The upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia represent one of Russia’s most significant foreign policy tests in the post-Soviet space. Following the substantial erosion of its influence in Moldova, the narrowing of its political leverage in Georgia, and the deterioration of relations with Yerevan, Moscow increasingly views Armenia as one of the last states in the South Caucasus where it still retains meaningful tools of influence.

At the same time, one of the central questions shaping the Russian-Armenian agenda ahead of the elections concerns Moscow’s ability to convert its existing political and economic assets into a strategically favorable outcome. It is precisely the prospect of losing Armenia — a country that is increasingly signaling its intention to fundamentally transform its foreign policy, that explains the increasingly sharp rhetoric directed at Yerevan by members of Russia’s political establishment.

Against this backdrop, assessing the possible outcome of the Armenian elections and the prospects of pro-Russian political forces requires a careful examination of the resources available to Moscow and its capacity to transform them into tangible political gains.

Economy and Trade

The economy remains Russia’s most powerful instrument of influence. Russia continues to be Armenia’s largest trading partner, while trade with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) accounts for more than 80 percent of Armenia’s external trade turnover. A significant share of Armenian exports is oriented toward the Russian market, and many sectors of the Armenian economy remain critically dependent on access to it.

Moscow has already demonstrated its willingness to employ these economic levers. Restrictions on imports of Armenian products have been observed, alongside signals regarding potential revisions to gas and petroleum pricing arrangements and warnings concerning the implications of Armenia’s growing divergence from the EAEU framework. Although the EAEU lacks a legal mechanism for expelling Armenia from the organization, Russia has shown a readiness to pursue measures that could result in Armenia’s de facto economic isolation.

For a considerable segment of the Armenian business community, a deterioration in relations with Russia would entail direct economic costs. However, both the Armenian leadership and much of Armenian society increasingly interpret Russian restrictions as instruments of political pressure, a perception that has produced mixed - and in some respects counterproductive results for Moscow.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has sought to capitalize on this dynamic by emphasizing the European Union’s willingness and capacity to offset potential economic losses incurred by Armenia. He has already announced his intention to visit Moscow following the elections. Such a visit is likely to be aimed at buying time for the gradual restructuring of Armenia’s economy ahead of any future withdrawal from the EAEU.

In this context, Pashinyan’s government faces two immediate strategic priorities: securing the rapid conclusion of the Agreement on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the European Union, and achieving regional transport and communications connectivity arrangements that would reduce Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia.

Energy

Armenia remains critically dependent on Russian natural gas supplies and on Russia’s involvement in the country’s energy infrastructure. It receives Russian gas at preferential prices that are substantially lower than prevailing European market rates. According to Reuters, approximately 82 percent of Armenia’s gas consumption is supplied by Russia. This dependence explains the Armenian government’s efforts to diversify its energy partnerships through closer cooperation with Iran and the European Union.

In this regard, Yerevan is seeking to expand the existing “gas-for-electricity” arrangement with Iran, develop new transmission lines connecting Armenia, Iran, and Georgia, integrate into emerging South Caucasus and Black Sea energy initiatives, and increase the share of solar and renewable energy generation with the support of Western partners.

For Armenia, the most attractive long-term scenario involves integration into the emerging European energy space via Georgia and the Black Sea. This refers to a strategic infrastructure Black Sea Submarine Cable project (BSSC) that envisages the construction of a submarine high-voltage electricity cable and fiber-optic connection across the Black Sea, linking Azerbaijan with Romania and Hungary through Georgia.

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has officially confirmed Armenia’s interest in joining the Black Sea Submarine Cable initiative, also known as the Green Energy Corridor. Discussions on Armenia’s participation took place during Kobakhidze’s visits to Yerevan, including within the framework of intergovernmental consultations and meetings associated with the European Political Community. Participation in the project would provide Armenia not only with access to alternative energy imports but also with opportunities to export domestically generated electricity to external markets.

At the same time, Armenia has taken steps to reduce Russian influence over its domestic energy sector. The Constitutional Court of Armenia has upheld the government’s authority to nationalize Electric Networks of Armenia, a major energy distribution company owned by Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan, one of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s principal political rivals ahead of the elections.

In parallel, Yerevan is engaged in discussions with the United States regarding the potential deployment of small modular nuclear reactors. These developments suggest that, while Armenia’s energy dependence on Russia remains significant, the situation is far from irreversible. Russia retains important leverage in the energy sphere, but its resources are increasingly challenged by Armenia’s diversification strategy and by the growing availability of alternative partnerships and infrastructure projects.

The Armenian Diaspora in Russia

Russia is home to one of the world’s largest Armenian diaspora communities. Hundreds of thousands of Armenian citizens either work in Russia or maintain direct economic ties to the Russian market. Remittances from Russia have traditionally played a significant role in Armenia’s economy.

This reality creates a potential electoral constituency for political forces advocating the preservation of close relations with Moscow. In addition, according to Reuters, Western intelligence services suspect Russian structures of attempting to mobilize Armenian citizens residing in Russia to participate in the elections, allegations that are partially reinforced by certain reported developments. Moscow, however, has categorically rejected such accusations.

Information Influence

Despite the noticeable decline in the popularity of Russian media in Armenia since 2020, Russia’s informational presence remains substantial. Moscow continues to exercise influence through Russian-language media outlets, networks of Telegram channels, pro-Russian public figures, segments of the expert community, and longstanding ties with elements of Armenia’s traditional political establishment.

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these instruments is no longer comparable to what it was a decade ago and, in many cases, has produced diminishing returns or even counterproductive outcomes. Russia’s information strategy has largely centered on direct criticism of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government, often relying on historical narratives emphasizing Russia’s purportedly protective role toward the Armenian people. At the same time, Moscow has continued to employ increasingly outdated approaches associated with coercive influence and conflict-management tactics.

An additional limitation is that criticism directed at Armenia is frequently voiced either by Russian citizens of Armenian origin or by prominent Kremlin-aligned media personalities whose capacity to shape Armenian public opinion is limited. As a result, while Russia retains a significant informational footprint in Armenia, its ability to translate media presence into meaningful political influence has weakened considerably.

Political Allies Within Armenia

Russia continues to maintain channels of communication with virtually all major opposition forces that challenge the policies of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. These groups generally argue against further deterioration in relations with Moscow, warn of the economic costs associated with distancing Armenia from Russia, question the reliability of the West as a strategic partner, and express skepticism regarding its ability to guarantee Armenia’s security and economic prosperity. They also criticize Pashinyan’s approach toward Azerbaijan and the broader regional normalization process. These arguments continue to resonate with a segment of Armenian society, particularly among older generations and constituencies that remain attached to traditional geopolitical orientations.

The principal weakness of Armenia’s pro-Russian political camp lies in its inability to formulate a political agenda that adequately reflects the country’s evolving geopolitical environment. Equally important is the absence of a unifying leadership figure. While Moscow maintains relationships with several opposition groups, it lacks a political figure of Pashinyan’s stature capable of consolidating the broader protest electorate under a single platform.

As a result, the opposition remains fragmented, and its support base is divided among competing political actors. This fragmentation significantly limits the ability of pro-Russian forces to convert public dissatisfaction into a coherent electoral challenge.

Military Presence

Russia continues to maintain a military presence in Armenia through its military base in Gyumri, which remains one of the most visible symbols of the Russian-Armenian alliance. Yet the security sphere has increasingly become the Achilles’ heel of Russia’s position in Armenia, particularly in the aftermath of the events of 2020–2023.

It is precisely in this domain that Russia has suffered its most substantial reputational losses within Armenian society, providing Pashinyan with a significant political advantage in his confrontation with pro-Russian forces. A considerable portion of the Armenian public now views Russia as an unreliable security partner following the loss of Karabakh. Even many critics of Pashinyan acknowledge that trust in Russia can no longer be taken for granted.

Capitalizing on this growing skepticism, Pashinyan has already taken steps to freeze Armenia’s participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This policy has been reflected in the suspension of Armenia’s membership contributions and the country’s refusal to participate in CSTO military exercises.

Perspectives

Against the backdrop of the factors outlined above, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has intensified efforts to deepen Armenia’s relations with the United States and the European Union. Armenia has signed a number of cooperation agreements with both Washington and Brussels, while European integration has emerged as one of the central themes of the current election campaign. Consequently, any attempt by Moscow to exert excessive pressure on Yerevan risks producing a counterproductive effect by further mobilizing support for the government’s current foreign policy course.

Under present circumstances, the most realistic objective for Moscow appears to be preventing Pashinyan from securing a constitutional majority, thereby preserving Russia’s ability to influence Armenia’s domestic political processes. Achieving a decisive electoral victory for openly pro-Russian forces, however, appears considerably more challenging.

Most recent opinion polls indicate that Pashinyan’s party remains in the lead, although estimates of its support vary depending on methodology. Some surveys place support at approximately 30–35 percent, while others report significantly higher figures among voters who have already made their electoral choice.

The paradox of the current situation is that Russia continues to possess an extensive array of instruments of influence in Armenia, including economic, energy, migration-related, informational, and political levers. Yet many of these tools are rooted in a previous architecture of bilateral relations and no longer guarantee the political outcomes they once did.

As a result, Moscow remains capable of exerting substantial influence on Armenian politics and complicating Yerevan’s westward trajectory. At present, however, Russia’s primary objective appears less about ensuring the emergence of a fully pro-Russian government and more about preserving significant influence while preventing Armenia’s definitive geopolitical realignment.

Based on currently available data and polling trends, Pashinyan’s political camp remains the favorite heading into the elections. Nevertheless, the final composition of parliament will depend in large measure on whether opposition forces are able to consolidate the protest vote and transform public dissatisfaction into a unified electoral challenge.