The changing global environment as the main catalyst of Chinese policy

A common explanation for China’s growing activity in Georgia is the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At first glance, this explanation appears entirely logical. Over the past decade, it has been precisely through the BRI that China has actively invested in the development of transport infrastructure, ports, railways, and logistics hubs stretching from Southeast Asia to Europe. However, if Georgia’s trajectory is viewed exclusively through the lens of this initiative, a legitimate question arises: why did the significant expansion of China’s presence in Georgia occur only almost ten years after the launch of the BRI?

If the initiative itself had been the main driver of China’s activity, large-scale investments, a strategic partnership, and intensive political dialogue between Beijing and Tbilisi should have begun much earlier. In practice, this did not happen. Moreover, until the early 2020s, the South Caucasus remained a relatively peripheral direction of Chinese policy. China showed little intention of turning the region into a key element of its Eurasian strategy, while Georgia clearly received less attention than Central Asia, Southeast Asia, or Pakistan.

This is why the explanation for the processes now underway should be sought not so much in the internal logic of Chinese foreign policy as in the radical transformation of the international environment. It was not Beijing that changed its long-term objectives; rather, the global architecture of trade, logistics, and security changed, forcing China to reassess the importance of a number of regions that had previously been regarded as secondary. The South Caucasus was one of them.

For several decades, China’s economic model was built around a relatively stable international trading system. The PRC’s export-oriented economy depended on the uninterrupted functioning of global supply chains, while maintaining open access to European markets was a key condition for continued growth. As long as the existing transport architecture functioned efficiently, China had little need to seek alternative routes for delivering goods.

Until 2022, the main overland trade route between China and Europe ran through Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus. It had the most developed railway infrastructure, substantial capacity, and relatively low transportation costs. Despite the political disagreements between Russia and Western countries, logistics companies regarded the route as relatively predictable and commercially viable.

However, Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine fundamentally altered the existing balance. The introduction of extensive sanctions against Moscow, restrictions in the banking sector, rising insurance costs, the refusal of some European companies to use Russian territory for transit, and the overall increase in political risks meant that the northern route could no longer be viewed solely as an economic project. It became a route exposed to significant geopolitical risks.

At the same time, it is important to note that China did not abandon the Russian route. On the contrary, trade between Moscow and Beijing continued to grow, while rail transportation across Russian territory retained considerable importance for the Chinese economy. However, Chinese strategic thinking has traditionally been guided by the principle of minimizing strategic risks. For Beijing, the problem was not the existence of the northern route, but the danger of excessive dependence on a single corridor. The history of recent decades has repeatedly demonstrated that any transportation artery can become subject to political pressure, sanctions, or military conflict. Consequently, the resilience of foreign trade depends not on the efficiency of a single route, but on the availability of multiple interchangeable transport corridors.

Almost simultaneously, another problem emerged that forced Beijing to reassess its logistical calculations. The escalation of the Red Sea crisis and Houthi attacks on commercial shipping demonstrated the vulnerability of the maritime route through the Suez Canal, one of the most important arteries of global trade. Many of the world’s largest shipping companies were forced to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. This increased delivery times, drove up transportation costs and insurance premiums, and disrupted established supply chains.

China thus found itself in an unprecedented situation. Within a relatively short period, the predictability of two major routes for trade with Europe simultaneously deteriorated: the northern overland route and the southern maritime route. This objectively required the search for new solutions.

It was precisely at this point that the Middle Corridor ceased to be viewed as a secondary project and began to acquire an entirely different significance. Previously regarded as an additional route with limited capacity, after 2022 it gradually emerged as an important component of China’s strategy for geo-economic resilience. Yet another feature of Chinese strategic thinking is essential to understanding this shift.

Unlike many Western states, which often respond to crises in a situational manner, Chinese policymakers have traditionally viewed infrastructure as a long-term instrument of national security. For Beijing, transportation routes are not merely a means of delivering goods. They are an element of strategic autonomy. The greater the number of alternative routes available, the more difficult it becomes for external actors to use logistics as an instrument of political pressure. This is why China is not seeking simply to replace one route with another. Its objective is to create the most diversified transportation network possible, in which disruptions along one route can be offset by the use of other corridors.

This represents a fundamental distinction between China’s contemporary strategy and the approaches of many other states. Beijing is not simply building individual roads or railway lines; it is constructing an interconnected network of routes designed to enhance the resilience of the country’s entire external economic model.

Unlike Russia, which has historically relied on military-political presence, or the European Union, which employs instruments of institutional integration and normative influence, Beijing places its emphasis on geo-economics. This is precisely why China’s growing presence in Georgia should not be viewed primarily as an attempt to expand political influence in the traditional sense. For China, Georgia is important above all as part of a new Eurasian transportation architecture. Political cooperation, strategic partnership, and expanding economic ties are not ends in themselves, but instruments for ensuring the long-term resilience of China’s trade with Europe.

Why Georgia ıs emerging as China’s key partner in the South Caucasus

At first glance, it may appear that China is interested in developing relations with all South Caucasus states relatively evenly. Indeed, Beijing maintains an active political dialogue with Azerbaijan, develops trade and economic ties with Armenia, and is steadily expanding cooperation with Georgia. If the region is viewed solely through the prism of diplomatic contacts, Chinese policy may appear to be based on a principle of balance, without clear priorities.

However, such an assessment is superficial. Once one moves beyond official statements and examines the transportation map of Eurasia, it becomes clear that the South Caucasus states perform different functions for China, and their significance is determined not by political preferences but by their position within the international logistics system.

From the perspective of a Chinese strategic planner, the South Caucasus is not three separate states but a single logistics corridor connecting Central Asia with the Black Sea basin and, ultimately, the European market. Within this system, each country performs a distinct function. Azerbaijan provides the crossing of the Caspian Sea and connects the South Caucasus with Central Asia. Armenia could potentially acquire greater significance if regional communications are opened, but today it remains outside the main routes of the Middle Corridor. Georgia, meanwhile, is the final, and simultaneously one of the most important, links in the chain, because it is on Georgian territory that the overland route reaches the Black Sea and connects with the European transportation system.

It is geography that makes Georgia virtually indispensable in the current configuration of the Middle Corridor. Any container train traveling from China through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian Sea and through Azerbaijan must ultimately cross Georgian territory. Here, a distinctive transition point emerges between two transportation spaces: the Eurasian overland route and the maritime infrastructure of the Black Sea. In other words, Georgia is what transforms the Trans-Caspian route into a functioning bridge between Asia and Europe.

The strategic value of Georgia, therefore, is determined neither by the size of its domestic market, which remains relatively small, nor by the scale of its economy, which is considerably smaller than that of many other states participating in the BRI. The country’s principal asset lies in its geographic position. In international politics, such states are sometimes described as geostrategic nodes: territories whose importance is determined not by their domestic resources but by their ability to facilitate the movement of people, goods, capital, and information between different regions of the world.

This is precisely why China’s interest in Georgia has a considerably more long-term character than may initially appear. Beijing views investment in Georgian infrastructure not as a means of expanding its presence in the local market, but as an investment in the resilience of its own export model. For China, every modernized railway line, every new logistics terminal, every reconstructed highway section, and every new port represents not merely an infrastructure asset but an additional guarantee that the country’s foreign trade will not become hostage to another international crisis.

Georgian ports are of particular importance in this strategy. Today, Poti and Batumi remain the country’s key maritime gateways, handling cargo moving along the Middle Corridor. Yet existing capacity already faces limitations, particularly in light of projected growth in container traffic between China and Europe. This is why the development of deep-water infrastructure is becoming strategically significant for Beijing. China is interested not simply in having access to the Black Sea, but in developing a modern port system capable of handling large vessels, processing containers efficiently, and integrating into European logistics chains.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to argue that China is relying exclusively on Georgia while ignoring Azerbaijan. On the contrary, China’s strategy is based on an understanding of the interdependence between the two countries. Without Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea cannot be crossed and Central Asia cannot be connected to the South Caucasus. Without Georgia, access to the Black Sea and subsequently to European markets is impossible. Beijing therefore effectively views Azerbaijan and Georgia as two complementary elements of a single transportation system, in which disruption to one link reduces the efficiency of the entire route.

However, while Azerbaijan provides access to the Caspian dimension, Georgia plays a decisive role in determining the Middle Corridor’s ultimate competitiveness. The condition of Georgia’s railway network, road infrastructure, customs procedures, and port capacity directly affects whether this route can compete with the northern route through Russia and maritime shipping via the Suez Canal.

Another important factor is the political predictability of Georgia’s foreign policy. Despite a complex domestic political environment, periodic crises in relations with the European Union, and internal political polarization, Georgia has consistently maintained its commitment to developing its transit function over recent decades. Regardless of changes in government, transport infrastructure remains one of the few areas in which there is a relative degree of domestic political consensus. For China, this is of fundamental importance, since infrastructure projects are designed not for years but for decades.

Moreover, Beijing traditionally adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. China does not seek to influence Georgia’s domestic political struggles and generally avoids public assessments of democratic processes, electoral campaigns, or foreign-policy debates. This approach significantly reduces the political costs of bilateral cooperation and allows the two sides to focus on implementing long-term economic projects.

Unlike Georgia’s relations with Western partners, where the political agenda is often closely linked to reform, the rule of law, and democratic institutions, China-Georgia cooperation is based predominantly on pragmatism and mutual economic benefit.

The economy as an ınstrument of political ınfluence

In reality, China is gradually developing a different model of international influence, based not on territorial control but on control over infrastructure and economic flows. Whereas in the twentieth century the central instrument of geopolitics was control over territory, in the twenty-first century the ability to shape the movement of goods, capital, technology, information, and production chains is becoming increasingly important. Beijing has been able to capitalize on this transformation earlier than many other major powers.

For China, the construction of a highway, railway line, maritime terminal, or digital infrastructure is not merely a commercial project. Each such facility is viewed as part of a long-term system of economic interdependence. The deeper a country becomes integrated into Chinese transportation, production, and trade networks, the greater the costs of disengaging from cooperation with Beijing become. In this sense, infrastructure gradually becomes a mechanism of political influence, even though formally it remains an economic project.

This process rarely happens quickly. China’s strategy is designed over decades and implemented in stages. At the first stage, Beijing offers financing for infrastructure projects that are objectively necessary for the host country. These may include the modernization of roads, construction of railway sections, reconstruction of ports, or development of energy and digital infrastructure. Such projects are often accompanied by the participation of Chinese state-owned banks, export-credit agencies, and major construction companies.

At the second stage, Chinese companies obtain long-term contracts for construction, technical maintenance, equipment supply, and management of individual infrastructure components. This creates a stable institutional relationship between Chinese businesses and state structures in the partner country. The relationship extends well beyond the original investment project and gradually acquires a long-term character.

The next stage involves growing trade flows and deeper economic integration. Developed infrastructure automatically increases transportation volumes, stimulates bilateral trade, and expands the participation of the local economy in Chinese production and logistics chains. The more intensive economic interaction becomes, the greater the dependence of national businesses, transport operators, and state institutions on maintaining stable relations with China.

Only after such interdependence has been established does what might be called the political effect of infrastructure emerge. A state does not become an ally of China in the traditional sense and does not lose its formal sovereignty. However, when making decisions affecting Chinese interests, it inevitably begins to take potential economic consequences into account. Political influence, therefore, does not precede economic cooperation; rather, it becomes its long-term consequence.

In the South Caucasus, this logic is particularly evident. China does not attempt to compete with Russia in the security sphere, does not offer regional states new military-political mechanisms, and does not seek to replace the European Union as a source of normative influence. Instead, Beijing occupies a relatively open niche: infrastructure development, logistics, industrial cooperation, and digital technologies. This approach allows China to gradually expand its presence without entering into direct confrontation with other external actors.

This strategy is particularly important in Georgia. For Beijing, investment in Georgian transportation infrastructure has value beyond the projects themselves. It becomes part of a broader network connecting Central Asia, the Caspian region, the South Caucasus, and European markets. The more successfully this network functions, the greater Georgia’s importance becomes in China’s external economic strategy and the stronger the mutual interest in maintaining stable cooperation.

For Georgia, cooperation with China provides access to additional investment, technology, and international transportation flows, supports the development of its transit function, and strengthens its role in Eurasian trade. At the same time, the expansion of China’s economic presence inevitably raises the question of how Tbilisi can maintain a strategic balance among different external centers of power. The deeper Georgia becomes integrated into Chinese infrastructure projects, the more complex the task of avoiding excessive dependence on a single partner becomes.

According to Einar Tangen, an American political and economic commentator, China expert, and Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), the South Caucasus is gradually becoming one of the key points where the geopolitical and geo-economic processes of the twenty-first century intersect. China views the South Caucasus primarily through the prism of connectivity, trade, and access to European markets; Russia primarily through the lens of security and the preservation of strategic influence; the European Union through economic and normative integration; while the United States increasingly assesses the region in the context of strategic competition with China.

As the expert notes, China’s interest in the South Caucasus today extends considerably beyond the original logic of the Belt and Road Initiative. After 2020, the global trading system experienced a series of structural shocks that significantly altered perceptions of the reliability of global supply chains. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the vulnerability of international production and logistics chains, the war in Ukraine transformed the configuration of Eurasian transportation routes, while disruptions in the Red Sea once again demonstrated the extent to which global trade depends on a limited number of maritime routes and strategic chokepoints.

At the same time, technological restrictions and U.S. measures aimed at containing China have encouraged Beijing to seek additional and more resilient trade routes. It is within this context, the expert argues, that the growing importance of Georgia should be understood. As traditional trade routes became more vulnerable, the significance of the Middle Corridor increased — an alternative overland route between China and Europe that can partially reduce dependence on Russian transit routes, the Suez Canal, and other strategic maritime chokepoints.

Tangen emphasizes that China does not view Azerbaijan and Georgia as competing priorities. On the contrary, their functions within the emerging Eurasian logistics system are different but complementary. Azerbaijan serves as a Caspian gateway connecting Central Asia with the South Caucasus through the Port of Baku, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, and an expanding railway infrastructure. Georgia, in turn, provides onward access through the Black Sea to European markets. The two countries therefore constitute not competing but interconnected links in a single transportation chain.

From this perspective, China’s interest in the Anaklia Deep Sea Port also becomes understandable. Formally, Beijing views it as a commercial infrastructure project, consistent with traditional Chinese diplomatic rhetoric. However, according to Tangen, Chinese infrastructure planning generally treats ports not as isolated facilities but as components of a broader integrated logistics system.

Anaklia fits well into China’s concept of multimodal transportation, logistics hubs, and the development of industrial clusters. Potentially, the port could provide another outlet for the Middle Corridor toward European markets while simultaneously increasing the resilience of Eurasian trade. Its significance may therefore extend beyond Georgia’s immediate infrastructure needs and be viewed within the broader restructuring of transportation links between Asia and Europe.

According to Tangen, Beijing’s approach differs substantially from Russia’s perception of the South Caucasus. For Moscow, the region remains part of a historically established security space. Russia’s principal concerns include NATO expansion, Western political influence, and the need to maintain stability along its southern borders. Moscow therefore tends to view regional development more through a military-political and security lens than purely through its commercial dimension.

At the same time, Tangen does not believe that the expansion of China’s economic presence in the South Caucasus automatically means the displacement of Russia. Chinese investments in railways, ports, and logistics infrastructure do not directly challenge Russia’s traditional role in the security sphere. In this sense, a kind of functional division of roles may gradually emerge between Moscow and Beijing: China focuses on economic connectivity and trade infrastructure, while Russia retains its emphasis on security.

The European Union offers the region its own model of engagement. Through the Global Gateway initiative, Brussels seeks to strengthen transportation links, diversify supply chains, and reduce dependence on Russia, while simultaneously promoting governance standards, transparency, regulatory convergence, and sustainable investment.

There is, however, a degree of overlap between the European and Chinese approaches. Both sides are interested in infrastructure development and expanding Eurasian connectivity. The key difference lies in the political and normative dimension. European financing is generally accompanied by requirements related to governance, transparency, reforms, and regulatory alignment. China’s model, by contrast, emphasizes state sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, and development without political conditionality. Whether the Chinese and European approaches will ultimately compete or complement one another will depend to a large extent on whether infrastructure becomes an instrument of geopolitical exclusion or remains a space for economic cooperation.

Georgia finds itself at the intersection of these approaches. However, according to Tangen, its task is not to choose one side or become yet another arena of geopolitical confrontation. Tbilisi seeks simultaneously to advance European integration, maintain security cooperation with the United States, attract Chinese investment, and preserve pragmatic relations with its neighbors.

In the long term, the expert believes, Georgia’s objective is to move from the role of a conventional transit country toward becoming a regional logistics, financial, and production hub connecting Europe and Asia. Transport infrastructure alone will not be sufficient for this. The country will need to develop ports and railways, establish logistics centers, attract manufacturing investment, expand financial services, and create conditions for companies serving both European and Asian markets.

Azerbaijan is pursuing a similar strategy, although it has a different geographic and geopolitical position. Following the restoration of control over Karabakh, Baku has sought to strengthen its role as an indispensable Caspian hub connecting Central Asia with Europe. In this configuration, Azerbaijan’s importance extends beyond its own transportation infrastructure: the country is becoming a critical element of the wider system linking the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and European markets. Stable relations with Armenia are particularly important in this system. According to Tangen, sustainable peace could open additional transportation routes and strengthen Azerbaijan’s central position within the architecture of the Middle Corridor.

According to Tangen, the significance of these developments extends far beyond the South Caucasus. Washington increasingly views Eurasian infrastructure through the lens of strategic competition with China. American strategists, including Elbridge Colby, argue that preserving American leadership requires preventing China’s economic integration from becoming a source of geopolitical influence. In Beijing, such measures are viewed as a continuation of a policy of containment whose origins China traces back to the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia.”

China’s response, Tangen argues, has not been military expansion but further diversification of trade routes, development of resilient logistics networks, and reduction of dependence on vulnerable maritime chokepoints. This is why the Middle Corridor is acquiring significance that extends far beyond its immediate commercial value. It is becoming part of a broader Chinese strategy aimed at ensuring reliable access to global markets and reducing the risk that a single geopolitical crisis could disrupt the country’s foreign trade.

However, according to Tangen, Azerbaijan and Georgia are not passive objects of this competition. Their geographic positions provide them with opportunities far greater than the economic scale of the two states themselves. The central task for Baku and Tbilisi is to preserve strategic flexibility as competition among major powers intensifies.

According to David Aptsiauri, a Georgian economist and former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Georgia to the People’s Republic of China, the geopolitical importance of the South Caucasus has increased substantially amid constrained economic cooperation caused by conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, around Iran, and in other areas of instability. It is therefore unsurprising that changes in the geopolitical environment have led to increased attention from global actors toward the South Caucasus. China, the world’s second-largest economy, is among the most significant of them.

Aptsiauri believes that China’s growing interest provides the countries of the region, including Georgia, with additional opportunities to overcome the consequences of the global crisis and open new avenues for stable economic development. As for Georgia, China has actively developed — and continues to develop, both bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the country. Given Georgia’s unique geographic location, its transit potential, and its accumulated experience of integration with the European space, the country is of particular interest to China, especially in terms of gaining access to European markets through Black Sea ports. According to the expert, this interest has been given institutional form through the Agreement on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed between Georgia and China.

As Aptsiauri notes, when global players are involved in international relations, it can sometimes be difficult to determine where political interests begin and economic interests end. These dimensions are so closely intertwined that they are difficult to examine separately, particularly amid the current global crisis and the growing importance of security considerations.

With regard to Georgia, Aptsiauri believes that China follows a pragmatic approach and is primarily interested in developing business cooperation. This includes the development of transportation corridors, the creation of logistics hubs, infrastructure modernization, green energy development, and other areas. The principal motivation, therefore, is bilateral and economic in nature.

At the same time, Aptsiauri argues that this motivation extends beyond purely bilateral relations and is reflected in the development of global projects, above all China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Consequently, in his assessment, there is a certain transformation of economic cooperation into a geopolitical dimension. However, it would be incorrect to define China-Georgia relations as exclusively political, since their foundation remains primarily economic interaction and a mutual interest in implementing concrete projects.

Aptsiauri notes that for a certain period China viewed the South Caucasus as a distinct region and prioritized bilateral relations. At the same time, its transit function always remained relevant. Today, in his view, this approach is changing: the South Caucasus is increasingly being considered together with Central Asia as a common and dynamically emerging economic space based on participation in global projects.

The development of the Middle Corridor as part of the Belt and Road Initiative is particularly important in this regard. According to the expert, there is now an increasingly visible trend toward closer ties between the South Caucasus and the Central Asian states, and this rapprochement has not only an economic and transportation dimension but also a broader geopolitical character.

Aptsiauri believes that China, as a country with a relatively predictable economy and a long-term approach to business relations with Georgia, can contribute to the growth of the Georgian economy and strengthen its stability, which corresponds to Georgia’s own long-term interests. At the same time, the expert acknowledges that China’s economic governance model, based on a balanced combination of state and market mechanisms, may serve as a positive example for foreign partners, including Georgia. Such an approach could be reflected in the implementation of long-term projects involving the Georgian side.

However, Aptsiauri argues that Georgia and the South Caucasus as a whole should not limit themselves exclusively to the service sector — trade, transit, logistics, and related activities. In his view, the time has come to move toward the creation of joint ventures and the development of manufacturing projects focused on industrial production, artificial intelligence, and advanced technologies.

Aptsiauri points out that a number of Chinese companies are already relocating or expanding their operations in countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and others. These developments indicate a broader transformation in the geography of global production. Under these circumstances, he believes, the South Caucasus and Central Asia could also have an opportunity to attract part of the emerging manufacturing capacity, investment, and technology.

For the region, this would potentially mean a transition from a predominantly transit- and service-based economy toward a more sophisticated model in which transportation infrastructure, logistics, and market access are combined with manufacturing, technological investment, and the creation of new enterprises. If successfully implemented, such an approach could turn the region’s geographic position into more than simply a transit advantage: it could become the foundation for new industrial and technological centers.

According to the expert, the prioritization of the European vector in Georgia’s foreign policy has required substantial effort and resources, which to some extent weakened cooperation with Asia. At the same time, over recent decades, the balance of power and economic influence in the world has shifted significantly toward Asia. Above all, the Chinese market has become one of the world’s major centers of economic attraction and offers significant opportunities for long-term development. Naturally, this factor has strengthened Georgia’s interest in cooperation with China.

At the same time, Aptsiauri believes that Georgia’s cooperation with China does not prevent it from maintaining cooperation with the Western community. On the contrary, under certain conditions, it can make an important contribution to the development and strengthening of Georgia’s international economic ties.

As his first argument, the expert points to the country’s geographic position. Georgia is a link between West and East and, for this reason, cannot participate in international business relations exclusively on the side of one partner. Its objective advantage lies precisely in its ability to connect different economic spaces.

Second, as Apciauri emphasizes, it is now virtually impossible to implement major global economic projects such as the Middle Corridor without Georgia’s participation. Its territory is crucial to establishing a route between the Caspian and Black seas and, through them, creating a more resilient connection between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and European markets.

Third, the expert points out that the European Union itself continues to recognize the importance of trade and other forms of cooperation with China, despite the sanctions and other difficulties that have emerged in recent years as a result of international conflicts and changes in the global political environment. Therefore, in Aptsiauri’s view, Georgia’s development of relations with China should not, in itself, be regarded as being in opposition to its relations with the West.