Several weeks after the signing of the memorandum on the ceasefire of 17 June 2026, the exchange of strikes between the United States and Iran demonstrated the limited effectiveness of the agreements that had been reached. The document made it possible to temporarily halt the most intense phase of the conflict, but it failed to eliminate the fundamental contradictions between the parties or establish an effective mechanism for preventing new crises.
The resumption of hostilities indicates that Washington and Tehran viewed the ceasefire primarily as an instrument for an operational pause to restore their respective capabilities rather than as the beginning of a political settlement. The renewed escalation resulted from the incompatible strategic objectives of the two sides, the absence of mutual trust, and differing interpretations of the provisions of the memorandum.
In the short term, the most likely scenario remains one of controlled escalation in which both parties continue to employ limited military actions as an instrument of political pressure while avoiding a full scale war.
Why the 17 June Memorandum Proved Ineffective
The principal reason for the instability of the agreement was the absence of a political compromise. The document formalized the cessation of active hostilities but did not provide solutions to the issues that had originally caused the conflict. These include the development of Iran's nuclear program, the United States military presence in the Middle East, the United States sanctions policy, and Iran's regional strategy.
In practice, the memorandum functioned as an agreement to reduce the intensity of the conflict rather than as a mechanism for resolving it. Both sides continued to pursue their existing strategic objectives. For the United States, the priority remained limiting Iran's military capabilities and ensuring the security of its regional allies. For Iran, the central objective was preserving its strategic deterrence capabilities, including its missile program and its influence through a network of regional partners.
The second factor was the ambiguity of the legal language contained in the agreement. The memorandum did not establish clear criteria defining which actions would constitute a violation of the ceasefire. The United States retained the right to conduct preventive or defensive strikes in the event of an immediate threat to its forces or to international shipping. Iran, by contrast, regarded any new United States strikes as a violation of the agreements that had been reached.
The third reason was the absence of an independent monitoring mechanism. Unlike traditional ceasefire agreements, the memorandum did not establish an international commission to monitor compliance, a joint mechanism for investigating incidents, or procedures for resolving disputes. As a result, every crisis was automatically interpreted by each side in accordance with its own interests.
The immediate trigger for the renewed exchange of strikes was a series of incidents in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. The United States stated that Iran's actions posed a threat to international shipping and to American military infrastructure, after which it carried out limited strikes against facilities associated with Iran's naval capabilities.
Tehran, in turn, described these actions as the first substantial violation of the memorandum by the United States. The retaliatory strikes were intended to demonstrate Iran's ability to maintain strategic deterrence and to prevent the perception that it was prepared to refrain from responding with force.
At the same time, it is important to note that neither side sought a full scale war. The scale of the operations, the selection of targets, and the nature of official statements indicate an effort to keep the conflict within the framework of limited escalation. Military operations were primarily demonstrative in nature and were intended to restore deterrence rather than to achieve a decisive military outcome.
Strategic Objectives of the Parties Following the Collapse of the Ceasefire
For the United States, the renewed escalation serves several objectives simultaneously. First, it reaffirms Washington's commitment to protecting freedom of navigation and the security of its allies. Second, it maintains pressure on Iran with the objective of limiting its military capabilities. Third, it demonstrates the ability of the United States to respond rapidly to regional crises without deploying a large scale ground operation.
For Iran, the exchange of strikes carries equally significant political importance. The country's leadership seeks to demonstrate that external pressure cannot alter the state's strategic course. The retaliatory actions are also intended to preserve the confidence of regional partners and the domestic audience, since the absence of a response could be perceived as a strategic defeat.
Thus, both sides employ the limited use of force as an element of deterrence policy. Military activity is not an objective in itself but rather an instrument for shaping the adversary's perceptions and demonstrating political resolve.
Forecast of Future Developments
The most likely scenario remains the preservation of the current model of conflict. The United States will continue to conduct precision strikes against facilities that it considers to be sources of threats to its forces and to international shipping. Iran will respond with limited military actions while avoiding escalation into a large scale war. At the same time, diplomatic contacts through intermediaries are likely to continue.
Nevertheless, the most dangerous scenario in which one of these limited operations results in significant casualties or strikes against critically important infrastructure remains the least likely. Should such a scenario occur, the risk of involving additional regional actors and transforming the local crisis into a large scale armed conflict with serious consequences for global energy security would increase substantially.
It also cannot be ruled out that growing economic costs, pressure from the Gulf states, and concerns over global instability in energy markets could encourage both sides to conclude a new agreement. However, such an agreement would be sustainable only if it included clearly defined compliance procedures, verification mechanisms, and agreed rules for responding to incidents.
The collapse of the 17 June memorandum demonstrates that the traditional model of ceasefire agreements no longer corresponds to the nature of the contemporary confrontation between the United States and Iran. The central problem is not the absence of agreements as such but the absence of a political foundation capable of ensuring their long term implementation.
For the United States, this implies the need to move beyond short term agreements toward more institutionalized mechanisms of crisis management that include permanent channels of communication and international verification of disputed incidents. For Iran, the continued reliance on a strategy of limited coercive pressure increases the risks of progressively deeper international isolation and economic pressure, even if a full scale war can still be avoided.
In a broader context, the July escalation confirms the transition of relations between the United States and Iran into a state of unstable strategic deterrence. Unlike the classical balance of power of the Cold War period, the contemporary model is characterized by the absence of stable rules of interaction, the prominent role of regional intermediaries, and the constant possibility of localized crises. This makes any future ceasefire agreements merely temporary instruments for managing the conflict rather than mechanisms for its final settlement. The violation of the 17 June memorandum resulted not from a single incident but from a systemic mismatch between operational arrangements and the long term strategic objectives of the parties.
As long as contradictions persist regarding the regional security architecture, the role of the United States in the Middle East, and Iran's military capabilities, the likelihood of similar crises recurring will remain high. Therefore, the most realistic medium term outlook is the continuation of a pattern of limited confrontation accompanied by periodic surges of violence and parallel diplomatic efforts aimed at managing escalation.