CASPIA presents an interview with Professor Yaşar Sarı, Director of the Heydar Aliyev Centre for Eurasian Studies at Ibn Haldun University (Istanbul, Türkiye).

— Preparations for the Ankara Summit at the end of October are taking place amid major changes in the geopolitical architecture of Eurasia. In your view, what should be the summit’s main strategic message, and what would demonstrate that the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is entering a new stage of development?

— The summit’s main strategic message should not be about expanding the organization or forming a new bloc, but rather about strengthening its institutions and enhancing its functional resilience. The key is to move the OTS from a platform based on cultural affinity towards a sustainable mechanism for economic integration, transport connectivity and regional coordination.

The organization’s own development demonstrates that its most compelling value lies in practical cooperation rather than geopolitical declarations. The Turkic World Vision 2040 document explicitly identifies more than 40 areas of cooperation, ranging from economic integration to education and innovation. Therefore, the summit’s strategic message should be built around three main priorities.

The first is economic integration as the foundation of the organization’s legitimacy. Since the beginning of the decade, trade among OTS members has almost doubled, reaching approximately $57 billion. Meanwhile, Türkiye’s trade turnover with OTS countries has exceeded $26 billion, while Azerbaijan’s trade turnover with the organization’s member states reached $7.3 billion by the end of 2025. These tangible achievements should be highlighted, alongside a clear commitment to further facilitating trade, harmonizing customs procedures and developing industrial cooperation.

The second priority is the Middle Corridor as strategic infrastructure. Freight volumes along the Trans-Caspian route increased from less than 1 million tonnes in 2021 to more than 4.5 million tonnes by the end of 2025. Thanks to digitalization and infrastructure modernization, delivery times have been reduced from 40–50 days to 18–23 days. If the OTS positions itself as an institutional platform supporting the development of this corridor, rather than as a competitor to other regional frameworks, it will demonstrate that the organization’s objective is to promote connectivity, not confrontation.

The third priority is digital and green transformation as forces that can bring the member states together in shaping the future. The informal summit in Turkistan in May 2026 focused on artificial intelligence and digital development. Türkiye, in turn, has identified cybersecurity coordination as one of the priorities of its upcoming chairmanship. The Ankara Summit should build on this agenda, paying particular attention to joint technology projects and human capital development—areas in which OTS member states can collectively achieve results that would be difficult to attain individually.

— What indicators suggest that the organization is genuinely entering a qualitatively new stage of institutional development?

— First and foremost, institutional cooperation is deepening beyond the level of declarations. The establishment of the OTS+ format, approved at the summit in Gabala in October 2025, marked a shift from internal institutional consolidation towards structured engagement with external partners. The decision to strengthen the OTS Secretariat’s institutional and digital capabilities, together with the appointment of a Deputy Secretary-General during the informal summit in Turkistan, also reflects the organization’s administrative development.

The second indicator is the institutionalization of economic cooperation. The establishment of the Turkic Investment Fund as the OTS’s first joint financial institution, together with the approval of a substantial increase in the Secretariat’s budget, represents concrete progress towards creating self-sustaining mechanisms for integration. When an organization moves beyond adopting declarations to capitalizing its own institutions, it has crossed an important threshold.

The third indicator is the expansion of engagement with observers. Turkmenistan has obtained observer status in both the Turkic Academy and the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation. Furthermore, in 2025, the first OTS summit to be held in an observer state took place in Budapest, Hungary, while the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus participated in the summit in Turkistan. These developments point to a gradual, albeit cautious, expansion of the organization’s circle of engagement.

The fourth indicator is the systematization of political dialogue. The regular summits, with the next scheduled to take place in Türkiye on 30 October 2026, alongside informal meetings, including those held in Kazakhstan in 2026, are establishing a consistent rhythm of interaction that goes beyond occasional meetings. During its chairmanship, Azerbaijan organized more than 100 events across various fields, further demonstrating the organization’s operational capacity.

Finally, an organization’s maturity is reflected in its ability to adapt to regional changes. The strategic message of the Ankara Summit should therefore be one of confidence without unnecessary confrontation.

— For many years, the Turkic World was viewed primarily through the lens of shared history, culture and identity. Can the Organization of Turkic States transform this commonality into a more concrete political and economic structure, or do structural constraints continue to hinder deeper integration?

— The changes that have taken place since 2021 are real, but their nature is more qualitative than quantitative. According to a comprehensive study of eight OTS summit declarations covering the period from 2009 to 2025, the number of functional commitments in trade, transport and security has increased significantly, while identity-related rhetoric has remained relatively unchanged and limited in depth. In other words, the organization is not so much reinforcing its ideological Turkic dimension as becoming more functional and results-oriented.

This shift is reflected in concrete mechanisms. The Middle Corridor has evolved from an alternative route into what OTS Secretary-General Kubanychbek Omuraliev describes as a “new sustainable transport architecture between Asia and Europe.” In 2025, freight volumes along the route reached 4.7 million tonnes. The e-Permit electronic permit system is already operational, while e-CMR and e-TIR systems are at the pilot implementation stage. The creation of the OTS+ format at the 2025 summit in Gabala was a deliberate step towards engaging external partners without expanding membership. In addition, the organization plans to launch a joint CubeSat satellite project in 2026 and has established the Turkic Investment Fund.

— What are the key political, institutional and economic constraints preventing the Organization of Turkic States from becoming a fully fledged political or economic bloc?

— Despite this functional momentum, several structural factors prevent the OTS from becoming a fully fledged political or economic bloc.

The first is the divergence in member states’ security alignments. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), whereas Türkiye is a member of NATO. This fundamental difference limits the potential depth of security cooperation. The OTS itself does not position itself as a military alliance.

The second factor is the member states’ determination to preserve their sovereignty and their ability to balance relations with different partners. The OTS functions as a platform for diversifying foreign relations rather than as a supranational structure. Its member states use the organization to expand their partnerships while avoiding commitments that could restrict their autonomy.

The third factor is the existence of competing regional frameworks. The OTS has areas of overlap with the Eurasian Economic Union, the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, but it cannot replace any of these structures. The organization’s Turkic identity also limits its capacity to serve as an all-encompassing regional platform, as it does not include non-Turkic neighbours such as Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan. The OTS should therefore be viewed as a complementary regional framework that works alongside, rather than displaces, larger organizations.

The fourth factor is economic asymmetry and limited resources. Türkiye carries considerable economic weight, but not enough to act as a regional hegemon and independently drive deep integration.

The fifth factor concerns the status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Despite its observer status, OTS member states have been reluctant to fully support its international recognition. Kazakhstan declined to invite representatives of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to the summit in Astana in 2022, while Central Asian states, by contrast, were deepening their relations with the Greek Cypriot administration. This demonstrates that pragmatic diplomatic considerations can outweigh ethnic solidarity.

Thus, the OTS is capable of translating a shared identity into concrete structures, and this process is already underway. However, the emerging model will not resemble the European Union or a traditional military alliance. Rather, it is likely to take the form of a flexible platform focused on functional cooperation in specific sectors, including transport, digitalization, trade facilitation and cultural exchange, while preserving the maximum possible autonomy of member states and their diversified external relations.

— Türkiye and Azerbaijan have become central players in the emerging system of Turkic cooperation. How do you assess Azerbaijan’s role in connecting Türkiye with Central Asia, particularly through transport, energy and trade networks?

— Azerbaijan’s contribution should primarily be understood in terms of its structural role as a connector. The country’s geographical position and infrastructure transform Türkiye’s cultural and political ties with Central Asia into a functioning transport corridor. Azerbaijan’s significance lies not so much in being a final destination itself, but in the fact that, without Azerbaijan, the Turkic World could not become a unified physical and economic space.

The Middle Corridor is the central infrastructure project connecting Türkiye with Central Asia. Azerbaijan’s infrastructure investments have made this route increasingly viable. The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, completed in 2017, provides continuous rail connectivity between China and Europe, while Azerbaijan is expanding the capacity of the Port of Alat to handle growing cargo volumes.

The next stage in Azerbaijan’s role as a connector should be the Zangezur Corridor, which is now being considered within the framework of the TRIPP initiative. Azerbaijan’s role in the energy sector has also evolved. Whereas the country previously acted primarily as a supplier of oil and gas, it is now becoming a transit hub for Central Asian energy resources. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor have long facilitated the delivery of Azerbaijani hydrocarbons to Türkiye and Europe. Azerbaijan is now also helping to bring Kazakh and Turkmen oil and gas to western markets.

An even more significant opportunity lies in the development of a Central Asia–Azerbaijan–Türkiye energy bridge. The proposed green energy corridor would enable renewable electricity generated in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to be transmitted across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and then onwards to Türkiye and Europe via Nakhchivan or Georgia. Azerbaijan’s contribution to connecting Türkiye with Central Asia is therefore structural and indispensable. Without Azerbaijan’s territory and infrastructure, the Middle Corridor would lose its key South Caucasus segment, and Türkiye’s links with Central Asia would remain predominantly political and cultural rather than physical and economic.

— Central Asia is becoming increasingly important to both Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Do you believe the Turkic states are gradually forming a common economic space, or will cooperation continue to be based primarily on bilateral relations and individual national interests?

— Several developments indicate that cooperation is moving beyond bilateral relations. One important factor is the Middle Corridor as a collective project. It is viewed not merely as a Turkish or Azerbaijani initiative, but as one of the OTS’s priorities. The organization projects that freight volumes along the corridor will increase to 11 million tonnes by 2030 and, following the commissioning of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, to 15 million tonnes. The modernization of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, which began in June 2026 and is intended to increase its capacity to 5 million tonnes per year, is the result of coordinated efforts by Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye, with Central Asian states also having a stake in the project.

Trade statistics also point to a positive trend. Between 2021 and 2025, Türkiye’s trade with OTS member states reached $72.2 billion, with a trade surplus of $10.9 billion.

Nevertheless, structural realities prevent this cooperation from developing into a fully fledged economic union. The OTS lacks a supranational body capable of ensuring the binding implementation of decisions. It operates as an association of states with different interests rather than as a unified bloc. Its members do not transfer their sovereign powers to supranational institutions; instead, they coordinate their actions in areas where their interests converge.

Energy and trade cooperation also remain largely bilateral. For example, Türkiye’s gas agreements with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are concluded bilaterally rather than through OTS mechanisms. The Iğdır–Nakhchivan gas pipeline, which connects Türkiye and Azerbaijan, is likewise a bilateral project, although it contributes to broader transport and energy connectivity.

Future progress will depend on several factors: the commissioning of the Zangezur Corridor/TRIPP, the implementation of EU investment plans under its connectivity platform, and the member states’ ability to advance regulatory harmonization and expand joint investment projects.

— There is frequent discussion about creating a stronger institutional structure within the Turkic World. What forms of institutionalization would be realistic in the coming years?

— In the near term, the most realistic progress is expected in economic cooperation, transport connectivity and collective investment instruments, while the OTS is not explicitly considering the creation of a formal military alliance. These are the areas in which institutionalization has reached the most advanced stage: specific mechanisms are either already operational or close to being launched.

— How do you assess the relationship between the Turkic World and the broader concept of Eurasian connectivity? Could the Turkic states eventually emerge as an independent geopolitical and economic pole within Eurasia?

— The relationship between the Turkic World and Eurasian connectivity is best understood as a mutually reinforcing process rather than a sequential one. The Turkic states are not merely participating in an existing system of Eurasian connectivity; they are actively shaping it through the Middle Corridor and are gradually acquiring the characteristics of an independent geopolitical and economic pole, albeit with significant structural limitations.

The Middle Corridor is a tangible expression of this relationship. It is not simply a transport route passing through Turkic states. It is increasingly viewed as the Turkic World’s contribution to the development of Eurasian connectivity. The initiative has already attracted considerable international attention. A World Bank report published in September 2026 notes that strategic investment in the Trans-Caspian Corridor could more than triple trade volumes, halve transport times, increase GDP by 3.3% and create an additional 2 million jobs by 2040.

The corridor’s geographical logic is fundamentally linked to the Turkic World: it connects Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan—all OTS member states—while Turkmenistan and Tajikistan serve as important transit hubs. As Kyrgyz Prime Minister Kasymbekov has noted, the Zangezur Corridor represents a “logical continuation of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway,” creating a transport hub that “provides access to European markets from China’s Pacific coast through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Türkiye.”

— Looking beyond the Ankara Summit, what is the single most important step the Organization of Turkic States should take over the next three to five years to turn its current political momentum into tangible results?

— The most important step for the OTS over the next three to five years should be to bring the Turkic Investment Fund (TIF) fully into operation as a key project-financing mechanism capable of translating political declarations into economically viable cross-border infrastructure and trade projects.

Agreements on the digital economy and the modernization of customs systems are important, but their implementation depends on political will and ratification procedures at the national level. The TIF, by contrast, is a capital-allocation mechanism capable of delivering concrete and visible results: modernized airports, financing for small and medium-sized enterprises, and completed cross-border projects. Every successful investment makes it easier to secure agreement on subsequent political commitments. The Fund’s mission explicitly includes increasing intra-regional trade and supporting the sustainable development of the Turkic World.

By prioritizing the full operational launch of the TIF, expanding its portfolio of economically viable projects, deepening co-financing partnerships with institutions such as the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector (ICD) and the World Bank, and establishing a credible track record of successful disbursements, the OTS can demonstrate that Turkic cooperation delivers tangible economic returns. This, in turn, would strengthen the political will needed to advance the more complex task of regulatory harmonization, without which deeper integration will remain out of reach.