On March 15, 2026, amid growing geopolitical turbulence and internal challenges, Kazakhstanis with a turnout of 73.12% took part in the vote on the new Constitution, where 87.15% of participants voted “yes”, thereby confirming their support for the institutional transformation announced by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev as early as January 20 at the session of the National Kurultai.
The Central Referendum Commission officially recognized the results as valid already on March 16, after which it became obvious that the updated Basic Law, which radically reworked about 84% of the previous text, will enter into force on July 1, 2026. The very day of voting will be marked as a national holiday, symbolizing not only the unity of the nation, but also the transition to a new era of Kazakh statehood.
What prompted the leadership of Kazakhstan to take such a radical step right now?
Most likely, the reason was the internal lessons of the January 2022 events, which exposed the fragility of the system and required greater legitimacy of power. Obviously, these processes also intertwined with external challenges, for example, the war between Russia and Ukraine, geopolitical turbulence, as well as the need for internal consolidation so that Kazakhstan would not become an arena for someone else’s interests.
President Tokayev spoke of transitioning from a “super-presidential” model to a presidential republic with an “influential parliament”, however, the scale of the changes still turned the reform into the creation of a new edition, where the emphasis is placed on strengthening the executive vertical while preserving elements of parliamentary participation.
Particular attention deserves an in-depth analysis of presidential powers, which became the central point of the reform and at the same time the main object of criticism. In the new Constitution, the head of state receives the right to unilaterally appoint key figures of executive and judicial power, namely, the Prosecutor General, the chairmen of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, the head of the National Bank and the head of the National Security Committee. In essence, this is a radical reduction of parliamentary control, when deputies can no longer lift immunity from these officials, and the budgetary powers of the Kurultai (the new unicameral parliament of 145 deputies elected under a proportional system) are significantly narrowed. In addition, the president appoints a vice-president with the consent of parliament, a position that was abolished in 1996. In case of double refusal by the Kurultai to approve the vice-president, prime minister or speaker, the president receives the right to dissolve parliament and temporarily issue decrees having the force of law. The term of the president himself is strictly limited to seven years without the right of re-election, and candidates must have at least five years of public service experience. In case of early departure of the head of state, it is the vice-president, and not the speaker of the Senate as before, who temporarily performs duties.
However, these changes also have controversial points that have caused discussions in some analytical circles. For example, the new advisory body, Қазақстан Халық Кеңесі (People’s Council of Kazakhstan) consisting of 164 members appointed by the president and having the right of legislative initiative, risks becoming a parallel structure duplicating and replacing parliament. The dissolution mechanism turns the Kurultai into an organ dependent on presidential will, and the vague wording of Article 23 on freedom of speech, which speaks of a ban on encroachment on “honor, dignity, public morality and order”, opens wide opportunities for judicial arbitrariness.
Returning to the context of regional turbulence and external risks, it is worth noting that the restoration of the institution of vice-presidency and the expansion of presidential powers in terms of succession are seen primarily as a well-thought-out measure to maintain stability in conditions where external factors can unexpectedly influence internal processes. After Western sanctions introduced in connection with the conflict between Russia and Ukraine significantly changed the configuration of northern logistics routes, the interest of global players in Central Asia has noticeably increased. The Northern Corridor, which passed through Russia and Belarus, has lost part of its attractiveness, and the Middle Corridor has come to the fore, where Kazakhstan occupies a key position as the main transit hub. According to analysts from the Carnegie Endowment and Atlantic Council, cargo volumes along this route have grown many times over; through Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey now go alternative supplies from China to Europe and back, as well as energy resources and critically important minerals.
On the one hand, this has opened new economic opportunities for Kazakhstan. The European Union is actively seeking diversification of energy and goods supplies, China is deepening projects within the framework of “One Belt, One Road”, Turkey is strengthening its role as a bridge between East and West, and the United States and India are showing interest in strategic minerals and logistics. Kazakhstan, while maintaining its unique multi-vector foreign policy built back in the 1990s, demonstrates readiness to act as a reliable partner for all parties. The president performs the role not only of guarantor of the Constitution, but also of the main coordinator of the strategic course. It is he who ensures prompt decision-making, balances interests and prevents possible pauses that could arise in conditions of geopolitical uncertainty.
On the other hand, such a model of succession and strengthening of the vertical of power allows the country to confidently balance between different centers of power without losing initiative in key issues of security and economy. From the point of view of domestic experts, this reduces the risks of a power vacuum in crisis scenarios and strengthens the ability to quickly respond to changes in global supply chains. For example, the growth of investments in the infrastructure of the Middle Corridor such as railways, ports, digital logistics platforms and so on, is already bringing tangible dividends. According to estimates by Astana Times and ORF, Kazakhstan is turning into one of the main beneficiaries of the reorientation of Eurasian trade, attracting capital from several directions at once.
No less significant are other emphases of the new Constitution, which reflect the desire to strengthen national identity in harmony with modern challenges. The preamble emphasizes the “primordial Kazakh land” and the continuity of the thousand-year history of the Great Steppe, which strengthens the cultural dominant of the unitary state and contributes to the formation of national self-awareness. Article 30 for the first time constitutionally enshrines marriage as a voluntary and equal union of a man and a woman, a step officially explained by the protection of traditional values and raising the status of the family, while causing a contradictory response in society. The status of the Russian language has been changed from the formulation “on equal terms” to “alongside Kazakh” in state bodies. Tokayev explained that it is not about lowering the status, but only about clarifying the role of the state language, which allows preserving cultural diversity and at the same time strengthening the positions of the Kazakh language. Recently, in a number of cities, a process of renaming streets with an emphasis on national history has been observed. Finally, the obligation “not to use armed force first” has disappeared from the text. Now Kazakhstan simply “respects the principles of international law” and pursues a peaceful policy. Such wording, according to analysts, leaves more room for flexible response to regional threats without changing the overall peaceful vector of foreign policy.
How will these changes affect neighboring countries and, above all, relations with Russia? Moscow has officially expressed support for the innovations, hoping to strengthen partnership in the EAEU and CSTO. However, the language nuance and the strengthening of national identity are perceived by Russia as a signal of greater autonomy for Astana and a reminder that Kazakhstan consistently pursues a multi-vector policy. For the Kremlin, this is a pragmatic challenge corresponding to the laws of time and moment, without violating, however, economic and energy ties. Central Asian neighbors, for example Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, have already expressed solidarity with Kazakhstan. Perhaps this reform can become a regional benchmark for strengthening presidential models.
The prospects for the adopted innovations are truly multifaceted. The positive scenario assumes strengthening of stability, when the vice-president and the new Kurultai can become instruments of accountability, the emphasis on traditional values and national identity will unite society, and digital and environmental norms will attract investments. The negative scenario, which must always be considered along with all others, paints a picture of stagnation. We are talking about the fact that centralization can provoke an outflow of critically thinking personnel, apathy among young people and interethnic tensions in the northern regions due to the language nuance. In addition, this is also a test of the compatibility of strong presidential power with elements of parliamentarism.
In the end, practice will determine everything. If the appointed vice-president and Kurultai really become platforms for dialogue, and not a continuation of presidential will, Kazakhstan will step towards the “Just State” with an emphasis on human rights, digital security and sustainable development.
The referendum on the new Constitution became not so much a vote as a choice of trajectory. Continuity of the Great Steppe is combined with an attempt to synthesize tradition, modernity and sovereignty in a rather complex environment. Whether this balance will succeed - time will tell. But already today it is clear that the era of the previous Constitution has ended, and a new chapter of Kazakh statehood opens with a clear emphasis on a strong presidential vertical, protected values and a confident course of its own path in a multipolar world.