The expansion of Central Asia’s consultative format to include Azerbaijan reflects a deeper geopolitical shift: the growing recognition that the region’s economic future cannot be separated from its connections to the Azerbaijan. The challenge now is to turn this strategic convergence into a functioning system of regional cooperation.
Azerbaijan’s inclusion as a full-fledged participant in the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia marks a significant change in the political geography of Eurasia. For years, the five Central Asian republics have sought to strengthen regional coordination while preserving their sovereignty and room for manoeuvre in an increasingly competitive international environment. Azerbaijan’s entry does not alter the geography of Central Asia in the conventional sense. It reflects something more consequential: the growing recognition that the region’s strategic interests extend beyond its traditional geographical boundaries.
The significance of this development lies less in the expansion of the format from five participants to six than in the reasons that made the expansion possible. Azerbaijan is located in the South Caucasus, yet its economic and political connections with Central Asia have become sufficiently substantial for its absence from the consultative framework to appear increasingly inconsistent with the realities on the ground. The decision to integrate Azerbaijan into the format, formalised in November 2025 and reflected in its participation in the eighth meeting in Turkmenbashi on 8 October 2026, acknowledges this change. The transfer of the chairmanship to Azerbaijan for 2027 gives the decision an immediate practical dimension. Baku will now have to demonstrate that the expanded format can deliver more than diplomatic recognition and declarations of shared ambition.
The underlying shift is best understood through the changing strategic value of the Caspian Sea. For much of the post-Soviet period, Central Asia and the South Caucasus were approached as distinct geopolitical regions, each with its own security concerns, political dynamics and external relationships. The Caspian was frequently treated as a boundary between them. Today, its significance increasingly derives from its capacity to connect economies, infrastructure networks and markets that were previously considered separately.
This transformation is driven by economic geography as much as by diplomacy. Central Asian states have a structural interest in diversifying their export routes and expanding access to international markets. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has invested in developing its position as a transport and logistics hub linking Central Asia with the South Caucasus, Türkiye and Europe. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route has become an important expression of this convergence. Its potential depends not on the infrastructure of any single country, but on the coordination of ports, railways, customs procedures, freight services and border crossings across several jurisdictions.
In this sense, Azerbaijan’s participation in C6 is not an externally imposed geopolitical realignment. It is an institutional response to a pattern of cooperation that has developed through trade, investment, energy partnerships and transport connectivity. The format is catching up with the geography of economic interdependence.
There is, however, an important distinction between strategic convergence and regional integration. The six countries share an interest in improving connectivity, but they do not necessarily have identical priorities, economic structures or assessments of external risks. Nor does closer cooperation automatically produce a common regional policy. C6 should therefore not be understood as the emergence of a new political bloc. Its more immediate significance lies in creating a platform through which sovereign states can coordinate specific interests without surrendering their freedom of action.
This flexibility is one of the format’s principal advantages. It also creates a challenge: cooperation must be sufficiently organised to produce results, but not so bureaucratised that it becomes detached from the priorities of participating governments and businesses.
The economic figures presented by President Ilham Aliyev illustrate why the relationship has reached a new stage. According to the Azerbaijani president, trade turnover between Azerbaijan and the Central Asian countries increased by more than 50 per cent in 2025. More than 400 companies involving Central Asian capital are operating in Azerbaijan, while joint investment funds have been established with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, each with capital amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.
These developments suggest that the relationship is becoming more institutionalised and commercially grounded. Yet rising trade volumes and investment commitments should not be mistaken for integration in themselves. Bilateral trade can expand without creating meaningful interdependence between productive sectors. Investment funds can accumulate capital without necessarily generating a pipeline of viable projects. The strategic question is whether the six countries can move from exchanging goods to jointly producing them.
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s proposal of “six economies – one product” addresses precisely this problem. The concept points towards production chains in which different countries contribute raw materials, components, technology, processing, assembly or distribution. Such arrangements can create a more durable basis for cooperation than trade alone because businesses acquire a direct commercial interest in the functioning of the entire regional system. Mirziyoyev also proposed holding a Central Asia–Azerbaijan business forum in Khiva in 2027 and establishing a platform to provide financial and technical support for joint investment projects.
The proposal is strategically relevant, but its implementation will require more than political endorsement. Cross-border production depends on predictable regulation, compatible technical standards, access to financing, efficient customs procedures and reliable logistics. Companies will not build integrated supply chains simply because governments support the concept. They will do so when the commercial benefits outweigh the additional costs and risks of operating across several jurisdictions.
This is where C6 could distinguish itself from a conventional diplomatic forum. Its value would lie in identifying concrete barriers to regional business and helping governments remove them. The initial priorities need not be grand industrial schemes. Improvements in customs processing, freight coordination, certification procedures and investment protection could have a more immediate effect on commercial activity. Over time, these measures could create the conditions for more ambitious joint manufacturing and technological projects.
Transport connectivity remains central to this process, but it should be viewed as an economic system rather than a collection of infrastructure projects. A corridor becomes competitive when it offers predictable delivery times, reasonable costs and reliable connections between markets. Additional railway capacity or port infrastructure will not deliver its full potential if border procedures remain slow or transport operators face inconsistent regulations.
Uzbekistan’s proposal to accelerate the establishment of a Council for Infrastructure Development is therefore significant. Better coordination could help the six countries align investment priorities and identify bottlenecks that undermine the performance of regional routes. For Azerbaijan, the broader objective should be to convert its position as a transit country into a source of wider economic activity. Logistics services, warehousing, processing, manufacturing and digital freight management can create additional value beyond the movement of cargo.
The same principle applies to Central Asian economies. A transport corridor should not simply carry their products towards external markets; it should also encourage the emergence of new industries and services along its route. If connectivity generates little domestic value, its economic benefits may remain narrower than the political attention devoted to it would suggest.
The C6 agenda also reflects an understanding that future regional competitiveness will depend increasingly on technological capabilities. Mirziyoyev’s proposal for a common computing infrastructure based on interconnected national data centres, alongside Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal for a declaration on the responsible use of artificial intelligence, points towards an emerging area of cooperation. These initiatives recognise that AI development is not simply a question of adopting new software. It requires computing capacity, reliable energy, skilled professionals, investment and credible rules governing data and cybersecurity.
For countries whose technological resources and domestic markets differ considerably, selective cooperation could help reduce costs and expand access to capabilities that would be difficult to develop independently. But shared infrastructure will only be sustainable if the participating states agree on practical questions of financing, access, data governance and security. The objective should be to develop complementary national capabilities, not to assume that a common digital platform can substitute for domestic investment and institutional capacity.
The emphasis on technology also reveals a wider point: the economic logic of C6 is not confined to traditional trade routes. Transport and energy infrastructure connect physical markets, while digital systems can connect businesses, research institutions and public services. If developed together, these two dimensions could reinforce one another. If pursued separately, they risk producing isolated projects with limited regional impact.
The human dimension of cooperation deserves similar attention. Tokayev’s proposals for joint cultural, sporting, scientific and tourism events, and Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov’s idea of a common visa space for foreign tourists travelling across several countries, recognise that regional connectivity cannot be sustained by infrastructure and government agreements alone. A regional marketplace that brings together products from all six states could likewise help translate political cooperation into more accessible commercial opportunities.
Historical, linguistic and cultural ties provide a useful foundation, particularly among Azerbaijan and the Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia. But shared identity should be treated as an enabling factor rather than a substitute for policy. The six countries have different social, economic and institutional circumstances, and their cooperation must accommodate these differences. People-to-people diplomacy becomes meaningful when it produces opportunities for students, researchers, entrepreneurs, tourists and professionals to interact beyond official events.
Energy offers another illustration of both the potential and the limits of the expanded format. The countries possess different resource endowments and infrastructure, creating opportunities for cooperation in hydrocarbons, electricity, renewable energy and industrial processing. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon’s proposal to consider a major regional oil refinery highlights the ambition to meet regional demand through shared industrial capacity. Yet a project of this scale would require a careful assessment of feedstock availability, transport costs, financing, demand and environmental requirements. Its strategic appeal cannot replace commercial feasibility.
This distinction matters across the entire C6 agenda. Regional cooperation will become more credible if proposals are evaluated according to their likely economic contribution, rather than their political visibility. The objective is not to maximise the number of joint declarations, councils or platforms. It is to establish a framework in which cooperation becomes easier, investment risks become more manageable and projects produce measurable benefits.
Mirziyoyev made a similar point when he argued that the number of documents adopted is less important than the implementation of decisions already taken. This is perhaps the most consequential observation for the future of the format. C6 does not necessarily need a large institutional apparatus. It needs continuity, clearly assigned responsibilities and a practical mechanism for monitoring progress.
The challenge is particularly relevant for Azerbaijan as it prepares to assume the chairmanship in 2027. Baku will inherit an ambitious agenda encompassing investment, transport, industrial cooperation, artificial intelligence, tourism and cultural exchange. Attempting to advance every proposal simultaneously could dilute the effectiveness of the chairmanship. A more useful approach would be to identify a limited number of priorities where the six countries can achieve tangible progress and demonstrate the advantages of working together.
Azerbaijan is well positioned to help advance this agenda because its interests connect the two sides of the Caspian. Its infrastructure and established relationships with Central Asian partners give it a practical stake in improving east–west connectivity. Its role, however, should not be reduced to that of a transit country or intermediary between Central Asia and Europe. The longer-term opportunity lies in helping build a regional economic space in which transport, investment, production and technology reinforce one another.
Ultimately, the transition from C5 to C6 is significant because it reflects a change in how regional cooperation is being conceived. Central Asia’s economic future is increasingly linked to developments beyond its traditional geographical boundaries, while Azerbaijan’s own connectivity ambitions depend on the depth of its relationships across the Caspian.
Azerbaijan’s 2027 chairmanship will therefore be a demanding test. Its success should be judged not by the number of initiatives announced, but by whether C6 begins to function as a practical mechanism for regional economic cooperation. That means helping turn transport corridors into productive economic networks, investment commitments into viable businesses, and political dialogue into sustained institutional cooperation. The strategic opportunity is clear. The more difficult task is to ensure that the expanded format delivers results that all six countries have a tangible interest in preserving.