The visit of the Prime Minister of Italy Giorgia Meloni to Baku matters not simply because the leader of one of Europe’s largest economies arrived in Azerbaijan. What matters more is the timing and the political backdrop. At a moment when relations between Baku and several European institutions remain tense - with the European Parliament repeatedly adopting critical resolutions and escalating political rhetoric - Italy is openly signaling something different: Rome has its own conversation with Azerbaijan. And its own approach.

Meloni’s route through the South Caucasus was particularly revealing. She first visited Yerevan and then immediately headed to Baku. The fact that Azerbaijan was not treated as a secondary stop but rather as an essential continuation of the regional visit carried clear political symbolism. In Baku, this was perceived not as diplomatic routine, but as a gesture of respect and recognition of Azerbaijan’s growing geopolitical weight. Especially now, when the South Caucasus is gradually transforming from a peripheral region into one of the key corridors linking Europe and Asia.

Unlike many EU states, Italy has never built its relationship with Azerbaijan solely around the language of “values” and Brussels-style political rhetoric. The relationship has always been far more pragmatic - and therefore far more resilient. Italy has remained Azerbaijan’s number one trading partner for years. Last year alone, bilateral trade volume approached $12 billion, numbers are reflecting the depth of the strategic linkage between Rome and Baku.

Perhaps the strongest indicator of mutual trust is not even trade itself, but the political architecture behind the relationship. Azerbaijan and Italy signed two separate declarations on strategic partnership - in 2014 and again in 2020. In diplomatic practice, repeating such agreements with the same country is rare. It demonstrates that the relationship is not simply “good,” but institutionalized, long-term, and continuously adapted to shifting geopolitical realities.

Energy, of course, remains the backbone of this partnership. Last year Azerbaijan exported 25 billion cubic meters of natural gas, of which 9.5 billion cubic meters went to the Italian market. Italy is effectively the largest European consumer of Azerbaijani gas. And judging by the signals surrounding Meloni’s visit, Rome is interested in increasing those volumes further. Europe’s energy map is changing rapidly, and Italy clearly does not want to depend on unstable supply routes. Azerbaijan, in this context, is viewed as both reliable and already integrated into Europe’s broader energy security architecture.

But perhaps the most interesting developments are happening beyond pipelines. Following the media outlets, SOCAR finalized the acquisition of 99% of Italiana Petroli, a company operating two major refineries and around 4,500 fuel stations across Italy. This changes the nature of the relationship entirely. Azerbaijan is no longer simply an external energy supplier to Italy; it is becoming part of Italy’s domestic energy infrastructure itself. That represents a completely different level of strategic interdependence.

Another notable aspect of the visit was the unexpected emphasis on Iran. According to official statements, this issue was discussed during talks between Ilham Aliyev and Giorgia Meloni. What matters here is not only the substance of those conversations, but the fact that Italy chose Baku as the place for discussing one of the region’s most sensitive geopolitical questions. That alone signals trust. It also reflects Italy’s understanding that Azerbaijan has become one of the key regional actors capable of offering insight into developments surrounding Iran and the wider region.

In many ways, Italy increasingly appears to be the one EU country pursuing a genuinely independent and carefully calibrated strategy toward Azerbaijan - one shaped less by Brussels’ political moods and more by long-term geopolitical calculation. Meloni’s visit to Baku only reinforced that perception.