Since 2023, the South Caucasus has entered a new phase of development in which not only political arrangements but also the very logic of regional security is being reshaped. The weakening of traditional centers of influence, growing competition among major powers, rivalry over transport routes, and the search for a new regional architecture are compelling Yerevan to reassess its long-standing foreign policy priorities. Against this backdrop, the key question is no longer limited to the prospects of signing a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Equally important is understanding what the region will look like after peace, who will set the rules of the game, and whether the South Caucasus can move from geopolitical rivalry toward economic cooperation.

To discuss how Armenia's strategic outlook is evolving, what challenges will remain even after a peace agreement is signed, why transport projects have become an integral part of broader geopolitical competition, and what the regional balance of power may look like in the coming years, CASPIA spoke with Armenian political analyst, expert on international relations and regional security, and Senior Research Fellow at the Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia (APRI Armenia), Benyamin Poghosyan.

– Mr. Poghosyan, since 2023 Armenia's regional environment has changed significantly. To what extent do you believe Yerevan's current policy reflects an independent strategic choice, and to what extent is it shaped by the new regional balance of power?

- Armenia began diversifying its foreign policy in 2022. This was driven by several factors simultaneously: the gradual decline of Russia's presence and influence in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan's efforts to revise the status quo established after the 2020 Second Karabakh War, and the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West following the war in Ukraine.

Over the past four years, Armenia has sought to adapt its foreign policy to a rapidly changing security environment by maintaining a delicate balance among the United States, the European Union, Russia, and Iran, while simultaneously continuing peace negotiations with Azerbaijan and pursuing the normalization of relations with Türkiye.

– If Armenia and Azerbaijan sign a peace agreement, which issues do you believe will remain the most difficult to resolve? What could become the main source of tension once the conflict is formally over?

- Once a peace agreement is signed, which would pave the way for the full unblocking of regional communications, including the reopening of the Armenia, Türkiye border and Armenia's access to Iran through Nakhchivan, the key unresolved issues in bilateral relations will be the delimitation and demarcation of the interstate border, as well as the fate of Armenian prisoners of war held in Azerbaijan (*Citizens of the Republic of Armenia accused of encroachments on peace against humanity, war criminals and the consequences of Armenia's military agression against Azerbaijan- Ed) .

Following the events of 2021 and 2022, Azerbaijan established control over several territories that Armenia estimates exceed 200 square kilometers. Over the past four years, Azerbaijan has carried out extensive fortification works in these areas. In addition, 19 Armenian prisoners of war remain in Azerbaijani prisons (*Citizens of the Republic of Armenia accused of encroachments on peace against humanity, war criminals and the consequences of Armenia's military agression against Azerbaijan- Ed/), making this another issue that will require further negotiations and resolution.

– Can a peace agreement remain sustainable without effective implementation mechanisms? In your view, what will constitute the foundation of security after such an agreement is signed: international guarantees, economic interdependence, or a new balance of power?

- The key factors underpinning long-term stability and security after the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan will be the balance of power, both between Armenia and Azerbaijan themselves and among regional and external actors, as well as economic interdependence.

Without these two elements, a peace agreement alone cannot guarantee lasting stability or security. This is precisely why the full unblocking of regional transport links is an essential prerequisite for achieving durable peace and sustainable regional stability.

– How prepared is Armenian society to embrace the idea of long-term coexistence with Azerbaijan? What has changed in public perceptions since 2023, and which attitudes remain deeply entrenched?

- According to a survey conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in Armenia in May 2026, the share of respondents who consider Azerbaijan to be Armenia's primary political threat has declined. While 93 percent of respondents held this view in March 2023, the figure had fallen to 73 percent by May 2026. This indicates a gradual transformation in Armenian public perceptions of Azerbaijan.

At the same time, the use of concepts such as the "Zangezur Corridor" and "Western Azerbaijan" continues to be perceived ambiguously within Armenia, complicating efforts to build mutual trust between the two sides.

– Following the 2026 parliamentary elections, Nikol Pashinyan secured the opportunity to continue his current political course. In your view, what will be his greatest challenge: bringing the peace process to completion, carrying out constitutional reform, or explaining Armenia's new foreign policy reality to the public?

- The completion of the peace process depends primarily on Azerbaijan. According to its official position, the Armenian government remains ready to sign and ratify a peace agreement and to move toward the full normalization of relations with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye.

If Baku demonstrates flexibility regarding its precondition that Armenia amend its Constitution and supports further progress in the Armenia–Türkiye normalization process, the region may finally break out of the current deadlock. Under the present domestic political circumstances, however, any attempt to accelerate constitutional amendments under pressure stemming from the Azerbaijani factor would only deepen societal polarization and could trigger another political crisis, with negative consequences for both the peace process and regional normalization.

– Armenia's relationship with Russia has changed significantly in recent years. Do you believe Moscow is genuinely losing its influence in Armenia, or is the nature of that influence simply evolving? Which Russian levers of influence remain the most effective today?

- Over the past several years, we have witnessed a significant decline in military-technical cooperation between Russia and Armenia. Whereas Russia was Armenia's principal defense partner just eight years ago, today it has become only one among several partners, with India and France now occupying the leading positions.

Bilateral trade expanded sharply between 2022 and 2024, reaching approximately US$12.5 billion. However, trade volumes fell by roughly 50 percent in 2025, and this downward trend has continued throughout 2026.

Nevertheless, Russia maintains a military presence in Armenia through its base in Gyumri and the deployment of Russian border guards. Moscow also retains substantial economic leverage, including natural gas supplies, remittances from Armenians working in Russia, access for Armenian labor migrants to the Russian job market, and exports of wheat and other essential goods to Armenia.

– If Armenia continues to distance itself from Russia's security system, how realistic is it to find a viable alternative? Is the West capable of providing Yerevan with security guarantees that could genuinely replace Russia's former role? And can European integration become an independent strategic project for Armenia, or will it inevitably be viewed through the prism of Russia–West confrontation?

-Under the current circumstances, I do not believe that any Western country or international organization is prepared to offer Armenia legally binding security guarantees.

-At the same time, the U.S. economic presence—through initiatives such as TRIPP, investments in the mining sector, and the development of artificial intelligence infrastructure, could serve as a deterrent and reduce the likelihood of future escalations.

As for European integration, Armenia remains far from joining the European Union and may ultimately never become a member.

– TRIPP has become the focal point of virtually every discussion about the future regional architecture. In your view, what is truly at stake in the competition over transport routes through this territory? And how do you assess Washington's primary strategic objective in the region?

- The Joe Biden administration largely viewed its engagement in the South Caucasus, including the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, through the lens of geopolitics and relations with Russia.

The Donald Trump administration, by contrast, appears to be placing equal emphasis on both geopolitics and geoeconomics. It seeks to establish an additional transport route linking Central Asia with Europe while simultaneously expanding the U.S. presence along the Armenia–Iran border and in a region that Russia has traditionally regarded as part of its sphere of influence.

Armenia's Syunik Province has the potential to serve as a secure transit corridor for both East–West and North–South transportation routes. The South Caucasus as a whole would benefit if the area through which these future transport corridors pass does not become yet another arena of geopolitical rivalry.

– Armenia is simultaneously developing relations with the European Union, the United States, Iran, and Türkiye while maintaining economic ties with Russia. How long can Yerevan sustain such a multi-vector foreign policy, and does it genuinely expand Armenia's room for strategic maneuver?

- In today's increasingly unstable international environment, many small and medium-sized states are seeking to diversify their foreign policy options and avoid becoming firmly aligned with any single alliance system. Armenia is no exception.

Yerevan will be able to maintain its current foreign policy course until Russia, the United States, and the European Union reach an agreement on a new European security architecture.

– How do you envision the South Caucasus by 2030? Ultimately, who will shape the rules of the game in the region: the South Caucasus states themselves or the major external powers?

- Forecasting developments over the next four years is extremely difficult given the rapidly evolving geopolitical environment.

Nevertheless, I expect the South Caucasus to remain a region where the interests of regional and external actors intersect and compete, and where various transport corridors will continue to vie with one another.

Under these circumstances, the institutionalization of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, together with the full unblocking of regional communications, will play an important role in strengthening the agency of the South Caucasus states.

– Finally, what strategic mistake must Armenia avoid at all costs today? Conversely, what decision taken in the coming years could fundamentally reshape the country's position in the region?

- Armenia must avoid taking any steps that could turn the country into yet another arena of confrontation between Russia and the West. Instead, it should continue focusing on economic development, strengthening the effectiveness of its state institutions, and modernizing its armed forces.