Following the end of the active phase of the Karabakh conflict, the South Caucasus has entered a period of profound political transformation. Today, the regional agenda extends far beyond negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, encompassing the formation of a new security architecture, the reopening of transport links, shifts in the balance of power among external actors, and the search for a new model of regional economic development.
How close are the parties to achieving a final settlement? What domestic political dynamics in Armenia are shaping the prospects for peace? Can economic interdependence replace decades of confrontation? How has public perception of security evolved in the aftermath of recent events? And what roles will the European Union, Russia, the United States, Iran, Türkiye, and China play in the future of the South Caucasus?
CASPIA presents an interview with Robert Gevondyan, an Armenian political scientist, expert of the NGO "Armenian Council" and analyst specializing in Armenia’s domestic politics, regional security, Armenia–Azerbaijan relations, electoral processes, and foreign policy.
-Many observers argue that Armenia and Azerbaijan have, for the first time, moved beyond simply ending the conflict and are now approaching the creation of a new regional security architecture. In your view, what remains the primary obstacle today: Armenia’s domestic political dynamics, competition among regional and extra-regional powers, or the persistent lack of mutual trust?
-If we examine what continues to hinder the further development of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations, several factors must be taken into account simultaneously. These include competition among external actors—both extra-regional and certain regional powers—as well as the deep-rooted mistrust that has developed between the two societies over decades of conflict.
However, in my opinion, the principal obstacle lies elsewhere. The main problem is that Azerbaijan has so far been reluctant to transition from a conflict-driven approach to a genuine peace agenda.
As far as Armenia is concerned, both the government and the majority of society are currently focused on advancing the peace process as quickly as possible. Naturally, it would be unrealistic to expect Armenians and Azerbaijanis to become friends in the near future after such a prolonged conflict. However, Armenian society is prepared for normal interstate relations, the reopening of borders, the expansion of trade, the restoration of transport links, and the direct transit of goods without relying on third countries. It is precisely this model of interaction that, in my view, Armenia is already ready to embrace.
At the same time, I do not yet see a comparable level of readiness on the part of Baku. This remains the key factor slowing the development of bilateral relations and preventing the realization of what could already exist today: open borders, a signed peace agreement, and full-fledged economic cooperation.
-Assuming that Armenia and Azerbaijan achieve a comprehensive settlement in the coming years, what do you see as the next stage? Is it realistic to move from a model of “peace without cooperation” to one of economic interdependence, or will the conflict simply shift into the political and diplomatic sphere?
-I believe that the transition from ending the conflict to developing economic cooperation could occur much faster than many people currently expect. The economy has the ability to transform even political relationships. That is why both countries should be prepared to establish close economic ties and mutual interdependence.
Essentially, there are only two alternatives: states either continue to remain in conflict, or they begin cooperating, at least economically. Today, the original subject of the conflict has, in practical terms, ceased to exist. For that reason, I consider the gradual development of economic interdependence between Armenia and Azerbaijan to be the most likely scenario.
However, one important condition must be met: both sides need to act more quickly. Azerbaijan’s slow pace, combined with a certain degree of hesitation—or perhaps even apprehension—on the part of the Armenian authorities, could result in the current window of opportunity being lost amid potentially unfavorable geopolitical developments. That is why advancing the peace agenda requires a sense of political urgency.
-Debates over a new Constitution continue within Armenia. To what extent is this process purely about domestic reform, and to what extent has it become part of a broader regional bargain aimed at achieving lasting peace?
-In reality, discussions surrounding a new Constitution have largely run their course. The primary reason lies in Armenia’s current domestic political realities. The existing composition of parliament does not allow for a constitutional referendum to take place.
Under the current legal framework, a draft Constitution can only be submitted to a referendum with the support of two-thirds of parliament. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan does not command such a majority. To secure the required number of votes, he would have to gain the backing of part of the opposition.
However, in my view, both major opposition forces represented in parliament today are largely aligned with the interests of the Russian Federation. Consequently, obtaining the necessary parliamentary support would effectively require reaching an understanding with the Kremlin.
Personally, I find such a scenario highly unlikely. It is obvious that Moscow would insist on incorporating constitutional provisions reflecting Russian interests. I do not believe that Armenia’s current leadership and Prime Minister Pashinyan in particular could agree to such conditions. Therefore, under the existing political configuration, holding a constitutional referendum appears virtually impossible.
For this reason, the constitutional issue will most likely be postponed until the next parliamentary elections, tentatively scheduled for 2031. As a result, Armenia and Azerbaijan will probably have to seek a final settlement without resolving this issue first.
-Whereas Armenian politics was once defined by the rivalry between the “old” and the “new” elites, what idea or political divide is likely to shape competition over the next five years?
-Regarding Armenia’s domestic political outlook, I remain rather skeptical about the emergence of a fundamentally new ideological agenda in the coming years.
Most likely, until the parliamentary elections in 2031, political life will continue to revolve around the confrontation between the current authorities and the former political elite. This rivalry will remain the defining feature of public political debate.
The foundations of this scenario are already visible today. Parliament essentially reflects two political camps: the current government led by Nikol Pashinyan and forces associated with the previous political establishment, including Robert Kocharyan and Samvel Karapetyan.
In my opinion, Samvel Karapetyan is gradually becoming one of the principal mobilizing figures for those segments of the former political establishment seeking to regain influence. I also believe that both Robert Kocharyan and Samvel Karapetyan maintain close ties with Russia and will largely represent Kremlin interests within Armenian politics.
Therefore, I do not expect substantive ideological competition based on alternative visions for Armenia’s development. The primary political struggle will likely remain confined to the existing confrontation.
-Has Armenia’s defeat in Karabakh fundamentally changed the public understanding of national security? How willing is society to abandon previous strategic assumptions in favor of a more pragmatic development model?
-In my view, Karabakh has never been the sole foundation of Armenian society’s perception of national security. Both before and after the conflict, there has been an understanding that Armenia is geographically situated between two Turkic states. This is an objective reality that cannot be changed.
What fundamentally changed after the Second Karabakh War was something different. While Armenia controlled Karabakh, a significant portion of society believed that an external power would guarantee Armenia’s security in the event of a major crisis. That external guarantor was widely perceived to be Russia.
Following the events of recent years, those expectations have largely disappeared. Armenian society has increasingly come to realize that no state will automatically guarantee Armenia’s security should threats arise from Türkiye or Azerbaijan.
Of course, different views still exist. Representatives of the former government argue that Russia could have provided assistance but refrained from doing so solely because of mistakes made by Armenia’s current leadership. However, I believe that the majority of society no longer shares this assessment.
The current government promotes a different security model. It argues that reducing risks depends not on finding another external patron but on building constructive relations with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye. A considerable part of society supports this approach.
Therefore, it is fair to say that Armenia is gradually moving toward a more pragmatic understanding of its own security. Nevertheless, I would not characterize this as a complete transformation of public consciousness. The process is still unfolding, and it is too early to draw definitive conclusions.
-Armenia is simultaneously deepening relations with the European Union, remaining a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, and continuing cooperation with Russia in several areas. Where are the limits of this multi-vector foreign policy? At what point could maintaining such a balance become impossible?
-Armenia is indeed pursuing several foreign policy directions simultaneously. Recently, legislation was adopted formally establishing the country's course toward European integration. This reflects Armenia’s gradual deepening of cooperation with the European Union and with Europe’s political, economic, and civilizational space.
At present, however, Armenia has not yet reached the point where it must make a definitive geopolitical choice. Developing relations with the European Union does not currently prevent the country from maintaining economic cooperation with Russia. That is why the existing multi-vector model remains viable.
Nevertheless, this situation cannot continue indefinitely. Sooner or later, Armenia will have to make a strategic decision. It is difficult to predict exactly when that moment will arrive. Personally, however, I believe Armenian society has already made its civilizational choice.
I consider Armenia to be part of European civilization and believe that it is steadily moving toward deeper integration with Europe—not only politically, but also economically and institutionally.
The only remaining question is timing. Considerable work still lies ahead, and this process is unlikely to be completed quickly. Yet I hope that when the moment for a final choice arrives, Armenia’s leadership will possess sufficient political will to make that decision.
-How realistic is the prospect of Armenia becoming an arena for competition among the EU, the United States, Russia, and Iran? What risks would such a scenario create for Armenia itself?
-From both political and geopolitical perspectives, I do not believe Armenia is capable of becoming a full-scale arena of global competition among the world's major powers.
The primary reason lies in the country’s limited resources. Despite its advantageous geographical position, Armenia remains a relatively small state in terms of territory, economic capacity, and natural resources. Consequently, large-scale geopolitical rivalry centered on Armenia appears unlikely.
The situation is entirely different in the economic sphere. This is precisely where competition among external actors is already becoming increasingly visible, and I regard this as a positive development.
The more countries and international companies become interested in establishing an economic presence in Armenia, the greater the opportunities available to the country itself. Economic competition expands Yerevan’s room for maneuver and allows it to derive greater benefits from cooperation with multiple partners.
-Following the recent war between Israel and Iran, the Armenian-Iranian dimension has gained additional significance. If Iran either weakens or strengthens in the coming years, how might this affect Yerevan’s strategic approach?
-Relations between Armenia and Iran do not depend solely on the balance of power in the Middle East or on whether Tehran’s international position strengthens or weakens.
For Armenia, Iran remains an immediate neighbor and one of its key strategic partners. Given that several other foreign policy directions face objective constraints, the Iranian vector has acquired particular importance for Armenian foreign policy.
Therefore, I do not believe that changes in Iran’s regional strength would fundamentally alter the nature of Armenia–Iran relations. These relations follow their own strategic logic and are primarily based on the long-term interests of both countries.
Naturally, one would like to see an Iranian leadership that regards Armenia as an equally important partner, just as Armenia views Iran. Overall, however, I do not expect any major changes in bilateral relations regardless of developments elsewhere in the region.
-Today, the Middle Corridor is evolving from a transport route into an instrument of geopolitical competition. What role could Armenia play in this emerging architecture if the current projects are successfully implemented?
-When discussing the Middle Corridor, it is important to recognize that the countries of the region have different interests. For Azerbaijan, this route effectively has no full-fledged alternative.
For Armenia and Georgia, however, the situation is different. There is objective competition between them regarding participation in the regional transport system. Yet this competition does not necessarily have to be destructive. On the contrary, it can become mutually beneficial if Yerevan and Tbilisi coordinate their efforts rather than obstruct one another.
Azerbaijan also plays an extremely important role in this process. Today, Azerbaijan already has well-established transport connections with Georgia. Comparable links with Armenia are only beginning to emerge.
This brings me back to the central point of our conversation. I would once again emphasize that Baku’s slow transition toward a comprehensive peace agenda does not serve the interests of the region as a whole. It is disadvantageous not only for Armenia but also for Azerbaijan itself. Moreover, it does not align with Türkiye’s interests, given that Türkiye has every prerequisite to become one of the largest transit hubs within the Middle Corridor.
If Azerbaijan demonstrates equal interest not only in projects passing through southern Armenia but also in developing the northern route, while Armenia simultaneously undertakes the necessary modernization of its own infrastructure, then both railway corridors, together with road connections, could become an important part of the transport system linking China, the Asia-Pacific region, and Europe.
Much will also depend on external investors. Above all, I am referring to the United States, the European Union, and China. According to the assessments I trust, these actors are prepared to invest in such projects. However, the initiative now lies within the region itself. The ball is primarily in the courts of Baku and Yerevan.
If both countries successfully adapt to the new realities and are guided by economic pragmatism, tangible results may emerge far sooner than many currently anticipate.
-If we imagine the South Caucasus in 2035, what model of regional order appears most likely? Which indicators already suggest the trajectory the region is following?
-I would not claim with a high degree of confidence to know exactly what the South Caucasus will look like by 2035. The processes currently shaping the region’s new architecture will require many years to produce tangible results, and any forecast inevitably remains probabilistic.
If current trends continue, if Armenia, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Iran, Russia, the United States, the European Union, China, and other interested actors proceed along the trajectories visible today—then by 2035 the region will undoubtedly look very different. New transport corridors will emerge. The economic landscape will be transformed. New logistics routes will develop. The South Caucasus will become significantly more economically interconnected.
However, this does not mean that geopolitical competition will disappear. On the contrary, I believe rivalry among the major external powers will persist. This will involve not only economic competition but also competition driven by geopolitical interests. In other words, economic integration alone will not eliminate the strategic contradictions between the world's leading powers.
One important qualification should be added. All these assessments are valid only if current developments continue along the trajectory we observe today. International politics rarely unfolds according to predetermined scenarios. History has repeatedly demonstrated that unexpected crises occur far more frequently than politicians and experts anticipate.
Therefore, while striving to expand cooperation, reduce tensions, and build a new regional architecture, the states of the South Caucasus must also remain prepared for potential crises.
It is essential not only to plan for the future but also to anticipate the possibility of new challenges that could substantially alter the trajectory of the region’s development.