Following the events of 2020–2023, the South Caucasus has found itself at a point of profound geopolitical transformation. The region, which for decades was perceived as a space of "frozen conflicts" and post-Soviet uncertainty, is now increasingly viewed as one of the key nodes of the new Eurasian architecture. The shifting balance of power, the growing importance of transport and energy corridors, intensifying competition between global centers of power, and the formation of new regional connections have transformed the South Caucasus from the periphery of global politics into an area of ​​strategic intersection of interests.

At the same time, the region remains a site of complex strategic rivalry. Here, the interests of Russia, Turkey, Iran, the United States, the European Union, and China intersect. Security issues are increasingly intertwined with energy, logistics, and technology, while global crises - from Ukraine to the Middle East - are increasingly impacting regional processes.

Against this backdrop, Azerbaijan is gradually strengthening its role not only as a regional state but also as an independent geopolitical actor, capable of influencing processes far beyond the South Caucasus. The development of the Middle Corridor, energy cooperation with Europe, deepening ties with Central Asia and the Turkic world, and a desire to maintain a multi-vector foreign policy course make Baku one of the most prominent players in the new Eurasian dynamics.

CASPIA presents an exclusive interview with American professor of international politics and expert on the geopolitics of Eurasia, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, Houman Sadri. Houman Sadri, PhD, holds a PhD from the University of Virginia and is a former research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. He is the author of six academic books and over 100 academic and analytical publications on international security, geoeconomics, energy, and strategic planning. He is also a professor at the University of Central Florida, one of the largest universities in the United States, and has consulted for U.S. government agencies, international organizations, and the private sector on security, development, and geopolitical analysis.

- After Azerbaijan regained control over Karabakh, the region entered a completely new phase.  How, in your opinion, will the architecture of the South Caucasus change after 2023? Can we say that the era of the post-Soviet status quo in the Caucasus has finally ended?

- In my view, the post‑2023 South Caucasus is transitioning away from the post‑Soviet conflict‑management architecture toward a more fluid, power‑political order shaped by shifting balances rather than frozen arrangements. The collapse of the Minsk Group framework, the reduction of Russia’s arbitral authority, and Azerbaijan’s restoration of control over Karabakh together signal the end of the post‑1991 status quo. What is emerging is not yet a stable new order, but a post‑post‑Soviet phase in which sovereignty, connectivity, and regional bargaining - rather than inherited mediation formats- will define the Caucasus architecture.

- How realistic is it today to form a sustainable system of regional cooperation between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia without the external dominance of major powers?

- Drawing on the European analogy, a purely regional, self‑sustaining cooperation system in the South Caucasus is conceivable but not yet realistic under present conditions. Unlike post‑war Western Europe, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia still face unresolved trust deficits, asymmetric threat perceptions, and divergent external orientations, which make insulation from major‑power influence difficult. That said, functional cooperation - especially on connectivity, trade, energy transit, and technical issues - could gradually emerge if sovereignty is mutually respected and benefits are clearly shared, potentially laying the groundwork for deeper regionalism over time. The EU experience suggests cooperation is possible after strategic realities stabilize, not before.

- Why has the South Caucasus in recent years become an arena for simultaneous energy, transport, and military-political competition?

- The South Caucasus has become a zone of overlapping energy, transport, and military - political competition because it sits at the intersection of global hydrocarbon dependency and intensifying great - power rivalry. Its oil and gas corridors, east - west transport routes, and proximity to Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Europe make control over the region strategically valuable at the same time that traditional security guarantees have weakened. As a result, infrastructure projects, energy flows, and military leverage are increasingly intertwined, turning the South Caucasus into a multifunctional geopolitical chokepoint rather than a peripheral post‑Soviet space.

- How do you assess the transformation of Azerbaijan's role - from a regional state to an independent geopolitical power?

- Viewed positively, Azerbaijan’s transformation reflects a deliberate shift from vulnerability to strategic autonomy rather than a sudden assertion of power. By consolidating sovereignty, leveraging energy and transit assets, modernizing its military, and diversifying diplomatic platforms - from the EU and Turkey to the Global South and NAM - Azerbaijan has reduced external dependency while expanding its room for maneuver. Today, it functions less as a passive regional actor and more as an independent geopolitical node capable of shaping outcomes, setting agendas, and balancing among larger powers on its own terms, even though it remains a middle power rather than a global one.

- Azerbaijan is simultaneously building relations with Turkey, Russia, the EU, the US, China, and the countries of Central Asia. How difficult is it to maintain such a strategic balance today?

- Maintaining this strategy is increasingly difficult but still manageable because Azerbaijan operates in a fragmented, competitive international system where interests often collide rather than align. Balancing Turkey and Russia, engaging the EU and the U.S. without formal alignment, expanding ties with China, and reconnecting with Central Asia requires constant calibration, diplomatic discipline, and credibility as a reliable partner. The difficulty lies not in diversification itself but in preventing any single relationship from becoming dominant - yet Azerbaijan’s record shows that institutional flexibility, energy leverage, and issue‑based cooperation have so far allowed it to sustain this balance better than most comparable middle powers.

- Many experts talk about the emergence of a new type of "middle power." Can Azerbaijan be considered an example of such an emerging middle power?

- Yes - Azerbaijan can credibly be seen as an emerging “new‑type” middle power, as the term is now used in international relations. It does not rely on size or bloc leadership, but on strategic positioning, issue‑based diplomacy, energy and connectivity leverage, and agenda‑setting in selective institutions (such as NAM). What distinguishes Azerbaijan is its ability to convert regional assets into global relevance - acting neither as a follower of great powers nor as a purely regional state, but as a flexible, sovereignty‑centered actor shaping outcomes across multiple theaters at once.

- How is Washington's perception of Azerbaijan changing following the energy crisis in Europe and changes in global transportation routes? Do you think the West fully understands Azerbaijan's strategic importance for Eurasia?

- Washington’s perception of Azerbaijan has become more pragmatic and interest‑driven since Europe’s energy shock and the reconfiguration of Eurasian transport routes: Azerbaijan is increasingly seen less as a peripheral post‑Soviet case and more as a reliable supplier, transit hub, and stabilizing connector between Europe and Asia. That said, the West still tends to view Azerbaijan sector-by-sector - energy one year, connectivity the next - rather than fully integrating its role into a coherent Eurasian strategy. In this sense, Western understanding of Azerbaijan’s structural strategic importance is improving, but it remains incomplete and reactive, rather than systematic and long‑term.

- Is Russia's position in the region gradually weakening, or does Moscow still retain key levers of influence?

- Moscow’s position in the South Caucasus is weaker than it was a decade ago, but it has by no means disappeared. Russia has lost key instruments of agenda‑setting and mediation - most notably its monopoly over conflict management and its credibility as an impartial guarantor -largely due to overextension elsewhere and changing regional dynamics. At the same time, Russia still retains important levers of influence, including military presence, economic ties, residual security arrangements, and its ability to act as a spoiler when its interests are directly challenged. In short, Russia is no longer the region’s dominant architect, but it remains a consequential - if more constrained - power in the evolving South Caucasus order.

- What strategy is the US currently pursuing in the South Caucasus - containment of Russia, competition with China, or an attempt to create a new geopolitical corridor?

- The United States is pursuing a layered and pragmatic strategy rather than a single, clearly defined doctrine in the South Caucasus. Washington’s primary short‑term focus remains limiting Russia’s ability to dominate outcomes, especially in energy security and conflict mediation, while indirectly managing China’s growing economic footprint through alternative connectivity projects rather than direct confrontation. At the same time, the U.S. supports the emergence of new East - West corridors - linking the Caspian, Black Sea, and Europe - as a way to enhance regional resilience and strategic optionality without assuming the role of a hegemonic architect. In practice, this results in selective engagement and corridor‑building, not containment in the classical Cold War sense nor a comprehensive grand strategy for Eurasia.

- Following the sanctions pressure on Russia, interest in the Middle Corridor has sharply increased. How interested is China in Azerbaijan as a strategic transit hub? Could the South Caucasus become a key link in China's Belt and Road Initiative in the coming years?

- China’s interest in Azerbaijan as a transit hub has clearly increased, but it remains selective and pragmatic rather than transformative. Under sanctions pressure on Russia, Beijing sees Azerbaijan and the Middle Corridor as a useful hedge - a complementary route that reduces over‑reliance on the northern Russian corridor without replacing it.

That said, the South Caucasus is unlikely to become the central spine of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, but it can realistically emerge as a strategic secondary artery. Azerbaijan’s value lies in its political stability, infrastructure readiness, and ability to connect the Caspian, Central Asia, Turkey, and Europe - making it attractive for diversification and risk management rather than as China’s primary Eurasian gateway.

- How concerned are the US and EU about China's growing economic presence in Eurasia? Do you see signs of new geoeconomic competition between China, the EU, and Russia for transportation routes through the Caspian region?

-The US and the EU are clearly concerned - but not alarmist - about China’s expanding economic footprint in Eurasia, viewing it primarily through a risk‑management and resilience lens rather than outright confrontation. European and American policymakers increasingly frame China’s role as a challenge to standards, transparency, and strategic dependencies, especially after the Russia sanctions shock exposed the vulnerability of over‑centralized corridors. Yes, there are clear signs of emerging geoeconomic competition in the Caspian - South Caucasus space, but it is asymmetric and indirect.

China seeks diversification and redundancy for trade flows, favoring flexible, cost - efficient routes rather than political leadership. The EU is responding by promoting alternative connectivity initiatives (Global Gateway, energy and transport partnerships) to ensure access without dependence on either Russia or China. Russia, meanwhile, is trying to preserve relevance by retaining control over legacy corridors and positioning itself as an indispensable security and transit actor despite declining leverage.

Rather than a zero‑sum contest, the Caspian region has become a competitive transit marketplace, where routes overlap and actors hedge against one another. In this environment, the South Caucasus - especially Azerbaijan - benefits from being a platform of choice rather than a camp follower, even as great - power economic competition gradually intensifies.

- What role will Central Asia and the Turkic states play in this logic?

- Central Asia and the Turkic states play a structural, not merely auxiliary, role in this emerging geoeconomic logic. They are the source region for east–west flows - energy, commodities, and trade - and their willingness to diversify routes away from Russia gives the Middle Corridor real momentum.

More importantly, the growing coordination among Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and others) creates a civilizational‑geographic backbone for connectivity that is politically flexible and less dominated by any single great power. In this sense, Central Asia provides the economic mass, Türkiye offers the western gateway, and Azerbaijan acts as the strategic hinge linking them - making Turkic cooperation one of the few regional logics capable of sustaining Eurasian connectivity without exclusive external dominance.

- Iran is extremely sensitive to changes in the balance of power in the South Caucasus. What specifically worries Tehran most?

-Tehran is most troubled by any shift that weakens its strategic buffer and limits its room for maneuver in the South Caucasus. Specifically, the Islamic Republic worries about the erosion of the Armenia link that has historically given it access northward without relying on Türkiye or Azerbaijan; the potential emergence of a contiguous Turkic corridor connecting Central Asia - Azerbaijan - Türkiye, which Tehran fears could marginalize Iran economically and geopolitically; and greater Western or Israeli presence near its northern borders, which it interprets through a hard security lens.

More broadly, Tehran’s sensitivity reflects concern that a reconfigured South Caucasus could bypass Iranian transit role, dilute its regional relevance, and expose internal vulnerabilities—especially in a context where sovereignty narratives and connectivity politics are becoming more decisive than ideological alignment.

- How dangerous is the tension between Iran and Israel for the region? Is there a risk that Middle Eastern crises will increasingly spill over into the South Caucasus?

- The Iran - Israel confrontation is dangerous for the South Caucasus, but not determinative - at least for now. The risk lies less in direct military spillover and more in indirect securitization of the region, where local balances become entangled in Middle Eastern rivalries.

Islamic Republic’s primary fear is that Israel’s security footprint - especially intelligence, technology, and defense cooperation with Azerbaijan - could translate into strategic encirclement near its northern border. Israel, for its part, views Azerbaijan as a peripheral but valuable strategic partner, not a frontline theater. As long as this interaction remains calibrated and non‑kinetic, escalation risks are manageable.

That said, the danger of spillover is growing but conditional. Middle Eastern crises tend to leak into the South Caucasus when three factors coincide: heightened Iran–Israel escalation, weak regional confidence‑building mechanisms, and external militarization of local disputes. The post‑2020 erosion of traditional mediation formats does raise vulnerability, but regional actors - especially Azerbaijan - have strong incentives to prevent the Caucasus from becoming an extension of Middle Eastern proxy dynamics.

In short, the South Caucasus is exposed to strategic pressure, not imminent destabilization. Spillover is possible, but not inevitable - and its prevention depends largely on regional states maintaining autonomy, restraint, and a clear separation between local security agendas and extra - regional rivalries.

- Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Europe has sharply intensified energy cooperation with Azerbaijan. Is this a temporary necessity or a long - term EU strategy?

- Europe’s intensified energy cooperation with Azerbaijan began as an urgent response to the Ukraine war, but it has increasingly evolved into a longer‑term strategic adjustment. The EU now views Azerbaijani gas not merely as an emergency substitute for Russian supplies, but as part of a broader effort to diversify sources, routes, and partners while stabilizing its southern energy corridor.

That said, this is not an exclusive or permanent dependency. The relationship is best understood as a medium‑ to long‑term bridge strategy: Azerbaijan plays a stabilizing role during Europe’s energy transition, complementing renewables and LNG rather than replacing them. In this sense, Azerbaijan has shifted from being a contingency supplier to a structural - but not dominant - pillar in EU energy security planning.

- Europe talks about a "green transition," but at the same time needs stable gas supplies. Isn't this a strategic contradiction? To what extent is energy diplomacy today becoming a tool of geopolitical influence?

- There is a tension, but it is less a contradiction than a dual - track strategy shaped by time horizons. Europe’s green transition is a long‑term structural goal, while stable gas supplies address short‑ to medium - term security and economic realities. Gas is treated as a transition fuel - necessary to stabilize grids, industry, and societies while renewables scale up - especially after the strategic shock of losing Russian supplies.

In this context, energy diplomacy has clearly re‑emerged as a geopolitical instrument. Access to gas, LNG terminals, pipelines, and transit corridors now directly influences alliances, bargaining power, and political dialogue. Supplier states like Azerbaijan gain leverage through reliability and connectivity, while consumer blocs like the EU use market access, regulation, and long - term contracts to shape external partnerships. Energy today is no longer just an economic commodity - it is a tool of strategic reassurance, influence, and risk management in an increasingly fragmented global order.

- To what extent are modern conflicts - Ukraine, the Middle East, Taiwan -interconnected? Is the world heading toward a new Cold War or is it already in one?

- Modern conflicts are interconnected structurally rather than operationally. Ukraine, the Middle East, and Taiwan are not coordinated theaters, but they are linked by the same underlying forces: the erosion of post‑Cold War rules, intensified great‑power competition, weaponized interdependence (energy, trade, technology), and weakening confidence in multilateral constraints. Each conflict tests different dimensions of the same question - who sets the rules, who enforces them, and at what cost - and actors learn from one arena how rivals respond in another.

This does not yet resemble a classic Cold War with rigid blocs, ideological uniformity, or sealed economic systems. Instead, the world has entered a hybrid era of competitive interdependence: rivalry without full decoupling, pressure without permanent alliance discipline, and escalation managed through ambiguity. States hedge rather than choose sides, cooperate in some arenas while contesting others, and prioritize sovereignty and flexibility over bloc loyalty.

That said, we are closer to a “Cold War–like condition” than at any point since the 1980s. Strategic mistrust is entrenched; military planning increasingly assumes worst‑case scenarios; and conflicts are interpreted globally rather than locally. If this trajectory continues - especially if crises in one theater trigger overt escalation in another - the system could harden into something resembling a new Cold War. For now, however, the defining feature is not bipolar standoff but fragmented rivalry, where multiple conflicts reinforce each other psychologically and strategically without merging into a single global confrontation.

- You have been studying the Caucasus and Caspian region for many years. What do you think Western analysts most often misunderstand when discussing the South Caucasus?

-Based on long‑term study of the Caucasus and Caspian region, Western analysts most often misunderstand the nature of agency, sequencing, and stability in the South Caucasus.

First, they tend to overread the region through external templates - Russia - West rivalry, democratization models, or normative institutionalism - while underestimating local strategic rationality. South Caucasus states are often treated as reactive “objects” of great‑power influence rather than as actors pursuing calculated sovereignty - maximizing strategies under constraint. This obscures why policies that look contradictory from the outside are often coherent locally.

Second, Western analysis frequently conflates conflict resolution with stability, assuming frozen arrangements are inherently preferable to change. In fact, much instability has stemmed precisely from the persistence of unresolved, externally managed status quos, rather than their transformation. Stability in the region has historically followed shifts in balance, not their indefinite postponement.

Finally, analysts often underestimate the importance of geography and connectivity - treating the South Caucasus as peripheral rather than as a strategic hinge linking Eurasia, the Middle East, and Europe. Energy routes, transport corridors, and security alignments are not adding‑ons to politics here; they are the core drivers of regional behavior.

In short, the most common Western mistake is reading the South Caucasus as a fragile periphery of other regions, rather than as a dynamic, interest‑driven system with its own internal logic.

- Looking at the next 10 years, which scenario do you consider most likely for the South Caucasus: integration, competition, or renewed instability?

- Looking ahead to the next 10 years, the most likely scenario for the South Caucasus is structured competition, not full integration and not a return to generalized instability.

Deep integration - on the European 1950s model - remains unlikely because trust deficits, asymmetries of power, and divergent external alignments persist, especially between Azerbaijan and Armenia. At the same time, a slide back into large‑scale instability is less probable than in the 1990s, because borders are clearer, state capacities are stronger, and most regional actors now have a shared interest in avoiding renewed war that would disrupt connectivity, energy flows, and sovereignty gains.

What is emerging instead is a competitive but constrained order: states will compete for corridors, influence, and partners, but within clearer red lines and growing acceptance of regional realities.

This competitive framework may still produce localized tensions and diplomatic crises, yet it is increasingly embedded in pragmatic cooperation on trade, transport, and energy, driven by external demand rather than internal reconciliation.

In short, the South Caucasus is likely to experience managed competition with selective functional cooperation - an order that is imperfect, uneven, and sometimes tense, but more durable than the old post‑Soviet status quo and short of both integration and renewed systemic instability.

- Who, in your opinion, is shaping the future of Eurasia today: states, energy routes, or technology?

- In my view, Eurasia’s future is shaped by the interaction of all three - but states remain the primary architects, with energy routes and technology acting as force multipliers, not substitutes.

• States still make the decisive choices: they set boundaries, define security red lines, regulate corridors, and decide whether energy and technology are opened, weaponized, or restricted. The return of sovereignty‑centered politics is unmistakable across Eurasia.
• Energy routes shape where power flows and who matters strategically. Pipelines, LNG corridors, and transport hubs do not determine policy on their own, but they constrain and incentivize state behavior, turning geography into leverage.
• Technology increasingly shapes how competition is conducted - through digital infrastructure, logistics, surveillance, finance, and military balance - but it rarely overrides political will.

Put differently: technology accelerates, energy structures, but states decide. Eurasia today is not being shaped by impersonal systems; it is being reordered by governments using energy connectivity and technology as strategic instruments. The balance between these tools - not any single one - is what will define Eurasia over the next decade.

- And the last question: is the South Caucasus becoming one of the key nodes of the new global geopolitics?

- Yes - the South Caucasus is increasingly becoming a key node of new global geopolitics, though not a central pole in itself.

Its importance stems from three converging dynamics: it has emerged as a critical connector between Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East; it sits astride energy and transport corridors that are gaining value as Russia‑centric routes weaken; and it has moved from being a managed post‑Soviet periphery to a space where regional agency matters more than inherited frameworks. What makes the region distinctive is that competition there is now about connectivity, resilience, and rule‑setting, not ideology.

That said, the South Caucasus is best understood as a strategic hinge rather than a hub of command. Its geopolitical weight derives from how effectively regional states - especially Azerbaijan - use geography, infrastructure, and diplomacy to insert themselves into wider Eurasian and global calculations. In this sense, the South Caucasus is no longer marginal: it has become a node where global interests intersect, even if it does not yet define the system itself.