A space is gradually taking shape on the Eurasian map that can no longer be explained solely through the logic of transport routes, energy projects, or growing trade flows. The rapprochement between Azerbaijan and the countries of Central Asia is unfolding against the backdrop of deeper transformations: traditional centers of influence are reassessing their capabilities, regional states are strengthening direct dialogue, and the longstanding division between Central Asia and the South Caucasus is becoming less distinct in political and strategic terms.

In this context, the C6 format is of interest not only as a new platform for cooperation, but also as a possible sign of a shift in the very logic of regional politics. For the first time, states that have long been viewed primarily through the prism of competition among external powers are increasingly seeking to define shared priorities independently, coordinate their positions, and develop mechanisms for cooperation. The question, however, is not only how sustainable this new format will prove to be, but also whether it may eventually develop its own political center of gravity.

To discuss the depth of these transformations, whether C6 could become the foundation of a new regional architecture, why flexibility may currently be more important than rigid institutionalization, and what role individual states could play in the emerging configuration, CASPIA spoke with Emilbek Dzhuraev, a Kyrgyz political scientist, expert on Central Asian regional politics, PhD in Political Science, and lecturer at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek.

— Over the past three years, relations between Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states have developed at an unprecedented pace. Yet there is a sense that transport projects, energy, and investment are merely the outward manifestations of a much deeper process. If we set aside the economic dimension, what do you believe is truly bringing Azerbaijan and Central Asia closer together today? Is it a convergence of national interests, a transformation of the international system, or a search for a new model of regional order?

— Relations between Azerbaijan and the countries of Central Asia have indeed been developing extremely dynamically in recent years. Cooperation has intensified across virtually all areas and with every state in the region. In my view, this is an objective and natural process.

On the one hand, this rapprochement rests on deep historical, cultural, and spiritual foundations. Our countries have developed enduring ties that provide a natural basis for mutual trust and cooperation. On the other hand, the impact of the current geopolitical and geoeconomic environment cannot be ignored. The circumstances that have emerged both within the region and around it are objectively contributing to closer ties between Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states.

At the same time, I would not regard cooperation in energy, transport, and trade merely as an external layer or a superficial component of these relations. On the contrary, these are critically important areas that can not only strengthen practical cooperation but also create conditions for the further deepening of more fundamental ties. Historical bonds, cultural affinity, and shared values foster a particular atmosphere of mutual goodwill and openness to cooperation. This is precisely why relations between Azerbaijan and the countries of Central Asia have the potential to be not merely situational, but long-term, substantive, and sustainable.

— Many view the C6 format as a logical continuation of cooperation around the Middle Corridor. But could the relationship work in the opposite direction? Could it be that transport does not shape politics, but rather that an emerging political coalition among the states makes such infrastructure projects possible? Which comes first in this case?

— This is indeed an interesting question: what comes first: the development of the Middle Corridor, which leads to the emergence of C6, or, conversely, the strengthening of the C6 format, which creates the political foundation for the development of the Middle Corridor? As I have already noted, it is difficult to draw a clear-cut, black-and-white distinction here. In my view, these are closely interconnected and mutually reinforcing processes.

The Middle Corridor is undoubtedly driven by broader transregional needs. The growth of trade flows and the need to develop transport and logistical connectivity between East and West have made the strategic importance of Central Asia and the South Caucasus particularly evident.

However, for this potential to be realized and for the Middle Corridor to achieve practical success, the states of the region needed to establish a genuine foundation for joint action. Such a foundation has gradually been created and strengthened in recent years through the development of the C5 format, which began to evolve into C6 last year following Azerbaijan’s accession.

Thus, we are dealing with two mutually reinforcing factors. On the one hand, the region’s strategic importance for international trade, transport, and connectivity is creating new opportunities. On the other, international economic and political interconnectedness itself provides the states of the region with additional incentives to deepen cooperation both among themselves and with external partners, countries, and markets.

Therefore, the Middle Corridor and the C6 format should not be viewed as competing or sequential processes, but rather as complementary elements of an emerging regional architecture.

— Since 2022, Russia has objectively lost some of its capacity to manage processes across Eurasia, yet no new and stable architecture has emerged. Could cooperation between Azerbaijan and Central Asia represent an attempt to fill this strategic vacuum, or do the states of the region still prefer to act primarily on a situational basis, avoiding the creation of their own political center of gravity?

— Since 2022, following the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine, major changes have taken place that have become an important factor in the development of relations within Central Asia. Before that, particularly during the 1990s and 2000s, Russia played a significant role in regional processes, often mediating relations among the Central Asian states through the prism of its own interests and political approaches. Today, this intermediary role has weakened considerably.

The Central Asian countries are increasingly engaging in direct regional dialogue without the participation of Russia or other external actors. At the same time, in building relations with major external partners, including Russia, China, Western countries, and others, they are increasingly making use of C5+ multilateral formats.

In my view, this is no longer a situational phenomenon. On the contrary, it is a more systematic process to which the leaderships of the region’s states have demonstrated a sustained commitment. Naturally, each state retains its own national interests and priorities. Politics is neither mathematics nor a natural science. It always involves a wide range of factors, and the interests of states may converge on some issues while diverging on others.

Nevertheless, with every new summit and every joint decision, it becomes increasingly evident that regional cooperation is acquiring a deeper and more sustainable character. This was particularly evident at the recent informal summit held at Issyk-Kul in Kyrgyzstan. Today, we can already speak of the emergence of a higher level of mutual understanding, trust, and shared interest in strengthening regional identity and a sense of regional community in foreign policy.

Azerbaijan’s active involvement in this process and its participation in the emerging macro-region, as some have described it, also indicate that this is not a temporary political trend, but an organic and natural process of rapprochement.

— Today, virtually all major external actors, China, the EU, Türkiye, Russia, and the United States, are interested in strengthening ties with Central Asia. Yet, for the first time, the states of the region themselves are creating platforms without the participation of these centers of power. Can we say that we are witnessing a transition from “geopolitics around Central Asia” to “the geopolitics of Central Asia”? How does Azerbaijan fit into this new logic?

— You have formulated the question very accurately. In my view, we are witnessing large-scale and, in a certain sense, tectonic changes. If we turn to history, including the nineteenth century, Central Asia was often viewed as a space of the “Great Game”—that is, as an arena for rivalry among major external powers.

In recent years, the situation has gradually begun to change. Today, it can be stated with considerable confidence that, by drawing closer together and coordinating their foreign-policy approaches, the Central Asian states are beginning to shape a common regional agenda: a system of shared interests, priorities, and patterns of behavior. The more successfully the countries of the region identify common ground and align their interests, the more effectively they will be able to act as a major regional actor alongside other centers of power.

Naturally, politics remains a dynamic sphere. During one period, processes may develop in one direction and then change under the influence of new circumstances. Therefore, it would be an oversimplification to claim that the countries of the region previously had no independent voice at all and now determine every process entirely on their own.

In practice, we are witnessing a more complex and balanced picture. Nevertheless, it can be stated with confidence that the Central Asian states have significantly strengthened their collective voice in geopolitics and international relations. In my view, Azerbaijan’s participation in these processes only enhances the potential and political weight of this regional voice.

— If we look not at the map but at political processes, where does Central Asia end today? In your view, is Azerbaijan already becoming part of a single political space in the region, or does it remain an external partner, regardless of how close the cooperation may be?

— The question of what exactly Azerbaijan represents within the C6 format remains an interesting one. Should it be regarded as part of Central Asia, or are we witnessing the emergence of a broader regional space?

At times, these discussions become overly formal and even somewhat curious. Personally, I believe there is no need to rigidly define the boundaries of Central Asia or to attempt to describe Azerbaijan’s place in its relations with the countries of the region in a single term.

For now, the most accurate and appropriate formulation remains the one used by the leaders of the states themselves: “Central Asia and Azerbaijan.” At the same time, C6 is already beginning to be used as a conventional designation for the emerging space of cooperation.

However, something else is more important. Azerbaijan differs from the five Central Asian states. To a certain extent, it can also be regarded as a country closely connected to the European space. It is much more closely linked to Türkiye’s geopolitical agenda and actively engages with the states of the Middle East.

It is precisely this multidimensional orientation that is of particular value to the countries of Central Asia. It would be a loss of a major advantage if Azerbaijan came to be viewed exclusively as a Central Asian state. From a geopolitical perspective, it is more beneficial for Azerbaijan to preserve its distinctive role: to remain a very close partner of the Central Asian countries, actively participate in regional processes, while at the same time continuing to act as an important player in other regional arenas. For the Central Asian states, this constitutes an additional advantage and enhances the strategic value of their partnership with Azerbaijan.

— Historically, Central Asia has built relations with external actors primarily through bilateral channels. Today, however, new multilateral frameworks involving Azerbaijan are emerging. Could this change the very principles governing foreign-policy decision-making in the region, or will national interests continue to dominate the collective agenda?

— Bilateral and collective, multilateral approaches to foreign policy do not contradict one another. They can develop in parallel and complement each other.

In recent years, within the framework of the Consultative Meetings, the Central Asian states have agreed and have formalized in a number of agreements and cooperation-development concepts, their intention to coordinate their foreign-policy actions. In other words, the countries of the region openly state their aspiration to develop common positions on issues affecting the interests of Central Asia as a whole and to present those positions jointly in international forums.

However, it is important to understand that this is a process of rapprochement and cooperation among sovereign states. We remain far from the creation of supranational structures. Neither the states nor their societies are likely ready for such a model. Moreover, the question of whether such a model would be appropriate remains open to some extent.

Therefore, both approaches are developing today: states retain their independence in foreign policy while increasingly shaping collective and coordinated regional positions. Compared with previous decades, it is clear that such positions already exist. They are not yet fully consolidated, but they are gradually becoming stronger.

Azerbaijan, which joined this format somewhat later, is also becoming a participant in the processes of coordination and discussion surrounding the common regional agenda. This is particularly important in the context of the development of the Middle Corridor and other international transport routes. For such projects to be effective and beneficial to all participating states, close coordination is essential. The countries of the region understand this necessity and are gradually moving from discussion to practical action.

— The expert community speaks extensively about joint projects, yet the institutional dimension of cooperation receives relatively little attention. In your view, could the C6 format eventually develop permanent coordination mechanisms (a secretariat, expert councils, or joint programs) or does its effectiveness lie precisely in the absence of rigid institutions?

— In the development of regional dialogue, particularly within the framework of the annual Consultative Meetings, many analysts have noted that the absence of rigid and inflexible institutional mechanisms has, to some extent, contributed to the gradual and steady development of regionalism in Central Asia.

There was also another, more conventional approach: states would only begin discussing regional cooperation but would almost immediately establish numerous institutions, agreements, secretariats, and formal mechanisms. Yet such processes often ended with cooperation failing to progress beyond the initial meetings and declarations.

The Consultative Meetings, first held in 2018, demonstrated a different model. The absence of binding and restrictive institutional frameworks allowed regional dialogue to develop gradually, flexibly, and with considerable success. At the same time, certain elements of institutionalization are already emerging. Participants in meetings at the level of heads of state are gradually beginning to discuss the need to provide further organizational structure to cooperation. Several important agreements already exist, including arrangements in the areas of friendship, good-neighborliness, and shared development in the twenty-first century, as well as long-term concepts and a vision for the development of regional cooperation through 2040.

However, none of these mechanisms has yet taken on a rigid institutional form. In my view, this approach is currently justified and effective. Figuratively speaking, it would be a mistake to put the cart before the horse by creating complex institutions before establishing a solid foundation of mutual trust and sustained political dialogue.

At present, in my view, the states of the region are moving in the right direction: first strengthening trust, expanding practical cooperation, and identifying common interests, and only then gradually moving toward more durable forms of coordination. Azerbaijan’s accession also gives this process a new dimension. By joining the regional dialogue, Azerbaijan has the opportunity to gradually identify common ground and strengthen mutual trust with all the states of the region.

— If we compare the processes taking place in Central Asia today with the situation a decade ago, what has changed fundamentally? Have the states themselves begun to think differently, or has the international environment changed in a way that has effectively compelled them to seek new formats for cooperation?

— The processes we are observing in Central Asia today began to take shape approximately nine or ten years ago. The progress the region has achieved in regional institution-building, the development of regionalism, and the strengthening of cooperation has been made possible by a combination of several important factors.

First and foremost, changes in political leadership in several states of the region played a significant role. The most important, and perhaps decisive, turning point was the change of leadership in Uzbekistan and the rise of Shavkat Mirziyoyev. This was a key factor in opening the way for the emergence of an entirely new model of regional dialogue.

Later, changes in leadership also took place in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. These states had previously been open to developing regional cooperation, but the new political dialogue initiated by Uzbekistan received additional support from the new leaderships of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In 2022, a new leader also came to power in Turkmenistan. Thus, changes in political leadership in several states created new opportunities for strengthening mutual trust and developing regional cooperation.

The second major factor was Russia’s war against Ukraine and the profound changes in regional and international geopolitics that followed. These developments had a significant impact on the Central Asian states and created serious challenges in trade, logistics, diplomacy, and other areas. It can be said that even if Central Asia did not suffer direct damage, it nevertheless faced complex consequences from these changes and continues to experience their effects to this day. In my view, it was precisely the combination of internal regional changes and the transformation of the geopolitical environment surrounding Central Asia that contributed to the emergence of a more mature and sustainable process of regional development.

The significance of progress toward resolving the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia should also be noted separately. Advances in the peace process in the South Caucasus have created new opportunities for broader regional cooperation. The achievement of peace and the strengthening of stability in this strategically important space enable Azerbaijan to pursue long-term areas of cooperation more actively and engage with other states within a broader regional context. Among these areas, Central Asia occupies a special place, in my view. The countries of the region are historically, culturally, and politically close to Azerbaijan, and expanding cooperation among them opens new opportunities for shared development.

— Kyrgyzstan is actively supporting processes of regional integration today. What role could Bishkek play within the emerging C6 format? Does Kyrgyzstan have the potential to become one of the key political intermediaries between Central Asia and the South Caucasus?

— In Kyrgyzstan, the country’s leadership, society, business community, and expert community generally view the development of regional cooperation positively. There is broad interest in Kyrgyzstan’s full and active participation in all processes of regional engagement. Naturally, Kyrgyzstan is a relatively small state, both in terms of its economic potential and its territory and population. However, this does not prevent the country from playing an important role in regional processes.

From the very beginning, Kyrgyzstan has been one of the most active participants in efforts to promote rapprochement and develop regional cooperation. This position was already evident in the 1990s and continues today. Another distinctive feature of Kyrgyzstan is that it has no deep-seated conflicts or pronounced competitive tensions in its relations with other states in the region. The final settlement of border issues in 2025 was also important. This further strengthened Kyrgyzstan’s position as an open, predictable, and cooperation-oriented state that does not seek rivalry with its neighbors.

In my view, these qualities enable Kyrgyzstan to play an important role in developing regional dialogue and to serve as one of the platforms for strengthening mutual understanding between the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan. Naturally, when discussing a format that brings together six states, each country performs its own key function in one way or another. Therefore, excessive emphasis on one state at the expense of the others should be avoided.

However, compared, for example, with Turkmenistan, whose policy of neutrality gives its participation in regional processes a certain distinctiveness, Kyrgyzstan demonstrates a more active and engaged approach. For this reason, Kyrgyzstan has significant potential to play an important connecting and mediating role within the emerging C6 format, contribute to strengthening political dialogue, and promote practical cooperation between Central Asia and the South Caucasus.