On February 24, 2026, four years will have passed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine — an event that forever altered Europe’s geopolitical map and escalated into a conflict with unprecedented consequences. Over these four years, Ukraine has endured massive destruction of infrastructure, severe losses in human capital, and profound economic and social challenges, yet it has demonstrated extraordinary moral resilience and the ability to mobilize resources to defend its independence.

The CASPIA Center presents an interview with Vladislav Olenchenko, founder of the Mikhailovsky Intellectual Club.

– The current conflict has already lasted four years. From your perspective, how has the strategic nature of this war changed—from an attempt at a rapid offensive to a prolonged war of attrition? What key factors drove this evolution?

– Let me remind you that initially this was not a full-scale war at all. It began as what was genuinely conceived as a “special military operation,” a plan developed in the Kremlin and, according to some reports, coordinated with the U.S. administration. Kremlin planned a rapid seizure of Kyiv within three days. However, the “special operation” phase ended in complete failure.

Ukraine and the Ukrainian people performed a genuine miracle, and to this day many still struggle to understand how it was possible. The situation resembled the events of the Maidan, when the population- amid an almost passive stance by the state and a lack of preparation on the part of government institutions—managed to self-organize. Horizontal civic organization became the first line of resistance. It was followed by armed, self-organized self-defense units, and only then by the army, initially at the level of individual units.

The passivity of certain state institutions was offset and neutralized precisely by this horizontal organization and by the population’s readiness to fight. This factor came as a complete surprise to the Kremlin, which had been fully confident in the success of its plan. Within a month, the war had effectively been lost by the Kremlin. As Russian forces were forced to retreat, leaving behind vast quantities of equipment and ammunition, Ukraine significantly strengthened its armed forces. At the time, there was a bitter joke that Russia had become Ukraine’s largest arms supplier.

The next phase of the war became known as the “firewall” or “fire curtain.” After the catastrophic failure of the initial operation, the Kremlin sought to disguise its defeats by creating the illusion that everything had unfolded according to plan. It resumed its offensive from the east, from the territory of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics. Russian forces advanced westward using “firewall” tactics, deploying, in some directions, up to a fiftyfold superiority in artillery, ammunition, tanks, aviation, and other weapon systems.

The Kremlin’s calculation was straightforward: Ukrainians would falter, the front would collapse, and the task of replacing Ukraine’s top political leadership in Kyiv could be accomplished. This plan, too, failed. Russian arsenals were depleted, while Ukraine possessed only a handful of HIMARS launch platforms supplied by the United States. Even fourteen such systems proved sufficient to demoralize the Russian army and force it to retreat from Ukrainian territory.

By the end of the summer of 2022, the “firewall” had exhausted itself. Ukraine launched a successful counteroffensive in the northern direction near Kharkiv, liberating Slobozhanshchyna and the Kharkiv region and routing a Russian force of around fifteen thousand troops. A similar operation was conducted in Kherson, where elite Russian units numbering between thirty and forty thousand soldiers found themselves encircled.

At this point, however, U.S. intervention became a critical factor. Washington began pressuring Kyiv to halt the encirclement of Russian forces, threatening escalation, including the nuclear option. The Director of the CIA and the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff effectively prevented Ukraine from encircling and destroying two major Russian groupings, which at that time constituted the backbone of the Russian army. Following this, President Vladimir Putin announced mobilization, expanded the theater of military operations, amended the Constitution, and attempted to compensate for the strategic failure—triggering a period of erratic, almost hysterical decision-making aimed at restoring lost capabilities.

The next phase of the war was the so-called Kremlin “counteroffensive project.” Combat operations during this period were less intense: both sides regrouped, brought in reserves, and trained new recruits. However, all of this was presented as Ukraine’s preparation for a major summer counteroffensive. The “counteroffensive” project became, above all, a public relations project of the Biden administration and, to some extent, of Ukraine. It envisaged frontal assaults by Ukrainian Defense Forces brigades against six layers of the “Surovikin Line” fortifications—without air support, without long-range missiles, and without sufficient armored vehicles. Air superiority remained firmly in Russian hands, and under such conditions, launching an offensive was sheer madness—something only brigades composed largely of newly mobilized troops could be pushed into. Yet this “madness” was only apparent.

The fourth war was fought by Ukraine largely on its own, after the United States suspended military, financial, and political assistance. It lasted approximately six months—from the autumn of 2023 to the spring of 2024. The fifth war continued almost until the U.S. presidential elections of 2024 and ended with Donald Trump’s return to the White House. This was followed by the sixth war, which unfolded amid a complete absence of U.S. pressure on Russia and a halt in aid to Ukraine, granting Moscow significant room to reconfigure its strategy.

This situation, in turn, prompted Europe to become more active. Beginning in 2025, European countries started providing Ukraine with weapons, ammunition, financial resources, and political support, gradually replacing the role previously played by the United States.

Today, the sixth war continues, with no clear end in sight. The more Donald Trump plays along with Putin, the more actively Europe mobilizes its resources, understanding that even a partial surrender of Ukraine will not sate the Kremlin’s ambitions. A catastrophe in Ukraine would inevitably lead to a catastrophe in Europe. Agreements between Putin and Trump—a kind of “Yalta 2.0”—have already been reached. Whether they are formalized orally or in writing is of secondary importance; what matters is that we are now witnessing the implementation of these arrangements through the joint actions of Trump and Putin on the political stage and in negotiations concerning Ukraine.

Thus, this is no longer merely a change in the strategic environment of the war—it is the sixth distinct war, each fundamentally different from the previous one. Each phase has had its own characteristics, tactical and strategic nuances, shaped by the interaction between the Ukrainian people, state institutions, external partners, and decisions taken within the Kremlin.

– Russia demonstrates resilience in sustaining the conflict despite enormous losses. How do you assess the Russian Federation’s military potential over the coming years and its ability to maintain high-intensity combat operations?

– In reality, the Kremlin policy should not be underestimated. Unfortunately for Ukraine, the Russian system learns quickly. It is capable of formulating problems systematically, setting objectives, designing solutions, assembling teams, and providing them with the resources required to implement specific plans. This process is almost technological in nature: teams are granted authority, adequate resources, and the freedom to act in a focused manner to achieve assigned tasks.

The Kremlin possesses considerable resilience, and Russia’s current capacity to wage war is largely determined by the physical and organizational functioning of its command center. Russia represents a peculiar social construct: citizenship there is often purely formal and in essence resembles subjecthood, or, more deeply, outright ownership of the people inhabiting the territory. 

Expecting a mass popular uprising in Russia at this stage is naïve; any real threat to the Kremlin can only come from within the elites.

This is precisely where the Russian government key vulnerability lies. Prior to the full-scale invasion, Russian elites were deeply integrated into the structure of the so-called Greater West. They enjoyed privileges and preferences, lived lavish lifestyles in Monaco, Nice, Paris, on yachts in the United States, and across other Western destinations. Today, however, these elites are squeezed by sanctions, exposed to the risk of legal proceedings in the West, and cut off from their habitual way of life. The Kremlin’s propaganda narrative of a “pivot to the East” may be acceptable to a coerced population or to naïve Europeans, but for the elites it is entirely unacceptable. None of them aspire to live in Shanghai or Beijing; their orientation is decisively toward the West and Europe.

An endless war guarantees a steady increase in risks for the elites, and it is here that the probability of an elite-led revolt emerges—a historically traditional mechanism of power change in Russia. Historical experience shows that elite-driven transitions almost always result in shifts in foreign policy and the termination of military conflicts. The Korean War serves as an example: Stalin’s death brought Soviet active involvement to an end, and the USSR quickly curtailed its operations and signed the necessary agreements.

At present, Vladimir Putin will wage this war endless. For him, there are no serious inconveniences or personal costs associated with continuing the conflict. On the contrary, propaganda and fear of external threats have consolidated the population, strengthened belief in the authority of the “tsar and the fatherland,” and enabled the Kremlin to completely eradicate internal opposition. Economically and politically disloyal oligarchs have been subdued, and their assets confiscated.

As a result, Putin has acquired virtually unlimited power and has no intention of changing the status quo. He will conduct the war at whatever level of intensity the regime is capable of sustaining, for the remainder of his life. The duration of the war will be determined not by fear of the future, but by the resolve of the Kremlin elites to protect their own self-interests—the interests of their families and children who live in, or aspire to live in, the West, and their personal well-being.

It is precisely these factors—the entrenchment of elite power, their fear of losing privileges, and their desire to preserve resources and influence—that will determine how long Russia can sustain its current level of military activity, despite all the obvious risks and the approaching catastrophe driven by the will of a single individual.

– How do you assess Ukraine’s potential in withstanding this pressure? What long-term changes in Kyiv’s defense strategy would you highlight over the past years?

– Ukraine’s defensive potential has already become a historic phenomenon—a genuine miracle. In circumstances where no country, no nation, had the slightest chance of holding back the Russian army, Ukraine managed to stand firm. The army had been completely demoralized, the defense system effectively dismantled, and the upper echelons of power and administration infiltrated with Russian spies and agents of influence.

And yet, thanks to horizontal, grassroots initiative, the people performed a miracle. The first phase of the war was held back by the efforts of a self-organized society. The second miracle occurred when the United States withdrew support—Ukraine demonstrated an unprecedented phenomenon. Even in the trenches, sometimes despite the state and official institutions, the population created new types of weapons, devised ways to use them, and invented entirely new methods of warfare.

These volunteer initiatives, drones, and innovations—often improvised from household appliances and makeshift materials—enabled the defeat of a 20th-century army operating under Kremlin command. The Kremlin, in turn, learned and drew conclusions—but on the battlefield, Ukrainian society displayed unprecedented innovative and engineering potential.

If we look at history, the Spartans defending their territory did not create new weapons or methods of warfare during their campaigns. Ukraine, however, has not only defended itself but has invented an entirely new form of warfare. This phenomenon has surprised even many of the world’s powerful actors.

Ukraine’s defensive potential often remains unknown even to Ukrainians, let alone to intelligence agencies and administrative offices. And while it certainly intimidates adversaries, Ukrainians demonstrate a readiness to defend, disrupt enemy plans, and act strategically. Casualties have been heavy and painful, of course—but there is no idea, nor any expectation, of surrendering to the mercy of the Kremlin.

– After four years of war, the West continues to affirm its support for Ukraine, but at the same time there is pressure and requests to limit the conflict. How do you assess the real political will of the U.S. and the EU to bring the conflict to a strategic Ukrainian victory, rather than a prolonged status quo?

– First, it’s important to distinguish between concepts. The phenomenon once referred to as the “united West” no longer exists. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, it became clear that the United States, as a governmental machine and central administration, has its own strategy. That strategy is to help Putin achieve the unconditional capitulation of Ukraine, with subsequent transfer of political control of Kyiv into Moscow’s hands. 

Europe, on the other hand, represents the fragment of the West that has remained intact. Its strategy is fundamentally different: to use all available means to help Ukraine hold its defense, while preparing for direct confrontation with the Kremlin, fully understanding the inevitability of conflict.

Europe is actively reviving its military-industrial complex, integrating the industrial and defense potential of Ukraine and Europe into a unified whole: joint ventures, direct financing of Ukrainian drone and weapons manufacturers by individual countries and the EU. These are the realities of 2025—the struggle against the Kremlin continues, and there is no question of a “status quo.” The aggressor cannot be rewarded; it will be punished.

We see this in practice: visits by European Parliament leaders, representatives from the Baltic states, and Scandinavia—all are ready for direct armed confrontation with Russia. They do not fear it, understanding that when war is inevitable, it is better to choose the time and place themselves rather than wait for the enemy to impose conditions. This, in turn, forms the blueprint for future confrontation, even without direct U.S. involvement.

– In light of the new American administration and its plans, how likely is a shift in Western strategy (for example, toward reducing support for Ukraine to achieve de-escalation), and what risks does this entail?

– These dynamics have already played out—every form of pressure on Ukraine has been observed in practice. The United States has demonstrated political, psychological, and moral pressure, as well as limitations on military assistance. All of this has already taken place.

Yet the nature of the conflict is extremely simple and uncompromising. As Golda Meir once said, “We want to live, and our enemies want us not to exist.” In the context of Ukraine, this means that the Kremlin seeks to destroy the state, the ethno-national identity of its people, its culture, and its history. Ukraine, in contrast, seeks only to exist. The space for compromise here is extremely narrow.

Any discussions of de-escalation or peacekeeping inevitably follow this simple formula: either Ukraine agrees to the cessation of its own existence, or it continues to fight. The United States has already done everything possible to pressure Kyiv: it has cut certain forms of aid, imposed restrictions, and applied diplomatic pressure. Yet in practice, this does not work.

Recent events confirm this: Davos, followed by the reactivation of the Geneva negotiation group—these may appear as negotiation processes, but in reality they simulate activity serving the interests of certain factions, rather than creating genuine conditions for ending the conflict or ensuring safe de-escalation.

– How do you assess China’s role in either restraining or escalating the conflict, given its strategic rivalry with the U.S. and its aim to strengthen influence in Eurasia?

– That’s an excellent question. China is currently sitting on the hill, carefully observing the developments. At this stage, it is a key beneficiary of the conflict. Was this entirely intentional, or did it happen by chance? Most likely, it is a mix of both.

First, China has gained new markets. Russia is forced to purchase a wide array of goods and technologies, including military assets. Second, China gains access to technologies it previously lacked—allowing it to understand how a new type of war is conducted, what resources and approaches are required, and how to prepare its own forces for future scenarios.

However, there is an important nuance. For the so-called “Yalta 2.0”—the arrangement between Trump and Putin—China does not need Russia to acquire Ukraine or half of Europe. If Putin pushes further, Europe might capitulate, and then cities like Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest could see the emergence of “leaders”, supposedly chosen through popular elections.

That outcome is not in China’s interest. Hence, Europe and China become positional allies—to prevent Europe from being divided between the U.S. and Russia. The more successful Trump is with Putin in this partition scenario, the more actively China will intervene to counter the possibility of a complete and uncontrolled breakup.

Of course, it is beneficial for China if Russia is weakened by the war—this creates opportunities in Siberia and the Far East, as well as economic and political leverage through so-called “people’s republics.” But China is closely monitoring Putin’s policies and the Kremlin, and it can signal discontent if necessary. In this way, China acts deliberately: it extracts benefits but actively restrains scenarios that could lead to an unpredictable and uncontrollable collapse of Europe.

– Against the backdrop of attempts at peace negotiations: can a peace process have any real chance today if the parties hold radically opposing positions on territorial integrity and security?

– Paradoxically, the peace process always has a chance. Even if it appears minimal, it must be attempted. But there is a nuance: what externally looks like a peace process can, in practice, be anything—from a negotiation exercise to an attempt to coerce the victim into unacceptable conditions.

This is especially relevant now because the negotiation process is being actively driven by the Trump administration. He is the one keeping it from stalling. But it is crucial to understand: even simulated negotiations will stall if they are not backed by real interests. For Trump, this is not about peace—it is about domestic political objectives, about cultivating the image of a great peacemaker. In reality, he is concerned only with his own advantage, though the framing is explained to the public.

Therefore, the process we are witnessing today will not lead to genuine peace. A completely different negotiation format is needed, one that includes both Europe and China with independent, public positions. Without this, any attempt by the U.S. and Putin to impose conditions on Ukraine is doomed.

It is important to understand: Russia does not intend to relinquish power through any elections, whether democratic or international. Red lines have already been crossed, and the U.S. will have to face the consequences. Any true peace process is only possible with the participation of multiple key players, where the interests of Ukraine, Europe, and China are genuinely taken into account, rather than being a simulation for political PR purposes.

– According to Western estimates, Ukraine may need hundreds of thousands of additional personnel and a significant reinforcement of its armaments. How do you assess the real capacity of the Ukrainian army to expand its potential, and which reforms are most critical in this regard?

– Indeed, the personnel issue is extremely acute. The fifth year of war on an unprecedented scale is already underway, and the strain on the army is enormous. However, as is well known, Ukraine has seen a significant renewal of leadership at the Ministry of Defense. Mikhail Fedorov has taken the helm—a figure primarily known as a manager and organizer from the IT sector—who has successfully launched a high-tech cluster in UAV production, established investment funds, and secured financing for new projects, including small startups.

The new Ministry of Defense team has already indicated plans to fundamentally revise the principles of mobilization: transitioning from traditional compulsory conscription toward a professional contract army. In effect, forced conscription is expected to be gradually minimized or eliminated entirely.

At the same time, Europe recognizes its own interests and is willing to fund these changes. Let’s be frank: it is more advantageous for Europe to support contract soldiers in Ukraine than to face a catastrophe in which the front line breaks and European countries are forced to rapidly create and finance their own forces.

This is why funding for contract personnel will be provided—otherwise the risks for Europe and NATO countries are simply too high. In the next six months, I expect a radical shift in the principles for forming the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ personnel. This will be as rational and well-considered as the launch of innovative UAV projects by the new Ministry of Defense team, which provide the country with a technological edge on the battlefield.

– How do you assess the long-term risks for Ukraine associated with the depletion of personnel, equipment, and resources? What pathways for strategic recovery do you see?

– There is much discussion about reconstruction programs. However, unfortunately, when we talk about recovery programs, one can never lose sight of the need to achieve peace. The problem of resource exhaustion is a natural challenge faced by any country at war. There are many ways to address it.

First and foremost, people are the country’s greatest asset. After the war, it will be the people who shape Ukraine’s future, and it is extremely important that they have motivation, an understanding of the significance of their role, and the opportunity to return to Ukraine to actively participate in the reconstruction of infrastructure, the economy, and social institutions.

But it is not only about people. Financial resources also play a critical role. Much of the state’s wartime expenditure is funded through borrowed capital, and these obligations will need to be managed, including decisions on debt management and potential negotiations for the partial forgiveness of significant liabilities.

At the same time, it can safely be said that solutions to these issues do exist. They are actively being discussed, and these options vary not only in terms of radicalism but also in terms of traditional approaches and implementation methods. However, it is still too early to decide precisely how strategic recovery will be carried out.

There is still time, and the selection of a particular path can be made later. For now, it is important to discuss these questions, analyze potential approaches, assess consequences, and lay the groundwork for a comprehensive post-war recovery of Ukraine, ensuring that the approach is thoughtful, systematic, and realistic.

– What long-term consequences for European security do you foresee if the war drags on for decades? How do you assess NATO’s readiness to defend the eastern flank and the likelihood of direct military confrontation with Russia?

– To be blunt, NATO’s readiness today to defend Europe and to face a possible confrontation with Russia is zero.

Primarily, this is linked to the position of the United States. In their doctrinal document, the National Security Strategy, it is explicitly stated that the European Union should be dissolved, and European countries are, in effect, expected to balance military power and the threat from Russia on their own, through regional groupings of states.

These documents do not state that NATO is obliged to perform this function. Against the backdrop of deep divergences between European and U.S. strategic positions, we must soberly acknowledge that NATO, in its previous form, effectively no longer exists as a real North Atlantic military alliance in which one party is ready to defend another militarily.

This is confirmed not by statements, but by practice. Today, for example, there is escalation between the U.S. and Israel around Iran: fleets are mobilized, carrier groups deployed, military presence strengthened. At the same time, France and the U.K. have refused to allow the U.S. to use their bases for American aircraft—whether as a demonstration of force or preparation for possible strikes against Iran.

These practical indicators speak far more than any public assurances of “unity” or “solidarity” within NATO. NATO will not defend Europe, NATO will not engage in direct armed confrontation with Russia. Consequently, prolonging the war—or ending it—is a matter that falls exclusively on the shoulders of European elites.

Here, Europe has a historical opportunity—or indeed, a necessity—to demonstrate political maturity, strategic thinking, and to leverage its centuries-long experience of survival in complex security systems.

It is entirely possible that Europe will need to seek allies beyond the traditional Atlantic model—perhaps in China, perhaps in Central Asia. Certainly, Europe will need to pay close attention to Turkey and Azerbaijan.

As we know, Turkey has long been considered part of the European space—albeit with a different cultural matrix and historical contradictions—but objectively, Turkey has more in common with Europe than, say, Europe does with China or Indonesia. There is much to discuss here, with numerous intersecting interests, especially in the realm of security.

Ultimately, the long-term consequences of this war for European security will be determined by how it ends. The configuration of the war’s conclusion will shape the entire future security architecture of the continent. This architecture will include not only EU countries, but also Turkey with its interests, Azerbaijan, and Central Asian states.

These are not players on the scale of the U.S., but they are states whose voices can carry significant—and sometimes decisive—weight in shaping a new European security system.

– How do you assess the role of Ukrainian society, its moral resilience, and the country’s ability to mobilize human and intellectual resources for a long-term struggle?

– This is indeed a very important question, especially in the context of a full-scale invasion. But in reality, Ukraine and Ukrainian society began demonstrating moral resilience, mobilization capacity, and horizontal self-organization not in 2022, but back in 2014.

In fact, Ukraine—and above all the Ukrainian people—have been living in a state of war, fighting, enduring, helping, financing, and sustaining resistance for twelve years. From 2014 to 2022, this was an attempt to lull Ukrainian society, orchestrated by many actors, including elements of the domestic Ukrainian political establishment.

Society was told that “peace is near,” that the Minsk agreements existed, and that there were certain formulas for resolution. In reality, all of this was preparation for a Russian military intervention disguised as a “civil war.” The Minsk agreements and all these Steinmeier formulas served no other function than to conceal the aggression, to present the invasion as an internal conflict—allegedly a “march of Donbas miners on Kyiv,” whom nobody supposedly listened to.

That ruse failed. For twelve years, Ukrainian society has shown unprecedented resilience, and over the past four years, it has endured a war of absolutely unprecedented scale: in terms of casualties, volume of ammunition, artillery and missile strikes, destruction of energy and civilian infrastructure, and deaths. And through all this, there is not even a hint of readiness to give up “to the mercy of the victor.”

This is truly a phenomenon that no powerful actors predicted before the invasion. Not only in Russia, but also in the U.S. and Europe. It was assumed that for Putin, marching into Kyiv would be a “walk in the park.”

Similarly, Ukrainian society was underestimated during the first and second Maidan. It was assumed that Kremlin-backed puppets, Donetsk criminal groups, and election fraud would make resistance impossible. Yet the Euromaidan arose. Later, there was an attempt to reverse the country, to draw it into the Customs Union—and the people rose again. Nobody expected it. Nobody predicted that Ukrainians could expel Yanukovych after the dispersal of peaceful protests and the beating of students.

And in 2022, nobody expected that the people could mobilize, endure, and survive everything—including the harsh winter on which the Kremlin had counted. Putin’s calculation was simple: to freeze, demoralize, and intimidate Ukrainian society, forcing it to accept humiliating “peace” terms—that is, capitulation.

But if we return to assessing the role of Ukrainian society, it has demonstrated unprecedented, unexpected self-organization capacities that were not forecast even by the most advanced intelligence services and the most informed political circles. And yes, that is precisely what has alarmed many observers.

As for domestic sentiments within Ukraine, there are no signs of readiness to cease the struggle. Nobody is calling for “peace at any cost.” Ukraine knows too well what Moscow occupation entails. Against this backdrop, a month in freezing conditions without electricity or water is not a price for survival—it is a trial the society is ready to endure. People are willing to suffer because they understand all too well what awaits on the other side.

– In your view, what strategic mistakes were made at the early stage of the conflict, and what are your forecasts through the end of the current year?

– It is obvious that an end to active hostilities is not yet in sight. Peace in the near term is not visible, because the logic of the Russian government remains unchanged. The Kremlin assumes that it can destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, undermine its military-industrial production, and break the will to resist. They believe they have the resources and that the longer they prolong the war, the greater the gains they will achieve in the future.

Ukraine’s position, however, is geometrically opposite. The logic is straightforward: either capitulation or resistance with weapons in hand. If, for example, holding Slavyansk or Kostiantynivka costs the Kremlin hundreds of thousands of its own citizens, it will radically reduce the it’s ability to continue the war further. Therefore, nobody in Ukraine is prepared to capitulate, and nobody expects “the mercy of the victor.” This is precisely why Donald Trump lacks real instruments of pressure —  neither on Ukraine nor on Europe.

Europe has already realized that security is its own responsibility, not the concern of some “kind American uncles.” Consequently, the U.S. will gradually step back from the process, increasingly absorbed in domestic political struggles, particularly in the context of Congressional elections.

There is a high probability that the war will continue into 2026, but with a reduction in the intensity of hostilities. We are likely to see the formation of a new military-political configuration: a coalition of Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Scandinavian countries. There will also be increasing pressure on the transport of Russian resources through the Baltic and Black Seas, sharply reducing Russia’s financial capabilities.

Direct armed incidents around the blockade of Russian tankers are quite possible—no longer between Ukraine and Russia, but between Russia and Baltic or Scandinavian countries. Recent statements by Sergey Narishkin, head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, about alleged intentions by France and the UK to supply Ukraine with nuclear weapons, are not coincidental. The Kremlin understands that it is in a difficult situation.

Ukraine, in exchange for relinquishing its nuclear arsenal, received security guarantees that were not fulfilled. Moscow knows this. Therefore, they also understand that Ukraine has the moral and political right to restore its nuclear status as a strategic deterrent. The emergence of Ukrainian nuclear weapons would not be an escalation factor—in fact, it would help cool hot heads in the Kremlin. Ukraine possesses nuclear power plants, a strong scientific community, missile engineering, drone technologies, and an industrial base. No one would want to test what that entails in practice.

The U.S. will certainly oppose this, alongside Moscow. But history has examples of allies acting without permission. France, for instance, once left NATO, conducted nuclear tests, and later rejoined. As Golda Meir once said: “We do not have nuclear weapons. But if our existence is threatened, we will use them.” This is a formula that, at a certain point, could be voiced by Ukraine.

As for forecasts: a complete cessation of hostilities by the end of autumn should not be expected. However, there are solid grounds to believe that the intensity of the war will noticeably decline. The ultimate resolution of the conflict is unpredictable—there are too many variables: global, American, and Russian.

Ukraine understands its objectives. Europe is beginning to understand its own responsibilities as well—and realizes that without Ukraine, it becomes easy prey for the Kremlin and for potential great-power deals behind its back. Therefore, the partnership between Ukraine and Europe in 2026 will only strengthen. And the Kremlin will certainly not see Ukraine capitulate in 2026.

Regarding strategic mistakes: the key error of Ukraine at the early stage was an excessive faith in the words of the U.S. and the so-called “united West.” Guarantees, support, and assistance were promised. But when it came time to act, the United States evacuated its embassy, signaling directly to the aggressor that there would be no direct confrontation and that Ukraine could be abandoned. The evacuation of embassies always signals the inevitability of disaster. It implied: “We are leaving to avoid crossing paths.” In Ukraine, this was perceived as a betrayal—painful and profound.

History knows such examples. In the past, Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon made a behind-the-scenes deal that effectively surrendered South Vietnam. Ukraine then felt like South Vietnam. But Ukraine is not Vietnam. This is Europe. Two Maidans and a society that has learned to close ranks.

The second strategic mistake was believing in the rationality of the Kremlin. Many Ukrainians, until the last moment, considered Russia a “brotherly nation,” assuming it was madness to start a war with a neighbor. 

Ukraine has internalized this lesson. And it has become a lesson for the entire world. Today, the question arises more often: where is international law, and who is really willing to trust U.S. security guarantees? This is a very complex and dangerous process of transformation for the entire Western world. Whether it will emerge from it in a controlled manner is far from certain.