 28. For many conservatives, any compromise with Washington risks being portrayed as surrender rather than pragmatism.
Consequently, both sides are already presenting the agreement according to their domestic political requirements.
For Washington, the deal demonstrates that the United States has once again secured the free flow of maritime commerce through one of the world's most important energy corridors while avoiding another prolonged military commitment in the Middle East.
For Tehran, the agreement is framed as a strategic victory and a rational peace initiative that preserved Iranian sovereignty, forced negotiations on sanctions relief and secured international recognition of Iran's indispensable role in Gulf security.
The reality lies somewhere between these competing narratives.
The agreement has succeeded in stopping a war and creating diplomatic space. However, ceasefires do not automatically translate into strategic settlements. In other words, peace may have been declared, but the fundamental disputes have merely entered a new arena. The war has paused. The contest over the future order of the Persian Gulf has not.