The recent deterioration of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan is increasingly transforming from a bilateral security issue into a factor of regional economic instability. At a time when Central Asian states are actively seeking to diversify trade routes and reduce dependence on traditional corridors, instability along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border threatens major infrastructure and transit projects that could reshape the logistics map of Eurasia.

Early Sunday morning, the Pakistani military carried out airstrikes on Afghan territory, stating that the targets were “camps and hideouts” of armed groups linked to a recent wave of attacks, including a deadly suicide bombing at a Shiite mosque in Islamabad (Al Jazeera, 22 February 2026). Pakistan’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting reported that the military conducted “intelligence-based precision operations” against seven camps and shelters belonging to the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and affiliated groups. According to the statement, Pakistan possesses “irrefutable evidence” that recent attacks in Islamabad and in the northwestern districts of Bajaur and Bannu were planned and directed by militant leadership and handlers operating from Afghan territory (Al Jazeera).

Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense condemned the strikes, stating that they hit a religious school and residential areas in the border provinces of Nangarhar and Paktika, resulting in dozens of casualties, including women and children. The Afghan authorities described the strikes as a “violation of international law and principles of good neighborliness” and pledged a response, placing responsibility for civilian casualties and attacks on religious sites on the Pakistani military and signaling that Kabul would respond with proportionate measures (Al Jazeera).

This new escalation between Pakistan and Afghanistan could have far-reaching consequences for the broader region. Increased armed clashes along the border are likely, including possible retaliatory strikes, artillery exchanges, and the closure of border crossings. Such developments would disrupt trade flows and restrict the movement of people. Border areas are already fragile, and renewed hostilities could lead to population displacement, infrastructure damage, and rising civilian casualties.

The situation also affects the interests of external and regional actors, including China, Iran, and the Central Asian states. China is arguably the most invested stakeholder, given its Belt and Road Initiative projects and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It is evident that close Pakistan–China cooperation does not align with the geopolitical interests of India and, to a certain extent, the United States. India’s strategic recalibration and Washington’s evolving regional posture increasingly frame Central Asia as a space of competing transport and connectivity projects. In this context, the southern route through Afghanistan and Pakistan could complement existing corridors such as the Trans-Caspian route and northern pathways through Russia.

For Central Asian countries—particularly Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan—Afghanistan is viewed as a critical transit corridor providing access to the ports of the Indian Ocean via Pakistan. Amid sanctions pressure on Russia and growing logistical constraints along traditional northern routes, the importance of the southern direction has increased. One of the most prominent symbols of these ambitions is the Trans-Afghan railway project, which envisions connecting Uzbekistan to Pakistani ports through Afghan territory (The Times of Central Asia). If realized, the project could significantly reduce transportation costs and expand the region’s export potential. Alongside the strategic China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, the Trans-Afghan route is seen as a key element of Central Asia’s long-term connectivity strategy. However, the deterioration of relations between Kabul and Islamabad renders such initiatives highly vulnerable.

Stability in Afghanistan is also critical from a regional security perspective, particularly for Central Asian states such as Tajikistan, which shares a long and sensitive border with Afghanistan. This border remains exposed to challenges such as narcotics trafficking and broader regional security risks, making sustained instability a direct concern for neighboring states.

Beyond security considerations, trade and economic factors remain among the most important dimensions of Afghanistan’s relations with Central Asia. Approximately 90 percent of Afghanistan’s trade with Central Asian countries consists of exports from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (The Times of Central Asia). Kazakhstan is Afghanistan’s primary supplier of wheat and other grain products, while Uzbekistan is the country’s largest exporter of electricity. Although Kyrgyzstan’s trade volume with Afghanistan is more modest, it reached approximately 66 million dollars between March 2024 and March 2025 (The Times of Central Asia). Taken collectively, Central Asian states have become Afghanistan’s largest trading partners, surpassing Pakistan, India, and China in overall trade volume.

In February, a delegation from Uzbekistan’s Syrdarya region visited Kabul to participate in a business forum, during which the two sides signed 25 agreements worth approximately 300 million dollars. These agreements covered construction, food production, agriculture, furniture manufacturing, textiles, and pharmaceutical cooperation (The Times of Central Asia). A parallel business forum organized by the Uzbekistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry took place in Mazar-i-Sharif, bringing together over 150 Afghan entrepreneurs and representatives from more than 50 Uzbek companies. Preliminary agreements signed there exceeded 200 million dollars (The Times of Central Asia).

At the core of the current crisis lies a fundamental clash between security and development priorities. For Pakistan, counterterrorism and tighter border control remain paramount. For Afghanistan, asserting sovereignty and achieving economic legitimacy through participation in regional and international projects are key objectives.

Despite rising tensions, diplomatic options have not yet been exhausted. Mediation efforts and negotiations are likely in the near term, as neither side stands to benefit from a prolonged conflict. Pakistan’s periodic military operations and border tightening consistently provoke strong reactions from Kabul, reinforcing mutual distrust. Ongoing instability in Afghanistan and recurring border crises with Pakistan increase political and financial risks for investors. Until sustainable security arrangements are reached, large-scale infrastructure and connectivity initiatives will remain vulnerable to disruption, border closures, and renewed escalation.