CASPIA presents an interview with Turkish international relations expert, senior researcher at the Iranian Studies Center (IRAM), Oral Toga.

— To what extent would the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei change the balance of power in Iran?

-The death of Khamenei would inevitably alter the balance of power within the country. However, it is important to emphasize that the Iranian political system is largely “pre-secured,” particularly in light of the experience from the recent 12-day conflict — Tehran has been preparing for such a scenario. Notably, inside Iran itself, there is no atmosphere of panic or chaos. On the contrary, the sense of uncertainty today is much more pronounced on the American side. At the same time, the further course of the war will have a decisive, largely determining influence on the development of the situation. To make accurate and measured forecasts, it is first necessary to wait for the conclusion of military operations.

— How do the war and internal elite disagreements affect Iran’s ability to effectively counter external strikes?

-Both the 12-day war and the current events are more likely to lead not to division, but to internal consolidation. The death of the Supreme Leader is an event of exceptional importance, given his political role, status as a guardian of religious legitimacy, as well as his position as a Grand Ayatollah and a source of emulation for the faithful.

Paradoxically, attempts by the U.S. and Israel to weaken the revolution and its ideology may produce the opposite effect — strengthening it internally. For the religious segment of society, Khamenei’s death could become a powerful symbol, almost a mythologized image. Furthermore, Iranians are deeply attached to their country, and it is highly likely that we will see consolidation around the idea of its preservation and survival.

— To what extent do strikes on military targets and infrastructure weaken the position of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)?

-Obviously, these strikes have damaged the institutional structure of the IRGC. However, it is important to remember that this is not merely a military, but above all an ideological organization. As long as the ideology survives, it will find ways to exist, adapt, and recover. At the same time, it is unlikely that the situation will return to its previous state — regardless of whether changes occur for better or worse.

— What scenario of international pressure is most likely: sanctions, diplomacy, or direct military escalation?

-In fact, we are already witnessing a regional war unfolding. If the U.S. attempts to bring the situation to the level of systemic paralysis — as happened with Iraq in 1991 — and repeats past strategic mistakes, tensions may only intensify. Judging by statements from American officials, at present the most likely scenario appears to be further escalation.

— How real is the risk of the conflict expanding into a regional war involving Iran’s neighboring countries and allies?

-If Iran shifts the focus of the conflict beyond confrontation with the U.S. and Israel, this would mean an expansion of the front and, accordingly, an additional strain on its resources. At the same time, strikes on targets and bases located on U.S. allies’ territory would increase the burden on the American side.

Most likely, Iran will aim to operate along this delicate edge, using its limited resources as efficiently as possible. A full-scale expansion of the front would appear to be a strategic mistake, though other scenarios cannot be ruled out if the overall situation changes.

— What are the implications of the current war for global security and trade, given Iran’s strategic position and the Strait of Hormuz?

-The impact will be inevitable. Depending on how the conflict develops, the crisis could deepen, and its side effects could increase significantly, affecting both security and global trade flows.

— How will the current actions of the U.S. and Israel affect the long-term resilience of the Iranian regime?

-There is no doubt that internal processes in Iran will enter a phase of transformation. However, by refusing to hide and effectively embracing death, Khamenei made a strategic move, turning his name into a symbol and banner. It is quite likely that around this symbol a group will form that will attempt to strictly restore the national security system, relying on scenarios prepared by Khamenei himself.

— How likely is it that internal disagreements and the ongoing war will lead to a change in Iran’s course in the coming months?

-In the short term, I do not expect any serious internal split. One can anticipate intensified strikes by the U.S., as well as potential activation of local protest or insurgent movements in certain regions. Nevertheless, there is a high probability that Iran will be able to restore its integrity. In this context, the example of Afghanistan over the past twenty years is quite indicative.