The memorandum signed by the transport ministries of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and the UAE Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure on cooperation under the CASA railway project reflects a broader shift in Central Asia’s transport strategy. The proposed Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan railway is not simply another infrastructure project. It is part of an effort by landlocked Central Asian states to build a direct southern outlet to the Arabian Sea and reduce their dependence on a limited number of traditional trade corridors. At this stage, the parties are focused on feasibility studies, technical and economic assessments, infrastructure requirements and possible implementation models. Yet the composition of the initiative already reveals its strategic logic: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan bring existing railway networks and transit capacity, Pakistan offers access to the sea, Afghanistan provides the most direct land bridge between Central and South Asia, while the UAE can contribute capital, logistics expertise and experience in developing integrated port and transport infrastructure.
For Central Asia, access to the sea is a structural economic challenge. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are all landlocked, while Uzbekistan is one of only two double-landlocked countries in the world, meaning its goods must cross at least two borders before reaching an open-sea port. This raises transport costs, increases exposure to transit-country risks and makes trade more vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions, tariff changes and congestion along individual routes. As a result, transport diversification has become a central part of regional economic policy. To the west, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states are developing the Middle Corridor across the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye, primarily to improve access to European markets. The southern route serves a different strategic purpose: it would connect Central Asia directly to Pakistan’s ports and, from there, to the wider Indian Ocean trading system. These corridors should therefore be seen less as substitutes than as complementary gateways serving different markets.
Pakistan’s appeal in this configuration lies above all in its maritime infrastructure. Islamabad has already offered Kazakhstan access to the ports of Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar for cargo transit and has expressed readiness to develop joint logistics projects. For Kazakhstan, and potentially for the wider Central Asian region, these ports could provide access not only to Pakistan itself but also to the Gulf, East Africa, Southeast Asia and other Indian Ocean markets. Karachi and Port Qasim are already deeply integrated into international shipping networks, while Gwadar is strategically located on the Arabian Sea close to major maritime routes leading toward the Persian Gulf. Pakistan has also proposed joint ventures in special economic zones, closer cooperation between port operators, improved shipping links and simplified trade procedures. The opportunity for Central Asia is therefore broader than simply reaching the sea. It includes access to warehousing, processing, re-export operations and potentially new manufacturing and logistics chains linked to South Asian ports.
For Kazakhstan, this diversification is particularly significant. The country is already investing heavily in its westward connectivity through the Caspian and the South Caucasus, but relying on a single geographic direction would limit the very resilience that diversification is intended to create. A system in which goods can move westward toward Europe through the Middle Corridor and southward toward Pakistan and the Indian Ocean would give Kazakh exporters a much broader set of options. Grain, metals, chemicals and other commodities could be routed according to demand, freight costs and market conditions. Strategically, this would allow Kazakhstan to position itself not simply as a link between China and Europe, but as part of a wider multi-directional Eurasian transport network.
A similar logic is visible in Kyrgyzstan’s engagement with Pakistan. Bishkek and Islamabad have agreed to expand bilateral trade, attract investment and develop transport routes linking Central Asia to South Asian ports and global maritime corridors. For Kyrgyzstan, which also lacks direct access to the sea, southern connectivity could widen export options and reduce dependence on a narrow set of existing routes. At the same time, the relationship works in both directions. Pakistan sees Kyrgyzstan and the wider region as potential gateways into Central Asia and, beyond that, into the broader Eurasian market. In this sense, Central Asia is looking south for access to the ocean, while Pakistan is looking north for access to inland Eurasia.
The central challenge, however, is Afghanistan. Geographically, it is indispensable to the economic logic of the route; politically and infrastructurally, it is its greatest source of uncertainty. Without Afghan transit, the most direct railway connection between Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Pakistan largely disappears. Yet Afghanistan’s railway network remains extremely limited. A line already connects Uzbekistan’s border at Hairatan with Mazar-i-Sharif, but the crucial onward section toward Kabul and Pakistan would need to be built largely from scratch. This would not be a simple rehabilitation project. It would involve hundreds of kilometres of new railway through difficult terrain, together with bridges, tunnels, stations, signalling systems, border facilities and supporting infrastructure.
This makes the Afghan section potentially one of the most capital-intensive parts of the entire project. In addition to the cost of laying track, the parties would need to address interoperability, gauge differences, transshipment, customs infrastructure, security systems and the integration of the line into Pakistan’s network. Mountainous terrain would further increase construction and maintenance costs. The commercial viability of CASA therefore depends on more than political backing. Fundamental questions remain unresolved: who would finance the Afghan section, who would assume construction and security risk, what guarantees investors would receive, and whether projected freight volumes would be sufficient to justify the capital expenditure.
Afghanistan’s political environment adds another layer of complexity. Since the Taliban returned to power, engagement with the de facto authorities has remained difficult because of limited diplomatic recognition, sanctions-related constraints, banking restrictions and persistent concerns over security and governance. For a multi-country transport project, these are not abstract political issues; they translate directly into project risk. Long-term agreements would be needed on transit rights, customs procedures, infrastructure protection, land access and dispute resolution. Investors would also need confidence that the operating framework would remain stable over decades. In this context, political uncertainty in Afghanistan becomes a financial variable: the higher the perceived risk, the higher the cost of capital and the more difficult it becomes to mobilise private investment. The strategic question is therefore not whether Afghanistan has an interest in the project, but whether that interest can be translated into credible institutions: predictable tariffs, secure transit, reliable customs procedures and arrangements acceptable to international lenders and investors.
This is where the UAE’s participation becomes particularly significant. Abu Dhabi is not itself a transit country on the CASA route, but its involvement fits a broader pattern of growing Emirati engagement in Central Asia. The UAE’s economic interest in the region is driven by a combination of resource access, investment opportunities, geopolitical positioning and a broader strategy of diversifying international partnerships. According to the figures cited from the Eurasian Development Bank’s 2025 report on mutual investment across Eurasia, accumulated UAE investment in the wider Eurasian region rose steadily from 2016 through the first half of 2024, reaching $12.2 billion. Turkmenistan accounted for around $8 billion, Uzbekistan for approximately $2.2 billion and Kazakhstan for about $1.5 billion. This suggests that Central Asia is no longer a marginal investment destination for the Emirates but part of a sustained regional strategy.
The UAE also brings a specific set of logistics capabilities that could be relevant to CASA. Emirati companies have extensive experience in operating large ports, free zones and multimodal logistics platforms. Jebel Ali in Dubai is one of the region’s largest port and logistics hubs and is integrated with JAFZA, where port infrastructure is directly linked to warehousing, manufacturing and re-export activities. DP World operates port terminals and logistics assets across multiple regions and has experience connecting maritime infrastructure with dry ports, railways and inland logistics. In Abu Dhabi, AD Ports Group has developed a similar model around Khalifa Port, industrial zones and logistics services, while Etihad Rail has given the UAE direct experience in building a national railway network and integrating it with ports and industrial clusters.
The UAE also has its own strategic interest in such a role. By entering Central Asian transport projects at an early stage, Emirati companies can position themselves within future flows of commodities, food products, manufactured goods and container traffic between Eurasia and the Indian Ocean. This fits a broader UAE strategy of building and participating in logistics networks beyond its own borders. For a country with a relatively small domestic market, influence over international trade infrastructure can itself become a source of economic and geoeconomic leverage. The UAE’s role in CASA should therefore be understood not as external technical assistance, but as a potentially mutually beneficial attempt to integrate Central Asia into a wider logistics system connected to the Gulf.
Still, the commercial case remains unproven. The signing of a memorandum does not mean that the railway will necessarily be built. Specific routes, freight projections, project costs and implementation timelines have yet to be disclosed, and these will determine whether CASA can compete with existing alternatives. A shorter geographic route does not automatically mean a more competitive corridor. If transit through Afghanistan involves high insurance premiums, lengthy border procedures or unpredictable delays, much of the distance advantage could disappear. Conversely, if the participating countries can offer through-tariffs, coordinated customs procedures, regular services and credible security arrangements, the corridor could develop a viable freight base.
More broadly, CASA reflects an important change in Central Asia’s transport strategy. The region is trying to move away from dependence on one or two external routes and toward a network of alternative gateways to world markets. To the west lies the Middle Corridor through the Caspian and the South Caucasus. To the south, the Pakistani direction offers a potential route to the Indian Ocean. Other links through Iran, China and neighbouring states are also being developed. For Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the objective is not necessarily to identify a single “best” corridor, but to create competition among routes. The more viable options exporters have, the stronger their bargaining position and the less vulnerable their economies become to disruption on any one axis.