Global politics is undergoing a profound transformation, and with it, the strategic importance of entire regions is being redefined. Just a few decades ago, the South Caucasus was viewed primarily as an arena of competition among Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the West. Today, however, China is emerging as an increasingly significant factor in the region. Beijing has long since ceased to be merely an economic superpower. By steadily expanding its political, technological, and investment footprint, it is becoming one of the principal architects of a new international order.

How is China's foreign policy evolving? How realistic are the expectations of the South Caucasus states regarding China's growing presence? Could the region become a vital component of the emerging Eurasian architecture, or will its significance continue to be defined primarily by its role as a transit corridor?

In an exclusive interview with CASPIA, Georgian political analyst, sinologist, China foreign policy expert, invited lecturer at Tbilisi State University, and researcher of China–South Caucasus relations Shalva Chikhladze shared his perspective on these issues.

— In recent years, China has increasingly been viewed not only as an economic powerhouse but also as one of the architects of a new world order. In your view, how is Beijing's foreign policy evolving amid intensifying strategic competition with the United States, and what implications could this transformation have for the South Caucasus?

— Following the launch of the Reform and Opening-Up policy in 1978, China concentrated primarily on economic modernization while adhering to the strategy of "keeping a low profile" and avoiding active involvement in international crises. Beijing became one of the principal beneficiaries of the existing international order, maintaining a cautious and pragmatic foreign policy.

The situation changed after Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. China abandoned its low-profile approach and emerged as a fully-fledged global power. Today, Beijing seeks to strengthen those elements of the international system that align with its interests while peacefully reshaping rules and norms that conflict with its long-term strategic objectives. China is no longer merely "the world's factory" but has become one of the leading global powers.

For the South Caucasus, China's growing engagement is primarily linked to securing resilient global supply chains. Beijing has introduced visa-free travel with all three countries of the region, established Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships with Azerbaijan and Georgia, and a Strategic Partnership with Armenia.

All three South Caucasus states are interested in expanding cooperation with China. However, their expectations often exceed Beijing's actual strategic priorities. This is precisely why a more realistic approach and deeper analytical assessment are needed.

— Traditionally, China has avoided active political involvement in the South Caucasus, focusing mainly on economic cooperation. Has this approach changed?

— Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, China was among the first countries to recognize the independence of the South Caucasus states. However, throughout the 1990s, Beijing remained focused on domestic modernization and showed little interest in becoming actively involved in regional politics.

Broadly speaking, this approach remains unchanged today. China has no interest in political micromanagement of the region. Instead, it continues to prioritize economic cooperation, people-to-people exchanges, and the development of transport and logistics infrastructure.

At the same time, over the past decades, Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan have come to better understand China's importance as one of the world's major centers of power. From Beijing's perspective, the South Caucasus is valuable primarily as a reliable logistics hub and a stable regional partner.

All three countries are pursuing increasingly multi-vector foreign policies, viewing East Asia as an additional direction for economic diversification. Nevertheless, realism remains essential: strategically, the South Caucasus still does not occupy the same place in China's foreign policy as it does for Russia, Turkey, Iran, or the Western powers.

— Amid growing instability along traditional transportation routes, the importance of the Middle Corridor has increased significantly. Has this route truly become a strategic priority for China?

— Recent years have demonstrated the critical importance of resilient transport routes. Military conflicts across various parts of Eurasia have elevated the importance of the Middle Corridor, which, following the end of the Karabakh conflict, has become one of the safest transport routes connecting East Asia and Europe.

Additional advantages include stable relations among Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, as well as growing railway and container traffic along the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway.

However, substantial limitations remain. The Middle Corridor still lags behind the Trans-Siberian Railway in terms of integration. Differences in railway gauge, multiple customs procedures, and the need to cross the Caspian Sea all increase transportation costs and transit times.

If the countries along the route succeed in harmonizing customs procedures and tariff policies, the Middle Corridor could become competitive not only during geopolitical crises but also under normal economic conditions.

— Since Georgia and China signed their Strategic Partnership Agreement, expert discussions have intensified considerably. How do you assess the practical outcomes of this partnership?

— It is important to understand the specifics of Chinese diplomatic culture. Unlike the Western understanding of strategic partnerships, China employs a multi-layered system of bilateral relations in which political declarations and flexible mechanisms of cooperation play a particularly important role.

The establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Georgia and China was a logical step. However, following the deterioration of Tbilisi's relations with the European Union and the United States, many interpreted this development as a possible geopolitical shift in Georgia's foreign policy orientation.

In practical terms, several tangible results have already been achieved. A mutual visa-free regime has been introduced, the number of direct flights has increased, tourism exchanges are expanding, and cargo transportation volumes continue to grow.

Nevertheless, Chinese investment remains relatively modest despite the existence of a Free Trade Agreement. Another persistent challenge is the limited structure of Georgian exports to China, which has remained largely unchanged for many years. Georgian businesses therefore need to identify new market opportunities and expand their presence in China.

— Could deeper cooperation between Georgia and China complicate Tbilisi's relations with the European Union and the United States?

— Today's international system differs fundamentally from that of the Cold War era. Countries are now deeply interconnected economically, making rigid choices between East and West increasingly unrealistic.

For Georgia, it is strategically important to preserve integration with Western security institutions while simultaneously expanding economic cooperation with leading Asian powers, including China.

The challenge lies not in Georgia's relationship with Beijing itself but rather in the deterioration of dialogue with Brussels and Washington in recent years. This has created the perception that Georgia's foreign policy orientation is changing.

In the long run, Georgia should restore constructive relations with its Western partners while maintaining pragmatic cooperation with China that serves its geoeconomic interests.

— There is growing discussion about competition between China's Belt and Road Initiative and the Western-backed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Are these projects truly competing with one another, and what role could the South Caucasus play?

— At this stage, it is premature to speak of direct competition. Unlike China, India has not yet fully moved into the implementation phase of IMEC, meaning there is currently no genuine rivalry between these infrastructure initiatives.

If India becomes more actively involved in developing transport infrastructure in the future, this is more likely to strengthen the South Caucasus' transit potential. Competition among transport corridors generally encourages greater logistical efficiency, infrastructure development, and investment. Therefore, the emergence of alternative routes should be viewed more as an opportunity than a threat.

— If the Zangezur Transport Corridor is eventually implemented, how attractive could it become for China? Could Beijing emerge as one of its future investors or major users?

— China could certainly have an interest in the project. However, expectations of rapid and large-scale Chinese involvement should remain realistic. Beijing has traditionally taken a cautious approach toward investing in transport infrastructure in the South Caucasus.

The Anaklia Deep-Sea Port project illustrates this well, as the Georgian authorities opted for a more flexible management model aimed at attracting a broader range of international operators.

The single most important factor determining the region's attractiveness remains the level of coordination among the South Caucasus states. Major international investors are far more willing to invest where political predictability, coordinated policies, and regional cooperation exist.

— In recent years, China has significantly expanded its presence in Central Asia. How does this affect the strategic importance of the South Caucasus? Does Beijing view the Caucasus as a separate region or primarily as an extension of the Central Asian route?

— The current limitations of the Middle Corridor mean that China still regards it primarily as an alternative route whose strategic value increases during periods of regional instability.

At the same time, China's perception of the South Caucasus has changed considerably. Whereas the region was once viewed largely as part of the post-Soviet space, it is now increasingly seen as a natural bridge connecting Europe and Asia.

From a logistics perspective, the South Caucasus is an extension of Central Asia. Without seamless connectivity between these two regions, Eurasian transport routes cannot function effectively. If Central Asia represents the core of the transport system, then the South Caucasus serves as its gateway to European markets.

— Despite considerable interest in Chinese investment, the volume of Chinese capital in the South Caucasus remains relatively modest. What is preventing a more substantial inflow of investment?

— Despite the positive momentum of recent years, Chinese investment in the region remains limited.

The South Caucasus countries have already achieved a sufficient degree of political stability to jointly promote investment initiatives. One promising idea would be to establish a permanent "3+1" format (South Caucasus + China), bringing together political dialogue, expert communities, and the business sector.

The region also needs to develop a deeper understanding of the Chinese market, expand export opportunities, harmonize customs procedures, and strengthen direct business-to-business ties.

Following the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese companies have become considerably more cautious in making overseas investment decisions, while state oversight of the economy has also increased. As a result, attracting Chinese capital now requires a more systematic and long-term approach.

— This year marks more than a decade since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative. How has the philosophy of the project evolved?

— Over the past decade, the Belt and Road Initiative has undergone a profound transformation. While it initially focused primarily on large-scale transport and energy infrastructure, China is now shifting toward a more selective model of cooperation centered on technology, innovation, and economic efficiency.

Experience with major infrastructure projects has revealed substantial financial and political risks. Consequently, Beijing has embraced the principle of "small but effective," reducing the scale of projects while placing greater emphasis on their commercial viability.

The priority is gradually shifting toward digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence, telecommunications, data centers, satellite technologies, digital trade, and green energy. At the same time, China has stopped financing coal-fired power projects abroad and has significantly increased investment in renewable energy, battery manufacturing, and electric vehicles.

This transformation reflects broader changes within China's own economy. Today, Beijing increasingly focuses on exporting technology, digital solutions, and high-value industrial products rather than relying solely on infrastructure construction.

As a result, the Belt and Road Initiative is steadily evolving from a predominantly infrastructure-focused project into a platform for technological, digital, and innovation-driven cooperation, where the quality of investment, sustainable development, and the establishment of new international technological standards have become the defining priorities.