The European Union often presents itself as a geopolitical actor committed to regional connectivity, economic integration, and strategic resilience. On paper, its latest initiative appears to reflect precisely these ambitions.

This week, the European Commission launched a new Connectivity Agenda Platform and signed statements of intent with international financial institutions expected to mobilize up to €2 billion for transport, border-crossing, and trade-facilitation projects across the Black Sea region and the South Caucasus. The initiative was unveiled during a high-level ministerial meeting in Brussels hosted by European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos, Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela, and Commissioner for Sustainable Transport Apostolos Tzitzikostas.

Representatives from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan participated in discussions focused on advancing connectivity under the EU's Global Gateway strategy.

At first glance, the initiative appears both timely and strategically sound. The Middle Corridor has become one of Eurasia's most important transport routes. Cargo volumes along the corridor have increased fivefold over the past six years, rising from 0.8 million tons to more than 4 million tons annually. As geopolitical disruptions continue to affect traditional transportation routes, European policymakers increasingly recognize the importance of alternative East-West corridors connecting Europe with Central Asia.

Yet there is an uncomfortable contradiction at the heart of Brussels' latest connectivity vision.

Neither Azerbaijan nor Georgia was officially represented at the ministerial level despite being indispensable components of the very corridor the European Union seeks to strengthen.

This omission is difficult to explain from either a logistical or strategic perspective.

The Middle Corridor does not exist in abstraction. It is built upon physical infrastructure, transportation networks, ports, railways, and transit corridors. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway alone has become one of the foundational pillars of East-West connectivity across Eurasia. Any discussion about strengthening connectivity between Central Asia and Europe that excludes the principal transit countries of the South Caucasus inevitably raises questions about strategic coherence.

For years, Brussels has described Azerbaijan as a strategic partner. The European Union simultaneously relies on Azerbaijani energy exports to diversify supplies and on Azerbaijani transit infrastructure to facilitate East-West trade. Yet at critical moments, EU institutions often behave as though the South Caucasus begins and ends with Armenia.

This tendency has become increasingly visible in recent years.

Too often, European policymakers approach Armenia's development challenges as if they can be addressed independently of the broader regional environment. In reality, Armenia's long-term economic transformation is inseparable from normalization with Azerbaijan and the opening of regional transportation routes.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development recently announced plans to invest approximately €5 billion in economies affected by instability in the Middle East. Armenia was identified among the countries vulnerable to secondary economic consequences despite not being directly involved in regional conflicts. Even here, the EU has chosen Armenia.

However, the most effective solution to Armenia's structural vulnerabilities does not lie exclusively in additional financial assistance. It lies in ending decades of regional isolation.

This is where European policy often appears contradictory. Brussels enthusiastically promotes regional connectivity while simultaneously avoiding difficult conversations about the mechanisms that would make such connectivity possible.

One of those mechanisms is the Zangezur Corridor. European policymakers are comfortable with the concept or not, the issue remains central to any serious discussion about regional transportation architecture. A fully integrated South Caucasus cannot emerge while one of its key transit links remains blocked. Likewise, Armenia's economic integration into regional trade networks cannot be fully realized without direct connections to neighboring markets and transport systems.

Connectivity cannot be selective.

One cannot advocate for integrated Eurasian transport networks while overlooking the most direct routes capable of facilitating that integration.

What makes the situation particularly noteworthy is that the Brussels meeting coincided with the visit of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Magdalena Grono, to Baku. Her visit comes at a moment when Azerbaijani officials are increasingly likely to question why a country that serves as the backbone of both regional energy security and Eurasian connectivity appears absent from discussions ostensibly designed to strengthen both.

The broader concern is that the European Union risks allowing political preferences to overshadow geopolitical realities.

The South Caucasus has changed dramatically over the past decade. Azerbaijan has emerged not only as a major energy supplier to Europe but also as a critical logistical hub connecting Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and European markets. The strategic importance of Azerbaijani infrastructure has only increased amid instability in Eastern Europe, tensions surrounding Iran, and continuing uncertainty across the Middle East.

Brussels understands this reality when discussing energy security. It should demonstrate the same realism when discussing connectivity.

Ultimately, successful regional integration cannot be built around omissions. If the European Union genuinely seeks to transform the South Caucasus into a bridge between Europe and Asia, it must engage with all of the region's key actors rather than selectively emphasizing some while marginalizing others.