In recent years, domestic political processes in Iran have acquired a persistent crisis-like character, with protest activity becoming not the exception but part of a new political norm.

The key feature of the current situation is the gap between formal stability and the actual erosion of legitimacy. The political system maintains institutional integrity, but is losing its ability to generate hope and offer society a compelling vision of the future. Under these conditions, even limited protests become an indicator of deeper processes—accumulated frustration, fragmentation of identities, and growing alienation between the government and society.

The external environment only exacerbates internal contradictions. International pressure, regional confrontation, and attempts by external actors to interpret Iranian reality through simplified scenarios do not so much weaken the regime directly as narrow the space for internal compromise. This increases the role of security institutions and makes any transformation more risky and conflict-prone.

CASPIA presents an interview with Dr. Dünya Bashol, an expert on the Caucasus and the Middle East, and a specialist in Kurdish studies, ethnicity, and nationalism.

-What are the key factors—economic, social, or political—underlying the current protests in Iran?

-The wave of protests was ignited not by a single cause but by a confluence of chronic problems. Economically, the Iranian state has made no meaningful progress over the past decade in addressing the steady decline in living standards for ordinary citizens. Corruption, lack of investment and entrepreneurship in high-tech and innovative sectors stemming from an inhospitable economic and political environment, prolonged droughts reminiscent of pre-Syrian civil war conditions that have reduced harvests and fueled food inflation, and the absence of any visible improvement constitute the main economic grievances. Compounding these, citizens' taxes are channeled to Iranian proxies abroad, which a significant portion of the population perceives as money stolen from their pockets and squandered.

At the social and political level, chronic oppression across various strata of society remains the core problem. The Iranian state compels every citizen to behave in accordance with what Shiite religious authorities deem appropriate. Yet by the end of the first quarter of the twenty-first century, in line with global trends driven by unprecedented cross-cultural interaction, Iranian society has diversified into countless subcultural, subsocial, and subpolitical groups. Enforcing uniform conduct across such a heterogeneous population is simply impossible. Citizens seek to follow their own paths under a more liberal constitution that guarantees freedom of choice, yet the regime remains unwilling to accommodate this. Following the Mahsa Amini protests, women are now "tolerated" regarding dress codes in major metropolitan areas, but daily life otherwise remains heavily restricted.

In the political arena, ordinary Iranians see little change; entrenched elites retain disproportionate political advantage through their mutual dependence on the Supreme Leader and his inner circle. Newcomers may begin their political ascent with bold rhetoric but quickly find themselves constrained by the Islamic regime's complex web of rules, which limits what they can achieve.

A prosperous population with limited freedom of expression may tolerate such conditions due to material comfort. A society with freedom of thought but modest income may also endure hardship by hoping for a brighter future during periods of global economic growth. However, an economically impoverished and politically oppressed society stripped of hope and trapped within a stagnant, ossified political system faces a heightened risk of mass protests and rebellion.

-How has the attitude of the Iranian army and security forces toward the protesters changed since the unrest began?

-The attitude of Iranian security forces has shown fundamental differences compared to previous protests over the past decade. Two factors explain this shift: the scars of the Amini protests remain fresh and the embers still hot, while the collective trauma inflicted by Israel's precision strikes on Iran's command-and-control infrastructure exposed just how vulnerable the regime's forces are. To avert another mass uprising, security forces have adopted a more tolerant posture toward protesters, which has also helped keep participation low and allowed daily life to continue relatively uninterrupted.

However, acts of vandalism by certain groups, unprecedented in previous unrest, including attacks on the cultural heritage sites of Islamic scholars and other public spaces, have not only alienated the perpetrators from ordinary protesters but also provided law enforcement with a legitimate pretext to crack down. The burning of Islamic scholars' tombs is condemned even by non-religious Iranians, while indiscriminate shootings targeting security forces have also harmed civilians. These developments have worked against the protesters' cause.

The security forces have appeared notably calmer and better coordinated than in previous episodes. The combination of low participation, vandalism, attempts by Shah supporters to co-opt the protests, and statements from armed Kurdish and Baluch groups has caused the broader public to distance itself from the demonstrators allowing Iranian security forces to avoid panic-driven reactions and costly mistakes.

-How are foreign policy factors—the threat from the US, accusations of foreign interference, pressure from Israel—influencing domestic protests? How is Iran using these arguments to consolidate its internal forces?

-One key reason the protests have remained low in intensity stems from American and Israeli statements at various levels, particularly the promotion of the Shah's return. American and Israeli policymakers appear to be heavily influenced by the Iranian diaspora and seem to have been persuaded that the Shah could serve as a unifying figure for all Iranians. This is a deeply flawed assumption. The Pahlavi dynasty left no favorable legacy for most Iranians; it is remembered for enriching a tiny elite while leaving the rest of the country in poverty, and its "Persianization policy" showed no respect for ethnic minorities which make no less than %45-50 of the overall population. The Iranian diaspora that settled abroad after 1979 consisted largely of wealthy groups who benefited from the Shah's patronage networks and may retain fond memories of the Pahlavi era but the opposite is true for ordinary Iranians. Reza Pahlavi is widely mocked in Iranian daily life for his lifestyle and speeches, and rallying the nation around him is simply impossible, which would be worse than Ahmad Chalabi after Iraqi invasion. Yet both U.S. and Israeli media and politicians have promoted precisely this notion.

Consequently, in many protest zones people either abandoned the crowds once Shah supporters began chanting for his return, or as in Iranian Azerbaijan openly cursed the Shah during demonstrations. For conservatives in the streets, American and Israeli support also provoked anger; many quickly withdrew, reasoning that if the United States and Israel were backing the protests and the Shah, nothing good could come of it.

This case alone illustrates that the Iranian diaspora wields considerable lobbying power in the United States, while Israel despite executing effective macro-level policies against Iran in global politics fails to grasp the social dynamics within Iranian society.

-What signals is Russia sending regarding the current protests and possible regime change in Tehran? And what interests are Russia involved?

-As events in Syria demonstrated, the war in Ukraine is draining Russia's capacity to project influence even in its near abroad, since Moscow is effectively fighting not only Ukraine but also the substantial Western support flowing to Kiev across all dimensions. For this reason, Russia has been unable to protest loudly against American support for the protesters. At the same time, Russia is increasingly dissatisfied with an Iran disconnected from global networks, a consequence of Tehran's stubborn commitment to its proxy network in the Middle East and Africa and its open hostility toward Israel. Iran's isolation harms Russian interests in multiple ways: major trade routes now bypass Iran due to its antagonism toward the contemporary Western bloc, and Moscow has gradually come to view a disconnected Iran as a burden rather than an asset.

The same dynamic was evident in Syria. Iranian policies may have preserved certain regions for the Assad government in the short term, but Tehran's continuous logistical supply lines to Hezbollah and Hamas, combined with its physical proximity to Israel, ultimately caused more harm than good and contributed to Assad's eventual fall.

A moderate Iran that maintains at least a minimum understanding with the West, sets aside its nuclear ambitions, and removes Israel from its list of priority targets could benefit Russia in global politics. As matters stand, however, Iran represents little more than a liability. Russia may prefer not a counter-revolution, but a structural change in the current Iranian regime.

-How does Turkey assess the situation in Iran, given its relations with Tehran, its position on the Kurdish issue, and its own national interests? Could the current crisis impact Turkish-Iranian relations?

-Turkey maintains a general policy of non-interference in Iran's domestic affairs and typically expresses its concerns by calling for peaceful solutions, urging both protesters and the state to avoid violence in carefully diplomatic language. There are only two exceptions to this principle: mass casualties among Iran's ethnic Turks, and Kurdish armed groups expanding their areas of control within Iran.

Apart from PJAK, none of the Iranian Kurdish armed groups has a significant agenda concerning Turkey. However, PJAK is currently the only armed group capable of conducting large-scale attacks against the Iranian army, though throughout its history it has rarely done so, and its prestige suffered a major blow when it remained inactive during the Amini protests. Nevertheless, PJAK's manpower, its position within the KCK umbrella, its status as a direct PKK offshoot, and its ability to absorb any number of YPG or PKK fighters make it a priority security threat for Turkey.

For this reason, regardless of the state of Iranian-Turkish relations, Turkey will always assist Iran in crushing any Kurdish armed group infiltration into towns and cities should a power vacuum emerge. Although support for other Kurdish parties is higher across most ethnically Kurdish areas of Iran, PJAK has a strong chance of quickly seizing control and establishing dominance over rival parties, as occurred during the Syrian Civil War.

-What are the possible long-term scenarios for Iran—from political transformation to the preservation of the current government? What will be the main trigger for each scenario?

-Four primary scenarios emerge for Iran's long-term future, each with distinct triggers and trajectories.

The first scenario, which may be termed "Anti-1979," envisions a mass uprising resembling the 1979 Islamic Revolution but in reverse. Potential triggers include Khamenei's death or severe incapacitation, a complete economic collapse with the rial losing all value, a large-scale massacre particularly in Tehran, or a new military intervention by Israel or the United States. The process would unfold with a catalytic event sparking nationwide protests, followed by oil workers launching a general strike as they did in 1978–79, bringing regime revenues to a halt. Fractures within the IRGC would emerge as lower-ranking soldiers and Basij members refuse to suppress the population, with some mid-level commanders defecting to the opposition. The Assembly of Experts would dissolve, demands for a new constitution would mount, and a provisional government comprising opposition groups, exiled figures, reformists, and military defectors would form. However, significant risks attend this scenario: despite decades of mass protests and intense pressure, no clear and organized opposition movement currently exists; the IRGC's economic interests and ideological commitments may compel it to defend the regime to the bitter end; Russia and China may intervene to protect their strategic interests; and ethnic divisions combined with the presence of armed groups could precipitate Syria- or Libya-style chaos and civil war.

The second scenario is a "Velvet Revolution" or negotiated transition, wherein pragmatist factions within the regime enter negotiations with the opposition and systematically transfer power. Prerequisites include the selection of a "soft landing" successor following Khamenei's death—such as Hassan Rouhani or a reformist cleric—the IRGC leadership acknowledging that the current structure is indefensible, and the initiation of new nuclear deal negotiations with the West. Notably, Iran's constitution permits the Assembly of Experts to select a "Council of Jurists" rather than a single Supreme Leader, which could govern during the transition. The process would begin with the regime releasing political prisoners as a goodwill gesture, followed by a constitutional reform referendum to curtail the Supreme Leader's powers, free elections permitting reformist and opposition parties, and the establishment of truth and reconciliation mechanisms modeled on South Africa's experience. The advantages include minimizing violence and chaos, preserving institutional continuity, and attracting international support and investment. Challenges include the risk of sabotage by the IRGC and conservative clerics, the difficulty of balancing justice and accountability demands with stability, and disputes over the redistribution of economic resources.

The third scenario involves a military coup followed by gradual liberalization, resembling the Pakistani or Egyptian model. In this case, following Khamenei's death or a new military defeat, the IRGC leadership would declare the abolition of the Supreme Leadership, a temporary military council would assume control to restore order and stability, and the new military government would pursue normalization with the West and economic restructuring. Limited space would be granted to civil society and political parties, but military veto power would be preserved, followed by controlled elections featuring military-approved civilian candidates. Outcomes diverge: in the best case, a trajectory similar to Turkey after 1980 or Indonesia after Suharto, with military influence gradually diminishing; in the worst case, permanent military dominance as in Pakistan or Egypt, with civilian government serving merely as a façade. An alternative variant sees the regime collapsing under the weight of sanctions, corruption, and social unrest, leaving a vacuum filled by security elites and oligarchs. From this chaos, an "Iranian Putin" could emerge—a pragmatic general from within the IRGC who replaces Islamism with grievance-driven nationalism and rises to power on promises of order and stability.

The fourth scenario entails ethnic fragmentation. Ethnic Persians constitute only 45–55 percent of Iran's population, with the remainder comprising diverse ethnic groups. Triggers would include the collapse or severe weakening of central authority, the IRGC's fragmentation due to internal conflict or external intervention, regional commanders forming alliances with local forces, and the emergence of ethnic-based militias. Key actors include the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) advocating Kurdish independence; the South Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement demanding independence or unification with the Republic of Azerbaijan; and Baluch separatists in Sistan-Baluchestan seeking to establish an ethnic Baluch state encompassing Pakistan's Baluchestan province and Baluch territories in Afghanistan. Historical precedent exists: the Soviet-backed Kurdish Mahabad Republic and Azerbaijan People's Government emerged after World War II. This scenario would materialize only if complete collapse of central authority coincides with large-scale external intervention. Notably, even critics of the Iranian regime remain sensitive to separatist tendencies and external encouragement that could undermine Iran's territorial integrity.

Projecting these scenarios onto a timeline: in the short term (2025–2027), the conservative status quo remains most likely, with the IRGC intensifying internal repression and exploiting external threats to justify national unity, and Khamenei's successor probably being a conservative cleric or IRGC-aligned figure. In the medium term (2027–2030), the military coup or negotiated transition scenarios gain probability as deepening economic crisis, new military defeats, or increased regional isolation could fracture the regime. In the long term (post-2030), mass uprising or the rise of civil politics becomes possible, though this process would likely prove prolonged, conflictual, and unpredictable.

Ultimately, Iran's future hinges on the interplay of three fundamental dynamics: the IRGC's power and unity, the depth of economic crisis and popular discontent, and the level of international pressure and isolation. These dynamics could push Iran toward either a more authoritarian military dictatorship or a painful democratic transition. In the post-2025 period, Iran faces its greatest existential crisis since the 1979 Revolution, and the post-war era portends fundamental changes not only in the security paradigm but in the very foundations of the political system.