The parliamentary elections in Armenia and the subsequent political shifts extend far beyond the country’s domestic agenda. They reflect a deeper transformation across the entire South Caucasus — a region that is gradually moving away from the logic of prolonged conflict and entering a phase of cautious post-war restructuring.
A key element of this new reality is not only the internal consolidation of power in Yerevan, but also the reconfiguration of Armenia’s foreign policy environment. The gradual advancement of the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, the emergence of new formats of transit and economic interconnectivity, and the reduction in military tensions are shaping a fundamentally different diplomatic landscape compared to just a few years ago.
Against this backdrop, the dynamics of Armenia–Turkey relations are also undergoing a noticeable shift. Normalization, long constrained by regional conflicts and geopolitical limitations, is now gaining new space for progress — albeit still in a limited, partial form. At the same time, the influence of external actors, including Turkey, the European Union, and the United States, is increasing, with each viewing the South Caucasus as a space of emerging transport and strategic opportunities.
Russia, meanwhile, remains a factor that is simultaneously losing some of its former influence while still retaining a significant role in the regional security architecture. As a result, a complex multilayered system is emerging, in which the post-war reality is gradually replacing the previous model of conflict equilibrium.
Against this backdrop, CASPIA presents an exclusive interview with Armenian political scientist and Director of the independent analytical center “Regional Studies Center” (RSC) in Yerevan, Richard Giragosian.
-What do you see as the key political takeaway from the results of the elections in Armenia? How are these results likely to shape Armenia’s domestic political landscape over the next year? To what extent could they complicate the government’s ability to advance its reformist agenda?
-These elections confirmed that Armenians are seeking to avoid a renewed conflict and remain committed to the difficult task of adapting to a new and painful post-war reality. For the re-elected Armenian government, a modified strategy has been formed in which foreign policy has been redefined and recalibrated to reflect a much narrower interpretation of statehood.
At the same time, this redefinition of statehood included a revision of Armenia’s national interests, in which Karabakh is no longer present in the government’s defense reform and national security strategy.
This represented not only a significant shift in Armenia’s geopolitical vision but also a final confirmation of a new diversification strategy. The only imperative for the Armenian government has become prioritizing the protection and development of Armenian statehood, based on the assumption that all territorial losses, including Karabakh, are final and irreversible.
Thus, the domestic political environment continues to be shaped by the complex post-war reality of loss. However, the need to adapt to this new and painful reality has pushed the government toward moving forward beyond the Karabakh issue. Given the opposition’s lack of a clear or consistent alternative strategy on Karabakh, the issue played a less decisive role in the elections. Moreover, Armenia’s post-war political landscape is characterized by a decline in the appeal of nationalism, as society is clearly exhausted by conflict and war.
Although the parliamentary elections in Armenia were embedded in a broader geopolitical context, they were first and foremost a political contest that effectively became a referendum on the country’s future. The vote confirmed the belief that Armenia is moving in the right direction, amounting to a de facto endorsement of the current government. Furthermore, the re-election provides a renewed mandate to maintain positive diplomatic momentum, normalize relations with neighbors, and further diversify Armenia’s security partnerships.
-How will the election results affect the Armenian government’s ability to advance the peace agenda with Azerbaijan? Do you expect relations with Azerbaijan to become a central topic of domestic political debate in Armenia after the elections?
-Regarding the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, we have witnessed a year of unprecedented positive developments in diplomatic engagement between the two countries, with the situation along the bilateral border becoming an important element of post-war negotiations.
This unprecedented de-escalation was a direct result of initial talks between the leaders of the two countries in Abu Dhabi in July 2025, when a preliminary agreement was reached on the text of a new draft bilateral peace treaty.
The sides also reached a compromise on an ambitious connectivity agreement, including plans to restore road and rail transit through southern Armenia.
These understandings paved the way for the Trump administration to host a meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders at a “peace summit” at the White House. This ceremony in August 2025 concluded with the parafing of the bilateral peace treaty and the signing of a new US-backed connectivity agreement, ambitiously titled the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP).
Since then, the situation on the border has remained generally stable, and following Azerbaijan’s unilateral step to lift restrictions on trade and transit with Armenia, border delimitation talks are expected to be significantly less confrontational and far more promising.
Moreover, the imperative of “connectivity” is central to long-term stabilization and security. Despite everything, there is now a rare opportunity for regional cooperation, where the post-war geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus offers more hope than threat. In concrete terms, this opportunity stems from the potential restoration of regional trade and transport links.
The issue of restoring regional trade and transport represents a clear “win-win” scenario for post-war stability, where economic and trade opportunities matter for all countries in the region. It is also critical for rebuilding deterrence through economic interdependence, helping to prevent a renewed outbreak of hostilities. In this sense, economic incentives and trade opportunities have gained an unprecedented level of importance that the region has long lacked.
-To what extent do you think the election results will affect relations between Yerevan and Moscow? Can we speak of a further weakening of Russian influence in Armenia after these elections, or does its role remain stable despite political changes?
-Armenia is seeking to resist the gravitational pull of Russia’s “orbit,” and two factors are important here. First, there is a window of opportunity, as Russia remains distracted and overstretched by its failed war against Ukraine. Second, Armenia benefits from a parallel window of opportunity due to unprecedented Western (and European) interest in the country. In this context, Armenia is increasingly viewed as a more reliable democracy with higher strategic importance than before.
Armenia’s turn toward the West is not merely a reactive response to Russia, and there are several reasons for it. First, the core ideas of the 2018 “Velvet Revolution,” which brought Nikol Pashinyan to power, were much closer to European values as a rare example of a successful non-violent “people’s power” movement. Moreover, with the strengthening of genuinely free and fair elections, Armenia’s Western orientation has become a natural trend, developing more in spite of Russia than because of it.
The second factor is the broader contrast with Russia. Put simply, there is no real competition: Russia’s presence in the South Caucasus, and especially in Armenia, has historically relied on coercion, pressure, and threats, whereas the EU and the West have acted through invitation, attraction, and “strategic pull.” The third factor has been further strengthened after Russia’s failed war against Ukraine and its arrogant treatment of Armenia, which has reinforced perceptions of Russia as an unreliable security partner.
-To what extent did Russia influence the political and public atmosphere in Armenia during the election campaign, and can this factor be considered decisive in shaping pre-election dynamics?
-Faced with a new and painful post-war reality, Armenia’s strategy has been redefined and recalibrated to reflect a narrower interpretation of statehood. At the same time, this redefinition of statehood has included a revision of national interests, in which Karabakh has disappeared from defense reform and national security strategy.
This marked not only an important geopolitical shift but also a final confirmation of a diversification strategy. The government’s sole priority has become the development and protection of Armenian statehood, based on the assumption that all territorial losses, including Karabakh, are final and irreversible.
In addition to its important strategic partnership with the United States, Armenia also benefits from active European engagement policy, which is less provocative for Moscow and more pragmatic than American support. In particular, EU policy includes two significant elements: the unprecedented deployment (and recent two-year extension) of the EU civilian observation mission in Armenia, and the creation of the first-ever European security assistance package for the country.
Each of these initiatives represents an innovative form of engagement with a state that still hosts a Russian military base and remains a member of the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union. Therefore, while the EU is tightening its approach toward Georgia, in Armenia it is expected to deepen engagement, focusing on supporting democratic achievements and strengthening resilience against potential regression.
For the EU, however, Armenia’s resilience is the most striking feature. Despite numerous challenges, the country remains committed to democratization and reform. In the long term, Armenia has a strategic advantage — a rare resource of legitimacy based on democratic institutions and relatively free elections, as well as a higher level of stability than most of its neighbors. As a result, the prospects for Armenian democracy and reform remain strong.
-If these elections are seen as a political test for Nikol Pashinyan, what message did voters send to the Prime Minister? Does Armenian society support his course or demand a revision?
-The post-war political landscape of Armenia is a space where nationalism no longer resonates with a society that is clearly exhausted by conflict and war. The re-election of the Pashinyan government effectively became a referendum on the country’s future. The vote confirmed the belief that Armenia is moving in the right direction and amounted to an endorsement of the current leadership.
Furthermore, the re-election provides a renewed mandate to continue positive diplomatic engagement, normalize relations with neighbors, and further diversify Armenia’s security partnerships.
-Can it be argued that progress in the Armenia–Azerbaijan settlement became a key external factor that effectively “unblocked” the normalization process between Armenia and Turkey?
-Progress in the Armenia–Azerbaijan settlement has been one of the key external factors significantly accelerating the Armenia–Turkey normalization process. It has reduced political constraints on Turkey and weakened Ankara’s long-standing argument that progress with Armenia was impossible without sustainable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. With de-escalation and emerging agreements between Yerevan and Baku, Turkey has gained more diplomatic room for maneuver.
At the same time, explaining the dynamic solely through the Azerbaijani factor would be insufficient. Turkey is also acting based on its own strategic interests, including strengthening its regional role, developing transport and logistics corridors, expanding economic interconnectivity, and increasing its influence in the South Caucasus. In this context, normalization with Armenia becomes part of a broader regional strategy.
Thus, Armenia–Azerbaijan progress is not the only driver, but rather a factor that has opened a political window of opportunity, coinciding with Ankara’s own strategic calculations.
-How sustainable is the current dynamic of partial border opening between Armenia and Turkey, considering that a model of “partial normalization” could become a long-term compromise rather than a transitional phase toward full opening?
-The current model of partial border opening is highly sustainable in the short term, as it allows both sides to demonstrate progress without creating significant domestic political risks. The limited format, which includes access only for certain categories such as third-country citizens and diplomatic passport holders, makes the process manageable and politically less sensitive.
However, its future trajectory remains open. One scenario is that partial normalization could become a long-term compromise and a stable new format of relations without moving toward full border opening. This would be possible if political constraints and caution on both sides persist.
Another scenario envisions a gradual expansion of the format, where partial opening functions as an intermediate stage that could eventually lead to broader access, restored transport links, and full normalization.
Thus, the current dynamic is stable, but its final outcome will depend on the evolution of the Armenia–Azerbaijan process and the willingness of Turkey and Armenia to move toward deeper normalization.