CASPIA presents an interview with Dr Tolga Sakman, Chairman of the Centre for Diplomatic Affairs and Political Studies (DİPAM, Türkiye), whose areas of expertise include Turkish foreign policy, international relations and regional security.

– In your view, what should be the key strategic message of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) summit in Ankara, and what would signal that the Organisation is entering a new phase of development?

– The key strategic message should be that the Turkic World is moving beyond connectivity towards building an architecture of strategic resilience. Geopolitical changes across Eurasia, ranging from the Russia–Ukraine war to shifting trade routes and intensifying competition among major powers, have increased the importance of regional cooperation. The Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) should therefore focus on how shared political interests can be translated into tangible economic and strategic outcomes. In this regard, the Middle Corridor is of particular importance, connecting Central Asia with the Caspian region, Türkiye and European markets while also diversifying trade routes.

A new phase of development would be signalled by concrete commitments emerging from the summit in areas such as transport connectivity, trade facilitation, investment and the coordination of national economic strategies. Ultimately, the OTS should be assessed not only by the substance of its political declarations but also by its ability to expand the range of strategic options available to its member states. At the same time, we can expect steps demonstrating the Organisation’s efforts to coordinate its activities with other regional initiatives and develop common policy approaches.

– For many years, the Turkic World has been viewed primarily through the lens of shared history, culture and identity. Can the Organisation of Turkic States now transform this common identity into a more concrete political and economic framework, or do structural constraints continue to stand in the way of deeper integration?

– The shared history, culture and identity of the Turkic states provide a valuable foundation for cooperation. However, identity alone is not sufficient to sustain a deeper integration process. The main challenge is to translate this commonality into a system of complementary economic interests, diplomatic approaches and practical institutional mechanisms.

Structural constraints remain. These include differences in national development strategies, economic structures, external partnerships and approaches to regional cooperation. Such differences should not necessarily be regarded as obstacles that rule out integration. Rather, they are objective conditions that call for a flexible and pragmatic model of engagement.

Instead of attempting to replicate the models of other cooperation organisations, the OTS should develop a framework tailored to the political priorities and economic capacities of its members, starting with areas where their interests clearly converge. Trade facilitation, the coordination of customs procedures, infrastructure connectivity and joint investment can gradually transform cultural affinity into a more resilient strategic partnership.

Economic ties and trade are important unifying factors. However, political coordination is essential to ensure the continuity and further development of such cooperation. To this end, an overarching institutional framework adapted to the region’s specific characteristics, shared identity and capabilities can help establish common mechanisms for engagement.

– Türkiye and Azerbaijan have emerged as central actors in the evolving framework of Turkic cooperation. How do you assess Azerbaijan’s role in connecting Türkiye with Central Asia, particularly through transport, energy and trade networks?

– Azerbaijan occupies a central geographical and strategic position in connecting Türkiye with Central Asia, linking the Caspian region to the South Caucasus and, further, to European markets. Its importance extends beyond bilateral relations with Türkiye: Azerbaijan is a key transit country through which the economic and geopolitical potential of the Middle Corridor can be realised. It can further facilitate trade and investment between Türkiye and Central Asian economies by helping reduce logistical barriers and strengthen the reliability of east–west connections.

Having expanded its capacity for energy cooperation with Europe over the years, Azerbaijan is also continuing to develop its political relationships. In particular, the development of a Trans-Caspian pipeline could turn Baku into a major energy transit hub. Cooperation with Türkiye to ensure the security, diversification and efficient operation of such a pipeline would help Central Asian states exercise greater sovereignty over their energy resources and exports.

From a trade perspective, particularly in terms of access to open seas, Azerbaijan also plays an important role in helping Central Asian countries overcome their geographical constraints by connecting them to Turkish ports. For this potential to be realised, Caspian ports and railway links between Azerbaijan and Türkiye must also have the capacity to handle the required volumes. In this sense, Azerbaijan is not merely a bridge between two geographical regions; it is one of the key actors capable of turning the Turkic World’s connectivity potential into strategic and economic value.

– Central Asia is becoming increasingly important to both Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Do you believe the Turkic states are gradually forming a common economic space, or will cooperation continue to be driven primarily by bilateral relations and individual national interests?

– I believe the Turkic states have the potential to establish a more integrated economic space. However, two significant challenges remain.

First, the states prioritise different organisations as part of their efforts to diversify their regional policies, and it will probably take time to coordinate the activities of these organisations. The priorities of different cooperation platforms also vary, while states are reluctant to withdraw from any of them because they want to preserve the regional balance.

The second challenge is that bilateral relations are still not consistently developed within a broader framework of regional partnership. Since each state has its own economic priorities, strategic partnerships and development needs, bilateral relations will remain important.

However, bilateral cooperation does not necessarily have to compete with regional integration. On the contrary, it can serve as a building block for it. The key challenge is to connect individual partnerships through shared transport infrastructure, harmonised customs procedures, investment networks and more predictable trade rules. The Middle Corridor provides a particularly strong incentive for this approach, as its effectiveness depends on coordination among several countries rather than on the operation of a single national route.

Looking ahead, the aim should be to create an economic environment in which cooperation among the Turkic states generates added value beyond what each country could achieve independently. Under these conditions, we will also see diplomatic relations and regional policies becoming aligned at a faster pace.

– How should the Organisation of Turkic States manage its relations with major external actors such as China, Russia and the European Union? Can the Turkic states preserve their strategic autonomy while expanding economic cooperation with all three?

– The Turkic states follow a multi-vector foreign policy approach rather than choosing between competing geopolitical blocs. Russia remains a key actor in the regional security architecture and a significant political and economic partner for Central Asia. China is a major source of trade, investment and infrastructure financing. The European Union, in turn, offers substantial opportunities in trade, technology, energy and transport connectivity.

Although the nature of the United States’ interests may evolve over time, we can also see that Washington is seeking to develop economic and diplomatic relations with countries across the region. It is important to recognise that such diversification is primarily intended to prevent any single external actor from gaining excessive influence.

Strategic autonomy does not mean reducing cooperation with these partners. Rather, it means avoiding excessive dependence on any one of them while preserving the ability to make independent political and economic decisions. In this context, the OTS should function as a platform that strengthens the collective bargaining power of its members without turning into an anti-Russian, anti-Chinese or anti-European bloc.

The more diversified their partnerships and transport routes become, the greater the freedom states will have to engage with external powers in accordance with their own national and regional interests. In other words, diversifying relationships reduces the risk of dependence and the opportunities for it to emerge. Such autonomy enables the Turkic states to act in their own interests across a wide range of areas, from energy and the economy to diplomacy and security, and from bilateral relations to international organisations. This capacity is likely to expand further in the future.

– There has been growing discussion about establishing a stronger institutional framework within the Turkic World. What forms of institutionalisation would be realistic over the coming years?

– The most realistic approach is to prioritise functional integration in areas where cooperation can deliver measurable results without requiring member states to significantly curtail their national decision-making powers. Economic coordination, transport integration and joint investment mechanisms should be among the main priorities. A common investment framework could help identify regional infrastructure projects, attract public and private capital, and ensure that the benefits of improved connectivity are distributed more effectively.

Although establishing a mechanism that gives a substantial boost to trade, economic and financial cooperation is important, focusing exclusively on this area would risk turning the OTS into just another regional cooperation platform of a similar kind. While cultural cooperation is already developing naturally, education should not be overlooked either. Meanwhile, joint efforts in public administration and policymaking can help national governance systems operate in a more coordinated manner.

Security cooperation can also advance through practical engagement in areas such as information-sharing, dialogue on emerging threats, transport security and the protection of critical infrastructure. Rather than rushing prematurely to establish ambitious institutional structures, the OTS should build a track record of successful cooperation that generates both the political trust and the economic incentives necessary for deeper integration.

– How do you see the relationship between the Turkic World and the broader concept of Eurasian connectivity? Could the Turkic states eventually emerge as an independent geopolitical and economic pole in Eurasia?

– I believe we are moving towards a multi-centred system rather than a multipolar one. In this context, the Turkic World should not be viewed as a separate space isolated from the continent’s broader economic and political networks, but rather as an increasingly significant component of Eurasian connectivity.

Its geographical position creates opportunities to link Central Asia, the Caspian region, the South Caucasus, Türkiye and Europe through complementary transport, trade and energy networks. The Middle Corridor is a particularly important example, demonstrating that transport connectivity can generate not only commercial benefits but also greater strategic flexibility.

However, geographical advantages and a shared identity alone are not enough to establish an independent geopolitical and economic centre. The Turkic states will need closer economic coordination, effective institutions, sustained investment and the ability to develop common positions in areas where their interests converge. If these conditions are met, the Turkic World could become a significant cooperation network across Eurasia, enabling its members to strengthen their influence through more coordinated geopolitical action.

– What role can Azerbaijan play in ensuring that the Turkic World develops not merely as a cultural or political project, but as a practical platform for trade, investment, infrastructure and regional connectivity?

– Azerbaijan can play a decisive role by turning its strategic position in the Caspian region into a foundation for practical mechanisms of economic cooperation. Its transport infrastructure, energy links and close relations with Türkiye give it a significant role in connecting Central Asian economies with western markets.

In particular, through Trans-Caspian connectivity, Baku could emerge as a hub not only for logistics but also for economic policymaking. Azerbaijan can also help ensure that the benefits of improved connectivity extend beyond transit revenues by promoting manufacturing, logistics and regional trade through joint projects involving partners from Türkiye and Central Asia. In addition, Azerbaijan’s energy and economic ties with Europe and the Gulf countries can serve as a driving force for the OTS. This would help demonstrate that the Turkic World can deliver tangible economic benefits rather than relying predominantly on political declarations and cultural affinity.

Ultimately, Azerbaijan’s most significant contribution may lie in its ability to connect the OTS’s political vision with the practical networks through which goods, energy resources, capital and people move across Eurasia.

– Looking beyond the Ankara Summit, what is the single most important step the Organisation of Turkic States should take over the next three to five years to turn its current political momentum into tangible results?

– The most important step would be to establish a practical economic connectivity agenda centred on the Middle Corridor and backed by measurable commitments from all member states. The OTS should set clear targets, assign institutional responsibilities and regularly assess progress in reducing transit times, improving trade flows and attracting investment.

Such an agenda would also strengthen the strategic autonomy of its members by expanding their economic options and reducing excessive dependence on particular routes or partners. If the OTS can demonstrate that political cooperation leads to measurable improvements in regional connectivity and economic performance, this would mark a decisive step towards becoming a more effective actor in Eurasian affairs.

Furthermore, the Ankara Summit is also expected to advance the institutionalisation of the Organisation. This should include policy approaches designed to enable member states to align their positions as swiftly as possible.