The visits of German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul to Azerbaijan and Armenia on 17 and 18 November 2026 should be viewed as more than a matter of bilateral diplomacy. They reflect Berlin’s broader strategic interest in the South Caucasus, a region whose importance for European energy security, transport connectivity and relations with Central Asia has grown considerably. The fact that Baku was the first stop on the minister’s itinerary is also significant. Azerbaijan possesses the resources and infrastructure necessary to serve as a practical partner for Germany across several strategic areas.

The visits took place against the backdrop of a gradual shift in the region’s geopolitical landscape. The repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war, instability in the Middle East and persistent risks to established trade routes are prompting European states to reassess their approaches to energy supplies and Eurasian logistics. In this context, the South Caucasus is no longer a peripheral consideration in German foreign policy. It is increasingly seen as a region through which some of Europe’s key economic and transport links can be developed and secured.

For Berlin, relations with Baku have a tangible economic dimension. In 2027, Azerbaijan and Germany will mark the 35th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. The Joint Declaration on the Strategic Agenda for Bilateral Partnership, signed in July 2026, provides a political framework for expanding cooperation. However, the future of the relationship will depend less on diplomatic statements than on the ability of both sides to translate their commitments into concrete projects. Bilateral trade reached approximately $1.38 billion in 2025, although this represented a 14.15 per cent decline compared with the previous year. The figures point to an established economic foundation, but also suggest that the potential of bilateral trade remains underutilised.

Energy remains one of the principal drivers of Germany’s interest in Azerbaijan. Deliveries of Azerbaijani natural gas to Germany began in January 2026. Under a ten-year agreement between SOCAR and the German company SEFE, Azerbaijan is to supply 1.5 billion cubic metres of gas annually. While these volumes are modest compared with the scale of Russian gas supplies to the European market in previous years, the significance of the agreement extends beyond its immediate commercial value. It establishes a new channel of direct energy cooperation and reinforces Azerbaijan’s position as a supplier contributing to the diversification of Europe’s gas imports.

This issue remains particularly relevant to Germany. The energy crisis of recent years exposed the vulnerabilities of a model in which a substantial share of an economy’s energy needs depends on a limited number of external suppliers. Berlin is therefore interested not only in maintaining existing deliveries but also in exploring opportunities to deepen energy cooperation with Azerbaijan. Any increase in exports, however, will depend on available resources, infrastructure development and the capacity of the Southern Gas Corridor. Energy cooperation should therefore be understood as a long-term component of the bilateral partnership rather than a one-off commercial arrangement.

Transport connectivity is another important consideration shaping Germany’s regional policy. The disruption and reconfiguration of trade routes between Europe and Asia have been among the most consequential effects of recent geopolitical upheavals. The war in Ukraine has constrained the use of several established logistics routes running through Russian territory, while tensions in the Middle East have added uncertainty to other transport corridors. European states are consequently paying greater attention to alternative routes capable of providing reliable access to the markets of Central Asia and, further east, China.

Against this backdrop, the Middle Corridor is of particular interest to Germany. Its strategic value lies not only in the possibility of reducing reliance on northern routes but also in the opportunity to expand Europe’s economic presence in Central Asia. Azerbaijan occupies a central geographical position within this network, connecting the Caspian region with Türkiye and European markets. For Berlin, closer cooperation with Baku in transport and logistics could become an important instrument in pursuing a broader strategy of engagement with Central Asian states.

The TRIPP project adds another dimension to the prospects for regional connectivity. Its implementation could potentially reshape the transport geography of the South Caucasus by creating new links between Azerbaijan, Armenia and the wider region. For European states, initiatives of this kind are relevant primarily because of their potential to open additional routes and strengthen economic ties. Their practical significance, however, will depend on political agreements, the terms of implementation and the ability of the parties involved to ensure the reliable operation of the resulting infrastructure. Regional connectivity cannot be achieved through agreements alone. It requires political commitment and coordinated action by all stakeholders.

Wadephul’s visit to Armenia followed a somewhat different political and economic logic. The discussions focused on Armenia’s relations with the European Union, democratic reforms, economic diversification and prospects for regional peace. Germany has consistently supported Yerevan’s European agenda and views the development of relations with Armenia as part of the EU’s broader engagement with the South Caucasus. Transport connectivity nevertheless remains part of the bilateral dialogue. During German-Armenian political consultations in January 2026, for instance, the two sides discussed TRIPP alongside other regional infrastructure initiatives.

Berlin is therefore pursuing distinct but complementary priorities in its relations with the two countries. In the case of Azerbaijan, the emphasis is on energy supplies, transport infrastructure and economic cooperation. In its relations with Armenia, greater importance is attached to European integration, institutional reforms and support for the peace process. This differentiated approach allows Germany to strengthen its presence across the region without making its policy dependent on a single country or political track.

The absence of Georgia from the German foreign minister’s itinerary also warrants attention. This is notable given that Tbilisi has traditionally been regarded as one of Germany’s key partners in the region and an important link in the South Caucasus transport network. In recent years, however, political dialogue between Georgia and the European Union has deteriorated considerably amid disagreements over democratic governance and the country’s foreign policy direction. The omission of Georgia from Wadephul’s itinerary can therefore be seen as reflecting the current state of relations between Berlin and Tbilisi. At the same time, it illustrates how European policy towards the South Caucasus is becoming increasingly differentiated, with the nature of engagement shaped by the domestic political trajectories of individual states.