The Middle Corridor is steadily moving from the category of a promising geopolitical project into the realm of practical implementation, becoming an increasingly sought-after route for international business. Growing interest in the corridor’s transit potential confirms the strategic importance of this route. Now that its basic development trajectory has been established, the key challenge is to transform the route into a highly stable, predictable and competitive logistics chain. For shippers, practical parameters are coming to the forefront: actual delivery times, cost transparency, infrastructure capacity, the efficient operation of ports and border crossings, as well as the depth of digital integration among all participants in the process.
It is precisely at these levels that the most complex constraints become apparent. The Middle Corridor is not a single transport line, but a sequence of interconnected segments through which cargo moves across different modes of transport, port terminals, railway systems, border crossings and customs procedures. The efficiency of the entire route therefore depends not on the speed of any individual segment, but on how smoothly the entire chain operates. Even a significant increase in railway capacity will not produce the expected effect if cargo subsequently encounters delays at a port, at the border or during transfers between operators.
Another equally important aspect is the digital and administrative connectivity of the corridor’s participants. As long as railways, ports, customs authorities and private operators continue to work largely through different information systems and procedures, the transport chain remains fragmented. As a result, time and resources are lost not because of a physical lack of infrastructure, but at the interfaces between different participants.
CASPIA discussed the practical constraints facing the Middle Corridor, challenges in customs and transport administration, bottlenecks on the Georgian segment and the key areas requiring modernization with Irakli Saparidze, a customs administration specialist who previously held senior positions within the Customs Department of the Revenue Service of the Ministry of Finance of Georgia, including at the customs points of the ports of Poti and Batumi, as well as the Poti and Batumi Economic Clearance Zones. His assessment makes it possible to view the route not only as a collection of major infrastructure projects, but also as a mechanism operating on a daily basis, whose efficiency depends on numerous less visible procedures and operational decisions.
According to Irakli Saparidze, the main challenge facing the Middle Corridor today is that individual elements of the route are developing faster than a unified system for their interaction is being established. Official presentations, he notes, often emphasize land-based segments and infrastructure projects, while considerably less attention is paid to the instability of through tariffs, insufficient digital integration of multimodal operations and the dependence of the entire route on the capacity of Caspian and Black Sea ports.
When assessing the route, Saparidze emphasizes, it is essential to take this interdependence into account. Even if a land-based segment is capable of handling the required volume of cargo, delays on the maritime leg can eliminate the time savings achieved elsewhere. The Middle Corridor should therefore be viewed not as a collection of separate national infrastructures, but as a single cross-border logistics system.
On the Georgian segment, the most serious constraints, in his assessment, are primarily related to the capacity of the railway infrastructure. These include key stations and single-track sections that may become critical bottlenecks as cargo volumes increase further. At present, the modernization project of Georgian Railways and the related infrastructure works are at an advanced stage of completion. The modernization involves the construction of a new railway line, the reconstruction of stations, the extension of receiving and departure tracks, and the expansion of railway nodes, ultimately improving the speed and safety of train operations. To address last-mile issues and bottlenecks on approaches to the ports of Poti and Batumi, projects are also being implemented to modernize port-adjacent railway infrastructure, expand inland terminals and develop dry ports. At the same time, the existence of physical infrastructure alone does not guarantee sufficient capacity: traffic management, schedule synchronization and the ability of different operators to transfer cargo from one segment to another in a timely manner are equally important. This applies not only to the Georgian segment, but to the corridor as a whole.
Actual transit time remains another major challenge. Saparidze notes that it is often 20–50% higher than the figures officially stated. While a delivery time of approximately 18–22 days from China to Europe is officially cited, in practice transportation can in some cases take 25–35 days. Transit times are affected by weather conditions on the Caspian Sea, delays at borders and other factors that cannot be fully eliminated through the modernization of a single mode of transport.
As a result, the competitiveness of the route is determined not by achieving a record-short transit time under favorable conditions, but by the ability to provide a stable and predictable delivery window. This characteristic, the expert believes, is of direct importance to business.
Administrative and customs procedures also play a significant role. According to Saparidze, factors capable of causing delays include the absence of fully standardized digital formats for customs documentation between countries, duplicate inspections at border crossings and the incomplete implementation of unified electronic documentation, including e-CMR and e-CIM. As a result, physical verification of paper documents is still required in some cases, increasing the time needed to cross the border.
Interaction between railways, ports, customs authorities and private operators is gradually improving. However, the expert notes that the level of synchronization and real-time data exchange remains insufficient. The absence of a unified digital platform connecting government agencies and private operators leads to the duplication of certain operations and additional time losses.
This issue is particularly acute when it comes to end-to-end cargo tracking. In multimodal transportation, a single container passes sequentially through several transport systems and operators. If information about its movement is not integrated into a single digital environment, participants in the chain cannot always quickly identify where a delay has occurred or how it can be minimized.
In relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia, the expert also identifies several unresolved issues, including insufficient harmonization of tariff policies, delays in the transfer of trains at the border and incomplete integration of IT systems. The speed at which cargo moves from Azerbaijan’s Caspian port of Alat toward Georgian ports and borders is also of particular importance. The greater the disparity in the speed of individual segments, the higher the likelihood that an advantage achieved on one part of the route will be lost at the next stage.
Tariff policy remains another source of uncertainty. Currency fluctuations and the absence of a transparent fixed through-rate over the long term make it difficult to calculate transportation costs in advance. Differences in the tariff-setting structures of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia further complicate the ability of shippers to forecast the final cost.
It is precisely the combination of cost and unpredictable transit times that, in Saparidze’s view, explains why some companies may return to alternative routes after testing the Middle Corridor. When delivery deadlines are missed, shippers must take into account not only the transportation cost itself, but also the commercial consequences of delays. Under such conditions, a cheaper maritime route or an alternative land corridor may prove more attractive to businesses, even if the Middle Corridor appears geographically shorter.
Capacity becomes an especially important issue in the event of a potential sharp increase in cargo volumes. Saparidze believes that Georgian infrastructure is already operating close to the limits of its current capabilities. Until railway modernization projects are completed and the deep-water port of Anaklia becomes operational, a sharp increase in transportation volumes could create additional congestion. As an illustrative scenario, the expert considers a roughly 50% increase in cargo volumes compared with current levels: without corresponding infrastructure expansion, handling such an increase would be difficult.
Against this backdrop, Saparidze believes that the most significant impact over the next two to three years could come from investment in several areas simultaneously. The first priority is the expansion and modernization of key railway nodes and passing loops. The second is the full digitalization of customs procedures and the introduction of unified E-LOGISTICS platforms among the countries participating in the route. The third involves upgrading equipment and increasing the capacity of existing port terminals.
At the same time, the expert considers some statements about the Middle Corridor’s prospects overly optimistic. These include promises of consistently delivering cargo from China to Europe within 10–12 days, as well as forecasts that the corridor could soon capture a significant share — for example, 20–30% — of the volumes currently carried by the Northern Route or traditional maritime routes. In his view, such assessments do not fully take into account existing infrastructure, organizational and geographical constraints, including natural climate risks and declining water levels in the Caspian Sea, which complicate the operation of ports and shallow-water sections.
However, Saparidze emphasizes that a critical assessment of the current challenges does not amount to a denial of the corridor’s potential. Rather, it is a necessary step toward bringing the Middle Corridor to a qualitatively new level. The route has the prerequisites to become not merely an alternative, but a fully competitive logistics corridor. The key will be to combine infrastructure investment with deep digitalization, the harmonization of procedures, transparent tariff-setting and coordinated operations among all participants in the chain.
The key solution lies in moving from logistics based on “separate national infrastructures” to a unified “cross-border logistics system.” The corridor’s geographical advantage will translate into real commercial value only when the entire route operates as a single, seamless mechanism.
At the same time, the core purpose of the Middle Corridor is to provide mass, affordable and stable rail and multimodal transportation. Road transport currently serves effectively as a “safety net” for urgent and high-value cargo. However, it cannot become a large-scale alternative for global trade until railway, port and customs processes are fully synchronized.
Ultimately, the future of the Middle Corridor will be determined not only by the volume of investment in railways, ports and terminals, but also by the ability of different national systems to function as a single whole. The decisive factor in the route’s long-term competitiveness will be its ability to offer shippers transparent pricing, predictable transit times, minimal bureaucracy and end-to-end cargo visibility.