The introduction of Kazakhstan’s new constitutional model is moving from the political and legal sphere into practical implementation. Following the adoption of the new Constitution, the authorities are beginning to establish the institutions that will ensure its direct implementation. This is why the first session of the Kurultai is significant far beyond simply marking the start of a new parliament’s work. In effect, a new configuration of state power is now taking shape, while the first personnel decisions provide an initial indication of how the president’s initiative will be translated into practice.

Speaking at the opening of the first session of the Kurultai, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev outlined the immediate priorities: electing the leadership of the new parliament, establishing its structure, determining the composition of the government, and appointing a number of key government officials. The president stressed that, in accordance with the new Constitution, a number of procedural decisions must be made to enable the renewed institutions of government to begin operating fully.

At first glance, these may appear to be primarily technical procedures. Yet it is precisely through these procedures that the real substance of the new political system will be determined. The constitutional reform has created a new institutional framework, but its political impact will depend on how powers are distributed in practice among the president, the Kurultai, the government, the vice president, and the Security Council.

One of the first decisions will be the election of the Kurultai’s leadership. Tokayev nominated Aibek Dadebay for the position of speaker of the new parliament. In explaining his choice, the president highlighted Dadebay’s extensive experience in public administration, education, patriotism, and sense of responsibility. The very basis of this characterization is telling: at the initial stage of establishing a new institution of power, the priority appears to be not so much political competition as ensuring stable and manageable operations.

At the same time, what is considerably more important is that, alongside the formation of the Kurultai, the president outlined the future configuration of the executive branch. In accordance with the Constitution, Tokayev intends to submit candidates for vice president and prime minister to the deputies for consideration. Following consultations with the deputies, a new government will be formed. In addition, a deputy chairman of the Security Council will be appointed.

Thus, this is not simply a matter of replacing one parliament with another. Several elements of the state system are being restructured simultaneously. The Kurultai must establish its leadership and structure; the executive branch will receive new leadership; the position of vice president is being introduced; and an additional level of management is being created within the Security Council system. Taken together, these decisions point to a recalibration of the state’s entire institutional architecture.

Particular attention should therefore be paid to the future role of the vice president. The very creation of this position has the potential to alter the decision-making mechanism at the highest level. Much will depend on the individual appointed to the position and on the actual scope of his or her powers. If the vice president receives an independent political and coordinating function, the position could become an important link between the president, the government, and other state institutions. If, however, the role remains primarily administrative, the position will remain part of the broader presidential governance system.

The changing configuration of the Security Council is no less significant. The appointment of a deputy chairman indicates an intention to further institutionalize the mechanism for coordinating strategic and national security issues. Combined with the emergence of the vice presidency, this creates a new layer of high-level state governance, the significance of which will become clearer once the specific powers and areas of responsibility of the respective officials are defined.

At the same time, it is important not to interpret these developments as a complete dismantling of the previous system. The constitutional reform appears instead to be a restructuring of the existing governance model while preserving its central principle — a high degree of political manageability.

The political weight of the Kurultai itself will be particularly important. Will it have the ability not only to adopt legislation but also to exert a meaningful influence on the government’s activities? How significant will the deputies’ consultative and oversight functions become? Will the government acquire a more clearly defined political responsibility to parliament? The answers to these questions will show how fundamentally the new system differs from the previous one.

For now, however, the initial steps point more toward a gradual and controlled transition than toward a sharp transformation. The president is personally setting the sequence for establishing the new institutions, determining key personnel nominations, and linking their creation to the subsequent presentation of the annual address to the nation.

In this sense, the current session of the Kurultai is more a beginning than the completion of the reform. The adoption of the new Constitution has created the formal foundation for changing the system, but its real substance will be determined by subsequent decisions. It is precisely the personnel appointments, the distribution of powers, and the first practical interactions among institutions that will demonstrate how profound the declared transformation actually is.

For Kazakhstan, this is particularly important from the perspective of long-term political stability. Any new institutional model must not only appear convincing at the level of constitutional text, but also provide a clear mechanism for decision-making, the distribution of responsibility, and the continuity of power. The coming period will therefore serve as a kind of test of the viability of the new architecture.

Kazakh political scientist and political commentator, member of the Expert Club under the Senate of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, member of the Public Chamber under the Mazhilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and member of the Expert Council under the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Gaziz Abishev, notes that the political reform should not be viewed as a radical overhaul of Kazakhstan’s entire system of government. According to him, it is not an “extraordinary” or “super-fundamental” reform of the political system, since the republic remains a strong presidential republic. As the president himself previously emphasized at the closing of the final session of the previous parliament, the fundamental structure of state power remains intact.

The president continues to hold the main powers in the sphere of foreign policy, serves as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and remains the central figure in the political system as a whole. Therefore, the fundamental characteristic of Kazakhstan’s state structure has not changed following the reform: the head of state, possessing a direct popular mandate, remains the axis around which the entire system is organized.

For this reason, Abishev argues, the changes that have taken place should primarily be viewed as a fundamental reform of parliament. The main result has been the transformation of its structure — a transition from a bicameral to a unicameral system. At the same time, all deputies are elected directly: there are no deputies receiving mandates indirectly through local representative bodies, and there are no presidential quotas.

All parliamentary mandates are now effectively placed on an equal footing. Deputies are elected from political parties through a proportional system, while the legislature operates as a single chamber under new procedural rules. According to the expert, this is the key parliamentary change.

At the same time, once the formation of the Kurultai is completed, there is unlikely to be an equally far-reaching redistribution of powers among the main institutions of government. The president remains the key figure in the entire political system. Here, Abishev emphasizes, it is sufficient to refer to the head of state’s own public statements.

The president is also renewing the political class, doing so not only through institutional reforms but also through personnel policy. As an illustrative example, Abishev points to the appointment of Aibek Dadebay. In the expert’s view, his main advantage is that he is a person trusted by the president and someone who has worked closely with him.

Dadebay spent approximately 18 years working alongside the president in various positions. Prior to his current appointment, he headed the Presidential Administration; previously, he served as the president’s chief of staff and also worked as an adviser and assistant. During Tokayev’s tenure in Switzerland, when he served as Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dadebay also worked alongside him.

Thus, Abishev sees the president’s personnel policy as part of a broader process — the gradual renewal of the political class. People personally known to and trusted by the head of state are being appointed to key positions. In his view, this is part of the formation of a “New Kazakhstan” — a Kazakhstan that is, to a certain extent, distancing itself from the previous political model and the old political class.

The current prime minister, who is presently serving as head of government, is also indicative in this respect. It remains unclear whether he will retain the position going forward, but his emergence itself is significant. He is the first Kazakh prime minister who had not previously worked in government and, in particular, had not held government positions under Nursultan Nazarbayev.

As for the kind of Kurultai the president wants to see, Abishev believes it is more appropriate to focus not so much on specific personnel appointments as on the president’s own statements. The president has repeatedly spoken about the need for a professional parliament while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of bringing new people into it.

The current composition of parliament, in the expert’s view, largely corresponds to this approach. There has been a substantial renewal of the parliamentary corps: many representatives of the previous legislature failed to enter the new parliament, while a significant number of mandates went to mid-career specialists, sectoral professionals, and experts from various fields.

Thus, the renewal has taken place not only formally but also at the personal level. Abishev estimates that more than half of the parliament has been renewed, and possibly as much as two-thirds.

There is another important detail. A number of prominent populists who had previously been represented in various parties failed to enter the new parliament. This fact is also significant, the expert believes, as it indicates that the president is placing greater emphasis on competence and professionalism rather than political hype.

Tokayev has directly criticized this type of public political behavior. In his remarks at the August conference and subsequently at the first session of the new parliament, he again stressed that constant pursuit of publicity and endless public “lamenting” should not become the foundation of political work. Instead, professionalism, competence, and the ability to solve concrete problems should take priority.

It is in this direction, Abishev believes, that the work of the new parliament will develop. Its task is not merely to pass laws as such, but also to provide legislative support for ongoing processes and transformations. These include digitalization, improving the efficiency of public administration, enhancing budget policy, developing the economy, and addressing other practical challenges.

At the same time, Abishev specifically emphasizes that it would be incorrect to speak of a classic “triangle” of the Kurultai, the president, and the government, because these three institutions are not equal vertices of the political system. The president occupies an obviously central position and plays the key role in making strategic decisions.

As for the institution of the vice president, the expert likewise believes that one should not expect the emergence of an independent political center. The vice president does not possess sufficient institutional autonomy to become an independent political figure.

Yes, the vice president is appointed with the approval of the Kurultai, but the president can remove the vice president from office at any time. Moreover, the powers of the vice president are largely determined by the president himself. They include interaction with the government, the Kurultai, and other areas, but in practice the vice president operates within the powers and instructions of the head of state.

The question of what happens in the event of the early termination of the president’s powers is particularly important. In such a situation, the vice president becomes acting head of state. However, unlike under the previous constitutional model, the vice president does not have the opportunity simply to serve out the remainder of the presidential term.

Within two months, new presidential elections must be held, in which any candidate meeting the established requirements may potentially participate. Therefore, Abishev emphasizes, the current vice president does not become a figure capable of automatically inheriting presidential power and subsequently pursuing an independent political course.

Finally, speaking about the president’s annual address, Abishev notes that its significance should not be underestimated either. The address is traditionally a policy document that defines the main objectives for both the current year and the medium term. In this sense, the current address should be viewed as a continuation of the previous policy cycle. If last year’s address established priorities for the corresponding political and economic period, the current one sets the agenda for the next stage. Its significance therefore lies not only in outlining individual reforms, but also in defining the broader direction of the state’s future work.