CASPIA  presents an exclusive interview with Hooman Majd, an Iranian-American author and journalist specializing in Iranian politics and society. He is the author of several books, including the bestseller The Ayatollah Begs to Differ, and has been published in leading international media outlets such as The New York Times, The New Yorker, and Newsweek. He also served as a translator and informal adviser to Iranian President Mohammad Khatami during his visits to the United States and UN sessions.

– In your opinion, what was the main cause of this war: domestic protests, Iran’s growing military power, or the strategic decisions of the U.S. and Israel?

-The main cause was the decision by Israel, and subsequently the United States (which was persuaded by Israel), that the timing was right to eliminate the adversary’s ability to threaten U.S. allies. This was primarily a strategic decision: Iran was seen as approaching a dangerous threshold in terms of its missile and nuclear capabilities, and delaying action could have resulted in a far more complex and risky situation in the future. Domestic protests and Iran’s military power were part of the broader context, but the decisive factor was the assessment of timing and perceived vulnerability.

– Why did the U.S. and Israel decide to move from threats to full-scale strikes against Iran at this particular moment?

-Because, in their assessment, Iran was at its weakest position: it had not yet fully recovered from the June war, and the January protests revealed internal vulnerabilities and instability within the regime. From their perspective, the combination of military degradation, economic pressure, and internal unrest created a “window of opportunity,” when the risks of retaliation were lower than they would have been at another time. They likely concluded that further delay would allow Iran to recover and close this window.

– To what extent did the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei serve as a trigger for escalation?

-Escalation would probably have occurred regardless, as long as Israel and the U.S. continued striking Iranian targets. However, the assassination of Khamenei significantly strengthened the government’s resolve to act decisively. It was a powerful symbolic and political event that consolidated the elites and increased pressure on the leadership to take decisive action.

– How have strikes on key Iranian military and nuclear infrastructure affected its defensive capabilities?

-It is difficult to assess precisely in the context of an ongoing conflict. Nevertheless, it is clear that Iran’s air defense systems have been further weakened. Strikes on radar installations, missile depots, and command centers likely complicated defense coordination. At the same time, Iran still retains substantial missile stockpiles and asymmetric deterrent capabilities, meaning its defensive ability has been seriously weakened but not entirely eliminated.

– How effective have Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone strikes on Israel and U.S. bases been?

-If the war continues, the likelihood that some missiles will penetrate defenses and cause significant damage increases. A prolonged conflict raises the risk of system overload, operational errors, and more severe losses.

– Is there a real threat that the war could escalate into a full-scale regional conflict involving neighboring countries?

-That threat always exists, especially in a region with high tensions and a complex web of alliances. Nevertheless, I doubt neighboring states are willing to directly enter the war. Most will likely limit themselves to diplomatic actions or indirect measures to avoid large-scale destruction and serious economic consequences.

– How does the war affect protest movements within Iran — do they weaken or strengthen?

-At present, there are no active protests in Iran. There were reports of celebrations following Khamenei’s death among those who blame him for the deaths of protesters during the January crackdowns, but it is difficult to gauge how widespread these sentiments are. In periods of external threat, societies often rally around the state, even if there was previous discontent. At this stage, there are no clear signs of mass protest activity resuming.

– Are internal splits among the elites and the IRGC possible, and who really holds power today? Could Shiite militias and Iran’s allies expand the conflict beyond the country?

-In the long term, this is unpredictable. At present, there are no visible signs of elite fragmentation, and in the early stages of a war such divisions are unlikely — an external threat generally promotes unity.

Regarding Shiite militias and Iran’s regional allies, theoretically they could extend the conflict beyond Iran, targeting U.S. or Israeli interests. However, the extent of their involvement will depend on Tehran’s strategic calculations: excessive escalation could provoke broader international intervention, which the Iranian leadership would likely seek to avoid.