Following the war in Karabakh, the crisis in Ukraine, and the rapid escalation of tensions surrounding Iran, the South Caucasus has found itself in an entirely new geopolitical reality. The region, which for decades existed within a relatively predictable balance of power, is now becoming a crossroads of interests among several major power centers. Old security mechanisms are rapidly eroding, while new ones have yet to take shape. Against this backdrop, not only are the foreign-policy strategies of regional states changing, but so too is the very logic of their existence amid growing international turbulence.

How has the regional security system changed since 2022? Why is Armenia increasingly reassessing its foreign-policy orientation? Can a peace agreement between Baku and Yerevan truly bring an end to the decades-long conflict, or will it merely usher in a new phase of geopolitical competition?

Arman Grigoryan, an Armenian political scientist and international security expert, discussed these and other key issues of regional politics in an interview with the CASPIA analytical center.

— Over the past five years, the South Caucasus has changed more than it did during the previous thirty. How would you describe the region’s new security architecture? Can we say that the era in which Russia was the region’s sole security guarantor has definitively come to an end?

— I would describe the current security architecture in the region as transitional, although that characterization is open to debate. Until the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine in 2022, Russia held, if not a strategic monopoly in the region, then certainly a position of strategic primacy. The West and Turkey were undoubtedly present in the South Caucasus and competed with Russia for influence, but Russia remained the dominant power.

After 2022, this status quo was significantly destabilized by two interrelated factors. First, Russia became involved in a prolonged and costly conflict that forced it to concentrate most of its resources and political attention on that war. Second, while relations between Russia and the West before the war in Ukraine could be described as conflictual and competitive, after the events of 2022 they effectively entered a phase of zero-sum confrontation.

We remain at the epicenter of this confrontation and do not know how it will end. Until then, it would be premature to speak of a fully formed security architecture. For now, only one thing can be stated with certainty: the previous status quo has collapsed, while a new order has yet to emerge. It should also be taken into account that the war in the Middle East will have a significant impact on the formation of a new security architecture in the South Caucasus, regardless of its outcome.

— How is the concept of “Real Armenia,” promoted by Nikol Pashinyan, perceived today within Armenia’s expert community? Do you believe Armenian society is psychologically ready to close the Karabakh issue once and for all?

— One thing can be stated with certainty: none of the major political parties campaigned on a revanchist platform in the most recent elections. This likely reflects the prevailing public sentiment in the country.

— Why, despite the defeat in Karabakh and numerous domestic crises, has Pashinyan managed to retain the trust of a significant portion of society?

— The answer is quite simple. The main divide in Armenian politics runs between the “former” and the “current” political forces. A significant part of Armenian society is so fearful of the return of the former elites and distrusts them so deeply that it continues to vote for Pashinyan despite the defeat in Karabakh and the generally unsatisfactory results of his administration. This logic determined the outcome of the 2021 elections and, in my view, remains relevant in 2026.

One might argue that a new political force has emerged to challenge Pashinyan: Samvel Karapetyan’s party. However, Karapetyan continued to be perceived as a politician associated with the “former” elites. There were also questions regarding the constitutionality of his potential participation in the elections. Finally, he and his team demonstrated a striking degree of political incompetence.

They failed to offer society a convincing alternative to the policies of the current government. Their election campaign was essentially reduced to promises of creating new jobs, without any coherent program of economic reform to support those promises. It is also telling that they rejected proposals from several other political forces to form a united opposition front, even though they themselves should have been seeking such consolidation.

Even a competent opposition always faces an uphill battle, since an incumbent government enjoys inherent advantages and a significant share of voters tends to favor preserving the status quo. If the opposition’s level of competence is comparable to what Karapetyan’s party demonstrated, its task becomes considerably more difficult.

— If a peace agreement is signed, will it mark the end of the conflict or merely the beginning of a new phase of competition? Which provisions of a future peace treaty could prove the most difficult to implement?

— I am not convinced that signing a peace agreement would bring the conflict to an end. In any case, Baku has repeatedly stated that the issues of interest to Azerbaijan in its relations with Armenia are not limited to the provisions of the draft peace treaty.

The use of the term “Western Azerbaijan,” discussions about the possible resettlement of 300,000 Azerbaijanis in Armenia, and proposals concerning a special operating regime for the “Zangezur Corridor” remain sensitive issues that continue to be discussed in the context of Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization.

An additional factor is the continuing imbalance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which continues to influence the negotiating process, as well as the current Armenian government’s policy of diversifying its foreign-policy and strategic partnerships.

In my view, this approach reflects Yerevan’s efforts to adapt its security system to the new regional realities. At the same time, it remains difficult to assess definitively whether cooperation with Western partners will be able to provide the expected level of long-term security guarantees.

— To what extent is this a strategic choice, and to what extent is it a forced adaptation? Can Armenia maintain functional relations with Russia while deepening cooperation with the West?

— From the first days of its independence, Armenia attempted to build its foreign policy in precisely this way. However, the situation has changed today for two reasons.

First, Armenia’s current leadership openly prioritizes integration with the West and views close ties with Russia as a threat to Armenian sovereignty. In other words, this is a strategic choice rather than a forced adaptation.

Second, maintaining good relations with both Russia and the West is becoming increasingly difficult amid their open confrontation and growing pressure from both sides to make an unequivocal choice.

— What would need to happen for even a minimum level of strategic trust to emerge between Baku and Yerevan?

— First and foremost, I would note that strategic trust cannot be created solely through the signing of documents. Documents are certainly important, but they cannot guarantee peace, trust, or lasting stability. In the long term, this will become possible only when both societies stop perceiving each other as enemies and begin to regard one another as ordinary neighbors.

Relations between Armenia and Georgia may serve as an example. Despite existing disagreements and periodically emerging tensions, neither side perceives the other, even at a subconscious level, as a threat or as an attractive target for coercive pressure. Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan will remain far from such a model for a long time. Reaching that point will require time and, in the short term, external security guarantees.

Unfortunately, today we are witnessing efforts to abandon Russia as a potential security guarantor without offering any replacement, as well as attempts to achieve far-reaching results within the shortest possible timeframe. In my view, such an approach entails serious risks.

— How do you assess the prospects for Armenian-Turkish normalization? How could the normalization of relations with Turkey change Armenia’s economic future?

— The situation with Turkey appears relatively straightforward. Its policy toward Armenia, including its willingness to normalize bilateral relations, depends directly on the progress of Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization. If Armenia and Azerbaijan reach a final agreement and sign a peace treaty, Turkey will most likely normalize relations with Armenia.

As for the economic consequences, much will depend, in my view, on Armenia’s own policies. In particular, certain segments of Armenia’s agricultural sector may suffer losses after trade barriers between the two countries are removed, and the Armenian side must be prepared for this.

At the same time, I believe that, overall and in the long term, economic cooperation is preferable to its absence. At the very least, that is what Adam Smith and David Ricardo taught us. Moreover, normalization with Turkey would provide Armenia with an alternative transit route, making access to global markets easier and less expensive.

— Recent developments surrounding Iran could alter the entire regional security system. Which risks do you consider the most likely?

— The most obvious risk remains a full-scale war. The likelihood of such a scenario is low, but it cannot be ruled out entirely. Such a development would inevitably destabilize the entire region, trigger large-scale refugee flows, and lead to a range of other severe consequences.

— Where do you see Armenia in ten years: within the European political space, as part of Eurasian integration, or as a state pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy?

— Much will depend on how the current geopolitical confrontation between the West, on the one hand, and Russia and Iran, on the other, ultimately unfolds. Regardless of its outcome, Armenia will most likely have to make a strategic choice. I am not convinced that, in an increasingly polarized international order, a multi-vector foreign policy can remain a sustainable long-term strategy.