The war in the Middle East, which has now been ongoing for a week, is rapidly expanding beyond the initial confrontation between Israel and Iran. The escalation of the conflict is gradually drawing other regional states into the orbit of the crisis and has already begun to exert indirect influence on the broader Eurasian context. Although the countries of Central Asia are not geographically involved in the hostilities, their economic, transport, and political ties with Iran make them vulnerable to the secondary consequences of the conflict - from disruptions to trade routes to macroeconomic instability.
The impact of the crisis is particularly noticeable in Turkmenistan, a state that shares a direct border with Iran both on land and across the Caspian Sea. The total length of the land border between the two countries is approximately 1,100 kilometers. As early as 2 March 2026, the press service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan issued an official statement expressing concern over the worsening situation in the Middle East. The statement emphasized that the escalation was especially regrettable given that it occurred against the backdrop of ongoing diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the regional crisis.
Maintaining its traditional status of neutrality, Turkmenistan has begun to perform a humanitarian function by opening its territory for the evacuation of foreign citizens from Iran. The border crossings “Artyk -Lutfabad,” “Gaudan - Bajgiran,” “Akayla - Incheburun,” and “Altyn Asyr - Incheburun” have been used for this purpose. In doing so, Ashgabat appears to be attempting to maintain a balance between humanitarian assistance and its policy of non-interference.
However, military actions on Iranian territory have already begun to directly affect Turkmenistan’s domestic economy. According to independent sources, prices for a number of goods - including food products, household chemicals, cigarettes, and construction materials - have risen sharply across the country. The increase has been particularly noticeable for agricultural products, a significant share of which is imported from Iran. For example, the price of Iranian potatoes in Ashgabat has nearly tripled, rising from 5 - 6 to 17 manats per kilogram. A similar situation can be observed with cucumbers, whose price has reached 17 manats per kilogram compared with a previous level of around 8 manats.
Experts attribute this to Turkmenistan’s high dependence on imports of Iranian goods, which are traditionally considered to be of higher quality than local products in the domestic market. Similar price spikes have occurred before - for instance, during the 12-day regional war in the summer and in the autumn of 2024, when Iran temporarily closed the border. At the same time, the Turkmen authorities have not publicly announced the existence of a long-term strategy for responding to such crises.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the conflict has effectively paralyzed the movement of oil tankers through the strategically important Strait of Hormuz. This has begun to affect not only global energy markets but also broader supply chains. Disruptions in logistics are affecting countries closely connected with Iran through trade and transit routes, including Turkmenistan. In recent years, economic ties between Ashgabat and Tehran have been actively developing: Iran remains one of Turkmenistan’s notable trading partners and an important transit route to southern markets. In 2023, Iran accounted for approximately 12.5 percent of Turkmenistan’s total imports.
Iran also plays a particularly significant role in providing Central Asian countries with access to global maritime markets. The key gateways of the region are the ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, which connect Central Asia with the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. If transportation disruptions across Iranian territory persist for a prolonged period, this could require a reassessment of profitability forecasts for trade operations along these routes.
The crisis may also have serious political and economic consequences for Tajikistan, a country that historically maintains close cultural and linguistic ties with Iran. The President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, sent a telegram of condolences to the President of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, following the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as well as a number of Iranian state officials and military commanders.
The Prime Minister of Tajikistan, Kokhir Rasulzoda, also visited the Iranian embassy in Dushanbe and left a message in the condolence book, emphasizing the support of the Tajik people and the country’s leadership.
From an economic perspective, Tajikistan may face primarily indirect macroeconomic consequences through several channels. First, the republic is almost entirely dependent on imports of petroleum products, as domestic energy production is extremely limited. Although the country does not directly import Iranian fuel, a rise in global oil prices will inevitably lead to higher domestic fuel costs.
Second, Iran remains a key component of the southern direction and part of the International North–South Transport Corridor, through which Tajikistan receives a portion of its imported goods. Disruptions in logistics could complicate supplies and increase the cost of trade.
Finally, financial consequences are also possible. The weakening of the national currency - the Tajik somoni - could lead to an increase in the cost of imported goods. For an economy heavily dependent on external supplies, this would directly affect domestic inflation and the purchasing power of the population.
Kazakhstan occupies a special place in the geopolitical configuration of the region. It is the largest economy in Central Asia and arguably the most interesting regional actor in the context of the current Middle Eastern war. Kazakhstan became the only Central Asian country to officially join the Abraham Accords, which in itself places it in a complex diplomatic position under conditions of the conflict.
At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan expressed condolences to the people of Iran following the death of Ali Khamenei. On the instructions of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Senate Chairman Maulen Ashimbayev visited the Iranian embassy in Astana and conveyed official condolences.
Simultaneously, the Kazakh leadership has begun taking steps to assess potential threats. As early as 28 February, Tokayev instructed the Secretary of the Security Council, Gizat Nurdauletov, together with the heads of the security agencies, to prepare a plan of emergency measures in the event of negative developments around Iran and potential risks to the country’s internal stability.
An additional diplomatic signal was also directed to the states of the Persian Gulf. The President of Kazakhstan sent letters to the leaders of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, declaring Kazakhstan’s readiness to support efforts aimed at ensuring regional stability.
At the same time, the war may negatively affect economic relations between Kazakhstan and Iran. In 2025, trade turnover between the two countries exceeded 430 million US dollars—about 0.3 percent of Kazakhstan’s total foreign trade. For comparison, Kazakhstan maintains comparable trade volumes with countries such as Croatia, Canada, and Ukraine.
Interestingly, in recent years Iran has become a notable supplier of construction materials to Kazakhstan. In 2025, Iranian companies exported approximately 138,000 tons of cement to the country, worth 6.8 million dollars. In addition, both states have actively developed transport cooperation within the framework of the North–South corridor. The Iranian port of Bandar Abbas and the Kazakh port of Aktau form a key link in this route, connecting Central Asia with the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. However, the current war has made the prospects of this transport axis considerably more uncertain.
At the same time, the crisis demonstrates the vulnerability of the region’s economies to external shocks: rising energy prices, possible disruptions in the import of goods, currency fluctuations, and pressure on domestic markets. These effects are already visible in certain countries of the region and may intensify as the conflict drags on.
Moreover, the current situation only exacerbates the structural constraints that have long complicated the development of cooperation between Iran and Central Asia. These include Western sanctions against Tehran, instability in Afghanistan that complicates transit routes, and competition in global oil and gas markets, where Iran itself acts as a major supplier.