Kazakhstan is pursuing an ambitious programme to expand its nuclear energy capacity. In addition to its first nuclear power plant, the Balkhash NPP, the construction of which has been assigned to the Russian side, Astana is discussing a second project, the Moyynkum NPP, with the Chinese corporation China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). If both projects are implemented in their proposed configurations, Kazakhstan will acquire approximately 4.8 GW of additional nuclear generating capacity. This would substantially transform the country's energy mix while raising complex questions concerning financing, technological autonomy, and environmental safety.
According to Kazakhstan's Minister of Energy, Yerlan Akkenzhenov, the parties are continuing negotiations on the terms of the agreement and the implementation timeline. The government expects both nuclear projects to be completed by 2035. However, negotiations with CNNC have not yet been concluded, as commercial and contractual terms remain under discussion, and the final configuration of the second plant has not been approved. In September 2026, Russia's Rosatom and the Kazakh side signed a contract for the construction of the first nuclear power plant, indicating that the Balkhash project has reached a more advanced stage of preparation than Moyynkum.
The first nuclear power plant, the Balkhash NPP, is to be constructed near the settlement of Ulken on the shore of Lake Balkhash. The project предусматривает two power units equipped with Russian VVER-1200 Generation III+ reactors, each with an electrical capacity of 1.2 GW. Their combined installed capacity will amount to 2.4 GW. Construction is scheduled to begin in 2027, while the first unit is expected to enter service in 2034. For the second plant, the Kazakh government has identified a site in the Zhambyl District of Almaty Region, near the location designated for the first NPP. The Chinese Hualong One (HPR-1000) reactor, also classified as a Generation III design and featuring an electrical capacity of approximately 1.2 GW, is being considered as a potential technological option. The preliminary configuration of the Moyynkum project also envisages two power units with a combined capacity of approximately 2.4 GW.
Taken together, the two facilities would provide approximately 4.8 GW of installed capacity. The scale of the proposed development suggests not merely the construction of two separate facilities, but the emergence of a major nuclear energy hub. Nevertheless, the same nominal capacity does not imply identical operational performance. Russian VVER-1200 and Chinese Hualong One reactors incorporate different engineering designs, safety systems, maintenance requirements, and nuclear fuel cycle arrangements. Their actual annual electricity generation will depend on capacity factors, the duration of scheduled maintenance, and operating conditions.
If both projects are implemented, nuclear power generation could become one of the principal sources of stable electricity supply for southern Kazakhstan. However, it is important to distinguish between installed capacity and continuously available generating capacity. An installed capacity of 4.8 GW does not mean that this volume of electricity will be available at every moment. Nuclear power plants generally operate at high capacity factors, but they do not generate electricity without interruption. Reactor units must periodically be taken offline for maintenance and refuelling. Consequently, Kazakhstan's power system will continue to require reserve generating capacity, an adequately developed electricity transmission network, and effective load management mechanisms.
Why does Kazakhstan require nuclear generation on such a scale? The primary rationale is the projected growth in electricity demand. Industrial expansion, infrastructure development, transportation, and urbanisation are creating an increasing need for reliable energy sources. At the same time, the country faces the challenge of modernising its energy infrastructure and gradually reducing its dependence on coal-fired generation. Another contributing factor is the digital transformation of the economy. The expansion of artificial intelligence, cloud computing services, and large-scale data centres is expected to increase electricity consumption substantially. Such facilities require reliable and uninterrupted power supply, making nuclear energy a potential component of the infrastructure underpinning digital development. Nevertheless, there is currently insufficient evidence to conclude that demand from artificial intelligence infrastructure is the primary driver behind the second NPP project. Such a conclusion would require specific electricity demand forecasts and concrete plans for data centre deployment.
Kazakhstan's choice of China as a potential partner reflects its intention to diversify international cooperation in the nuclear energy sector. CNNC possesses proprietary reactor technologies and experience in implementing large-scale energy projects. For Astana, cooperation with the Chinese corporation offers an opportunity to avoid concentrating the development of its nuclear infrastructure exclusively around Russian technologies. For Beijing, participation in the project would create additional opportunities to strengthen its technological and economic presence in Central Asia.
Nevertheless, the central issue concerns the terms of the prospective agreement. Will the Chinese company act as the general contractor, provide credit financing, or participate through a joint venture? Who will assume the principal financial risks, and which party will own the completed facility? At present, the final financing model and commercial terms have not been publicly disclosed. It would therefore be premature to claim that China will finance the construction entirely from its own resources or provide Kazakhstan with a loan under specific conditions. Equally important will be the early establishment of arrangements governing fuel supply, technical maintenance, workforce training, and technology transfer.
International experience demonstrates that the principal risks associated with nuclear energy projects emerge not only during the operational phase but also long before a facility enters service. Finland's Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant provides a relevant example. Its commissioning was initially scheduled for 2009, but commercial operation did not begin until 2023. The delay exceeded a decade, while the estimated project cost increased from approximately EUR 3.2 billion to EUR 11 billion. The contributing factors included technical difficulties, coordination problems among contractors, and limited experience with the construction of a new reactor design. This case is particularly relevant to Kazakhstan, as it demonstrates that even countries with established regulatory institutions and substantial financial resources may encounter considerable cost overruns and delays in nuclear construction projects.
A further example, geographically and historically closer to Kazakhstan, also warrants consideration. The BN-350 reactor operated in Aktau from 1973 and supplied electricity and heat to the region, while also being used for seawater desalination. Its operation ended in 1999. However, the obligations associated with decommissioning the facility and managing radioactive materials did not end with the reactor's shutdown. The process of decommissioning and placing the facility in a safe, long-term condition has continued for decades. This experience demonstrates that the lifecycle of a nuclear power plant extends far beyond its period of commercial operation.
The environmental implications of the two proposed projects are a particular source of concern. Locating both facilities in the Lake Balkhash area makes a comprehensive assessment of water consumption essential. Nuclear reactors require reliable cooling systems, and both the volume of water withdrawn and the potential thermal impact on the lake must be assessed in light of the cumulative environmental burden created by the two facilities. This issue is especially significant because the ecological condition of Lake Balkhash is closely linked to its water balance and the transboundary flow of the Ili River.
At the same time, direct environmental consequences for the Caspian Sea cannot be regarded as established, since Lake Balkhash and the Caspian Sea belong to separate hydrological systems. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan's experience with the BN-350 reactor in Aktau demonstrates that the country has a history of nuclear energy development along the Caspian coast. It also highlights the regional significance of radioactive waste management and long-term environmental monitoring. The implementation of the new projects will therefore require independent environmental assessments, continuous monitoring, and transparent public communication regarding potential risks.