As part of the regional business mission of international association Women in TLP in Georgia, particular attention was paid to the changing transport and logistics architecture of the South Caucasus and to the role played by new routes, infrastructure and customs procedures in this transformation. For the CASPIA Analytical Center, this issue is important not only from the perspective of competition between individual routes, but also as an indicator of the region’s ability to turn its geographic position into a sustainable transport advantage.

In an interview with CASPIA, international expert on customs administration and trade facilitation Samson Uridia argues that the situation should be viewed from a broader perspective. In his view, the region’s task is not to “divide” existing cargo flows between different routes, but to increase overall capacity and attract additional transit volumes. In this context, the competitiveness of the Middle Corridor is determined not only by roads and ports, but also by border-crossing times, digitalisation, procedural compatibility and how efficiently the entire logistics chain operates.

— How seriously is Tbilisi considering the opening of transport routes through Armenia as potential competition for the Georgian route?

— I think that, first and foremost, this issue needs to be viewed not from the perspective of individual South Caucasus countries, but in terms of the region as a whole and the role it plays in shaping the Middle Corridor. Today, the South Caucasus effectively serves as the western gateway to this route. Therefore, what matters much more is not which particular country receives an additional volume of cargo, but how much the overall capacity of the western section of the corridor can be increased.

If an additional transport channel through Armenia emerges, this does not necessarily mean that it should be viewed exclusively as a competitor to the Georgian route. On the contrary, new opportunities may increase the overall capacity of the transport system and make the entire western section of the Middle Corridor more resilient.

We have repeatedly heard from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other international financial institutions that the capacity of the Middle Corridor’s western gateway remains insufficient. According to the PMC Research Center study Middle Corridor Transit Cargo Flows: Georgia, prepared on the basis of data from the Revenue Service of Georgia, China accounted for less than 1% of identifiable transit flows through Georgia in 2025. The largest shares were generated by Central Asian countries — around 40%, Türkiye — 32%, and Azerbaijan — 18%.

This shows that the Middle Corridor currently serves regional and intra-corridor trade to a significant extent, while its potential for broader China–Europe transit remains only partially utilised. If we compare this figure with the scale of trade between China and Europe, it becomes clear how small a share of the potential market we are actually serving today.

Therefore, we are not in a situation where three countries have to compete for the same limited cargo flow. On the contrary, the region’s task is to create conditions that would allow at least a small share of the enormous China–Europe trade flow to pass through the South Caucasus.

That is why I would not view the development of the Armenian route simply as a matter of redistributing cargo between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. If the region expands its transport capacity, this could, in the long term, create more opportunities for all of its participants. Of course, this requires transport services to be stable, predictable and competitive.

As long as we cannot offer carriers acceptable transit times, clear procedures and a reliable route, it is difficult to speak of meaningful competition with other international corridors. Therefore, the priority today should not be protecting an individual national route from the emergence of new alternatives, but creating a system in which the region as a whole can efficiently handle growing transit volumes.

— Which categories of cargo could be the first to shift from Georgian routes to Armenian ones?

— I would not say that, once new routes are opened, specific categories of cargo will automatically shift from the Georgian route to the Armenian one. We need to take into account the current structure of transport flows and Armenia’s position itself.

Today, in terms of both foreign trade and cargo transportation, Armenia relies heavily on Georgian infrastructure. This includes Georgian ports, roads, rail connections and other elements of the transport system. Therefore, the Black Sea route will remain important in any case.

As for other channels, everything will depend on what kind of infrastructure is actually created and how attractive the new route proves to be for carriers. This is not simply a matter of having a road. Transport costs, transit time, route reliability, the condition of infrastructure, border procedures, tariffs and the ability to continue moving seamlessly after crossing the border all need to be taken into account. It is the combination of these factors that ultimately determines a carrier’s choice.

It is also important to remember that infrastructure of this scale cannot be built within a few months. Roads, railway lines, tunnels, bridges, border crossing points and all the necessary supporting infrastructure require years to develop. During that time, Georgia will also continue investing in its own transport system.

For example, if we look at the Kazbegi and northern route, projects are being implemented there to make the route more reliable and less vulnerable to weather conditions. It is expected that, following the construction of a long tunnel by 2028, the route will become more resilient and, particularly during winter, less dependent on severe weather conditions.

Geography also matters. Georgia and Armenia have different natural conditions. Georgia has areas with more favourable terrain for transport infrastructure, whereas Armenia is predominantly mountainous. This objectively affects the cost, timeframe and complexity of infrastructure development. But this does not mean that the Armenian route cannot develop. It can and will develop if the necessary conditions are created.

In addition, Armenian export flows could potentially use the Azerbaijani route if that route proves economically attractive. Therefore, I would not try to predict in advance which cargoes, or what volumes, will shift to one route or another. First, the conditions for transportation need to be created; only then will the market show which routes are most in demand.

 

— Which Georgian infrastructure assets would be most sensitive to such competition?

— I would not say that we can determine in advance which specific Georgian infrastructure assets will necessarily be particularly vulnerable to the emergence of new routes. At present, the problem is actually the opposite: existing capacity is insufficient compared with the potential demand that could emerge in the future.

Our main task is to handle as much transit as possible and to do so efficiently and profitably. If we consider the areas that could potentially face greater competition, road infrastructure may perhaps be among the first, because road transport offers greater flexibility and carriers can choose between several routes. But I do not think that the emergence of an Armenian route would automatically lead to a significant decline in volumes passing through Georgia. The potential volume of trade between China and Europe is so large that there is more than enough room for several routes to develop simultaneously.

The Middle Corridor cannot be reduced to a single road or railway line. It includes a maritime component, rail transit, road transportation, different combinations of routes, and now new land-based routes are also being discussed. This brings us to another important issue — procedural regulation. Even if we have a good railway or a port, that does not automatically make the corridor competitive. If a carrier has to deal with a large number of documents, several different government agencies, repeated inspections and long waits at borders, physical infrastructure alone cannot deliver the necessary result.

Ultimately, carriers will choose between different route combinations — for example, Azerbaijan–Georgia–Türkiye or Azerbaijan–Armenia–Türkiye. Türkiye also plays an important role in this process, as it constitutes the final segment of many transport chains connecting the South Caucasus with Europe.

Therefore, I would not recommend viewing this as a competition in which one country must necessarily win and another must lose. What matters much more is increasing the region’s overall capacity and attracting additional transit volumes. If several routes become more efficient simultaneously, this creates a more resilient transport system for the entire region.

— Some experts argue that the Armenian route could serve as a kind of counterweight to the Georgian route. How justified is this approach?

— I would say that this is more of a logic dating back to the 1990s. At that time, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia largely viewed their economic and transport interests separately. Each country primarily focused on its own route, infrastructure and opportunities. The external environment was different then, and although opportunities for cooperation existed, it was not possible to fully integrate those opportunities.

Today, the situation is changing. There is a growing understanding that the South Caucasus is a small region where the economic development of one country inevitably affects its neighbours. If new investment, infrastructure, jobs and trade opportunities emerge in Armenia, this can potentially benefit Azerbaijan and Georgia as well. If Georgia expands its transport capacity, Azerbaijan and Armenia can benefit from that. The same applies to Azerbaijan.

Therefore, I would frame the question somewhat differently: why should the development of one country necessarily be perceived as a loss for another? If a sustainable project attracts investment, creates jobs, increases trade and improves connectivity, then from a regional perspective it can create additional opportunities.

For the South Caucasus, it is particularly important today that peace and economic development move forward together. We need investment, trade, new production, jobs and stable transport links. If the opening of a new route contributes to these objectives, it is more logical to consider it in precisely that context.

— And how is the opening of the Armenian–Turkish border generally viewed in Tbilisi?

— Much depends on the perspective from which this process is considered. If we look only at an individual country, there may indeed be situations in which, in the short term, one route gains a certain advantage while another faces additional competition. But if we look at the region as a whole, the conclusion may be quite different.

We can take as an example regional railway cooperation involving Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Chinese companies. When countries agree on tariffs and establish the possibility of through movement, carriers receive a much more convenient system. They no longer need to negotiate separately with several carriers, coordinate tariffs and resolve interaction issues between different participants each time.

When there is a through tariff, harmonised procedures and a clear system of interaction, it significantly simplifies business operations. These are precisely the mechanisms that need to be developed further. A corridor is a chain. It cannot function properly if every segment is considered separately. Efficiency is determined by how well the different routes and participants in the transportation process are connected.

Therefore, the opening of the Armenian–Turkish border, if it takes place within a broader process of normalisation and economic cooperation, could create additional opportunities for the entire region. Georgia itself experienced the opening of its border with Türkiye in the 1990s. The resulting opportunities benefited not only Georgian companies. Türkiye also gained from expanded economic ties.

If we look at the development of Türkiye’s border regions over these decades, the difference between their condition then and now is indeed substantial. Economic activity, infrastructure, trade and the level of development have changed dramatically. Therefore, in this case, I am addressing the issue from an economic perspective: when borders open, new routes emerge and mobility increases, additional conditions for development are created.

— If new routes develop in parallel with Georgian routes, what factors will determine the choice of a particular route?

— If we look at this issue solely from the perspective of competition between individual routes, we may arrive at a rather narrow conclusion. But if we consider the region as a whole, it becomes clear that the issue is not simply where a particular shipment will go.

The maritime route will remain important in any case. At the same time, road transportation will continue to develop. For example, if we look at the Sarpi route, road infrastructure on the Turkish side is very well developed. Georgia also has two other road crossings with Türkiye — Kartsakhi and Vale. In theory, the route through Kartsakhi may be shorter in some cases. However, carriers choose Sarpi because the continuation of the route is well developed there and the Turkish side has the necessary infrastructure.

The terrain also needs to be taken into account. In some parts of the Turkish side, conditions for road transport are more favourable. All these details matter because they ultimately influence a carrier’s decision. Such elements cannot be considered separately from the broader system. Every new route has the potential to attract additional cargo volumes from Central Asia and China. Therefore, when assessing routes, we need to consider not just an individual segment, but the entire chain through to the final destination.

— What factors currently determine the competitiveness of the Middle Corridor to the greatest extent?

— In the past, we had more problems directly related to infrastructure. Today, the level of investment has increased significantly. New roads are being built, existing sections are being upgraded, and port and railway infrastructure is developing. But as physical infrastructure improves, another problem is becoming increasingly visible — the organisation of the transport process itself.

If we compare the Middle Corridor with the Northern Corridor, we can see a certain difference. There, in many cases, a carrier deals with a single system, a single chain of interaction and one main operator. Even if a problem arises or a particular service is expensive, the carrier knows whom it needs to deal with.

The Middle Corridor has many more participants. There are several countries, railways, ports, customs authorities, border agencies, private operators and other institutions. Therefore, our task is to turn this objective complexity into an advantage through interconnected or at least compatible systems.

A carrier should not have to provide the same data repeatedly at every border, each time in a different format. Repeating procedures for departure and entry takes time, creates inconvenience and increases transportation costs.

This is where a joint border crossing point, with border and customs procedures organised according to the one-stop shop principle, has enormous potential. We live in the 21st century. We have information technologies, digital platforms, identification systems and technical means of control. So the question arises: why should a carrier first stop for exit procedures, then stop again for entry procedures, and separately approach customs, border, phytosanitary and veterinary authorities if all these processes can be coordinated much more efficiently?

A system could be created in which the necessary information is provided once and then used by the relevant authorities along the entire route. For example, data provided by a carrier at the China–Kazakhstan border could form the basis for subsequent procedures along the route. The vehicle stops once, and the relevant authorities of the two countries simultaneously identify the vehicle and carry out the necessary checks.

Of course, this does not mean that controls should disappear. If there is a specific risk — for example, suspicion of drugs or other prohibited goods — state authorities must be able to stop the vehicle, conduct an inspection and use all necessary technical means.

Risk-based control means that 100% of transport remains subject to customs and border control, but not every vehicle needs to undergo the same complex and in-depth forms of inspection. Specific control measures should be determined by the level of risk, be effective and be coordinated among the competent authorities. If a carrier is a trusted operator, its data are known and it operates within a transparent system, a faster mechanism should be available to it. This is the modern approach.

Repeatedly providing the same documents is becoming a real problem for drivers. In Georgia, in some cases, a driver can remain in the cab, whereas in certain other countries the driver has to get out, find different services, submit documents and return to the vehicle. This creates additional delays and costs. Therefore, physical infrastructure alone cannot solve the problem. You can build an excellent road, a modern border crossing point or a new terminal, but if outdated procedures continue to operate inside the system, the driver will still have to wait.

At the same time, it is important to understand that improving procedures does not replace the development of physical infrastructure — the two elements must advance in parallel. Modern rules, digital systems and coordination between agencies deliver maximum results only when the transport infrastructure itself can support the required capacity.

A good example is the Rikoti section: following its modernisation, transit times for freight transport were significantly reduced. This demonstrates that corridor competitiveness is determined by a combination of soft and hard infrastructure — efficient procedures and modern physical infrastructure.

However, there are still other sections that need to be modernised, including the Batumi–Sarpi route and other roads towards Tbilisi. There is also the northern route, where the construction of a long tunnel should improve the reliability of traffic. In addition, Georgia is investing significant resources in port infrastructure.

Today, we have four main ports — Batumi, Poti, Supsa and Kulevi. In the future, the development of a fifth port direction is also being discussed. All of this increases the capacity of the Middle Corridor’s western gateway.

— How important are hidden costs and procedural transparency for the competitiveness of a route?

— This is a very important issue because the real cost of transportation is determined not only by the official tariff. There are also waiting times, parking, additional procedures, document processing, repeated inspections and other costs that directly affect carriers.

Georgia is gradually trying to reduce these hidden costs and make the system more transparent. For example, the Revenue Service provides information online about the situation with freight traffic and queues. In the Sarpi area, a website can be used to obtain information about available parking spaces. This allows carriers to understand the situation in advance and decide where to wait for the procedures to be completed.

At the exit, freight vehicles can use organised parking facilities. Information on the number of available parking spaces is published, allowing drivers to assess in advance whether there is room for them. This may seem like a minor detail, but such transparency is highly important for carriers because it allows them to plan their time.

There is also a road user charge of around GEL 350. It can be paid at different locations rather than necessarily at the parking facility itself. The New Computerized Transit System (NCTS) also plays a very important role. Transit declarations are processed through NCTS operators in Georgia. Essentially, a single declaration and one-time submission of data allow the cargo to be monitored through to its destination.

The development of the CAREC Advanced Transit System, a project related to electronic transit procedures and implemented with the participation of the Asian Development Bank, is also important in this regard. It would be beneficial if the countries along the corridor gradually joined similar systems. This could help establish a broader electronic transit system.

Imagine that the data are submitted once at the China–Kazakhstan border through the CAREC Advanced Transit System. The electronic document could then be used for further movement through Georgia via NCTS, through Türkiye and onward to the European Union. The carrier would not have to repeat the same procedure at every stage.

Of course, the TIR system is still in place and continues to be used. However, electronic procedures can significantly speed up the process. In some cases, a driver may have to wait for several hours when using TIR, whereas a vehicle with a completed NCTS declaration can complete the necessary procedures within 5–10 minutes. This is a good example of how digitalisation can directly reduce hidden costs.

Therefore, the transport sector should demand maximum transparency from government authorities. Electronic queues, publicly available information and the ability to see the situation at the border in advance should all become standard practice.

The same applies to the one-stop-shop principle. A driver should not have to move between customs and other agencies. In the Georgian system, a customs officer can receive the entire necessary package of documents and then organise the relevant procedure. If, however, the driver has to move between several officials, submit different declarations and collect signatures, this increases not only the time required but also the space for informal payments. Therefore, having a large number of separate government agencies between which a driver must move at the border is itself a problem.

At the same time, transit and imports need to be distinguished. If the cargo is an import, phytosanitary, veterinary and other types of control may indeed be required. But transit cargo, in the absence of a specific risk, should pass through much more easily. In Georgia, the customs officer is positioned directly at the level of the truck cab at the border, meaning that the driver does not have to leave the vehicle. The driver provides a passport, driving licence, necessary permits, road user charge information and the declaration. The entire procedure can take around ten minutes.

Today, we also need to gradually move away from the old system of paper passports and large numbers of stamps. Biometric technologies, facial identification and other modern control mechanisms are already being discussed at international conferences.

The one-stop-shop principle should be understood more broadly than simply having one window in a building. It should be a unified procedure: one stop, one submission of information, one set of documents and the necessary results delivered within a single process.

— How effectively do railways, ports, customs authorities and private operators interact?

— Commercial interest itself is an important factor encouraging participants in the transport chain to cooperate. If a railway, port or private operator loses time because of poor coordination, this directly affects its business. Therefore, economic incentives gradually push the system towards greater efficiency.

I would say that there is currently fairly good interaction between the Georgian, Azerbaijani and Kazakh railways. Chinese companies are also involved in the process. Through tariffs have already been agreed and are being applied, which is very important for carriers. If a carrier has a clear tariff for moving through several sections in advance, it becomes much easier to plan transportation costs. This is far more convenient than negotiating separately with different operators every time.

Ports also interact with each other and with other participants in the system. Overall, digitalisation is developing quite well, but there is one fundamental condition: information systems must be interoperable.

It is not enough simply to convert a paper document into an electronic format. If one system cannot transfer data to another system, the electronic document effectively remains within a single organisation. For example, Georgian customs may receive information electronically, process it and send information back. As a result, the document holder no longer has to move between different institutions collecting signatures and stamps. Therefore, the next step should be moving from simple document digitalisation to the digitalisation of business processes themselves. In other words, it is necessary to change not only the format of the document, but also the logic of how the system operates.

— What problems exist in coordination between Azerbaijan and Georgia?

— One of the important issues here concerns the joint border crossing point. I think the main challenge is that in projects of this kind, the procedure itself needs to be agreed first, and only then should the infrastructure be built.

You cannot build a border crossing point first and only afterwards start discussing how it should operate. The two sides must first agree on where the truck will stop, who will conduct the control, which documents will be submitted, what information will be exchanged between government authorities, how long the procedure should take and what actions each side will perform. Only then should the infrastructure be designed so that it corresponds to the agreed process.

If the process is reversed, it may happen that the facility is built but the organisation of traffic and control inside it does not correspond to how the two systems actually need to operate. In that case, some of the advantages of modern infrastructure are simply lost. Therefore, I believe the procedure should be agreed first and the infrastructure built around it. This is particularly important for a joint border crossing point between Azerbaijan and Georgia.

— If cargo volumes increase significantly, will Georgian infrastructure be able to handle the additional load?

— I think Georgia is currently doing quite a lot to prepare for an increase in cargo volumes. A large number of projects are being implemented: bypass roads are being built, individual sections are being modernised, the northern route is being developed, port infrastructure is being improved and other elements necessary for the expansion of the transport system are being created. Therefore, I would not say today that there is a problem specifically with Georgia’s ability to receive additional cargo. What arrives is accepted and processed. The question is how quickly this happens and where exactly delays occur.

Today, queues are observed to a greater extent on the exit side rather than at entry. This means that the Georgian system is generally capable of receiving and processing the traffic flow. Of course, there are specific problem areas.

Kazbegi, for example, is a special case because of its mountainous terrain, snow and weather conditions. These factors can seriously affect traffic during certain periods. But in other areas there is no systemic problem with receiving cargo. The main issue is the speed at which individual sections are cleared and, above all, the border.

If cargo volumes increase, infrastructure must continue to develop in parallel. But it is necessary to develop not only roads and ports, but also the procedures themselves. If physical capacity increases while border procedures remain unchanged, the bottleneck simply moves from the road to the border.

— What investments over the next two to three years could have the most tangible impact on regional connectivity?

— If we are talking about the next two or three years, I would primarily highlight infrastructure investment, particularly the construction of a joint border crossing point between Azerbaijan and Georgia. This project could deliver a very concrete and measurable result.

Once the border crossing point is built and begins operating according to an agreed procedure, we will be able to objectively assess how much border-crossing time has been reduced and how much capacity has increased.

According to the 2024 CAREC Transport Corridor Performance Measurement and Monitoring System, the average crossing time on the Georgia-to-Azerbaijan direction at the Tsiteli Khidi border crossing was approximately 15.6 hours, with a median of 12.1 hours.

For an international transport corridor, this represents a very significant loss of time. If cargo is travelling from Europe to China, 10–15 hours of waiting at a single border crossing become part of the final transportation cost and reduce the attractiveness of the route. Therefore, resolving this problem will matter not only to an individual driver or carrier. It will directly affect the competitiveness of the corridor as a whole.

For this reason, I believe it is particularly important today to move away from viewing the Middle Corridor as a collection of separate national routes and towards understanding it as a single transport space. The better Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and Türkiye — and, further along the route, the countries of Central Asia and the European direction — are connected, the more opportunities the entire region will have. The question, then, will no longer be which country took cargo away from another, but how much new transit we managed to attract to the region and how efficiently we were able to handle it. Ultimately, this is what should shape the development of the Middle Corridor.