The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek, held on August 31–September 1, 2026, offered an opportunity to view Azerbaijan’s foreign policy not through individual statements, but through the configuration of its key elements. At the official level, Ilham Aliyev took part in the “SCO Plus” meeting, held a series of bilateral talks, and discussed with fellow leaders the usual range of issues: trade, transport, energy, security, and regional cooperation. But once the protocol is stripped away and we look at who exactly met with the Azerbaijani president in Bishkek, a much more interesting picture emerges.

Over the course of two days, Aliyev met with Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Masoud Pezeshkian, Nikol Pashinyan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Narendra Modi, while also having a brief conversation with Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the summit. At the same time, Azerbaijan is not a member of the SCO, but participates in its work under a different status. This creates something of a paradox: a country formally outside the organization used one of its most important political platforms to engage simultaneously with several centers of power whose interests do not always coincide.

This is precisely where the real significance of the Bishkek summit for Baku lies.

It is less about Azerbaijan moving closer to the SCO than about the SCO becoming a convenient platform for implementing a much broader Azerbaijani strategy. Baku is gradually building a system of relations in which China, Central Asia, Türkiye, Iran, Russia, India, Armenia, the United States, and Europe do not necessarily have to share the same interests. It is enough for each of them to have its own interest in Azerbaijan. It is the intersection of these interests that creates the country’s political value.

Particularly telling is the fact that the first major connection begins not with China, but with Kazakhstan. During Aliyev’s meeting with Tokayev, the two presidents discussed bilateral relations, transport connectivity, and the further development of cooperation. For Baku, Kazakhstan matters as far more than simply a friendly Central Asian state. It is the eastern anchor of the Caspian transport system. As a result, a common geography is effectively taking shape between Astana and Baku, in which the sea ceases to be a dividing space and becomes an intermediate link in a single route.

Yet this is precisely where the first important detail becomes visible — one that is often lost amid discussions of the “Middle Corridor.” Its sustainability requires more than political closeness between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Both countries need a tangible economic interest in increasing cargo flows, investing in ports and railways, simplifying procedures, and building an economic ecosystem around the route. The Aliyev–Tokayev meeting therefore matters not simply in itself. It demonstrates that the transport connection between the two shores of the Caspian is gradually acquiring political support at the highest level.

Even more importantly, just one month before the summit, Azerbaijan signed a Treaty on Allied Relations with Kyrgyzstan. Speaking in the “SCO Plus” format, Aliyev specifically referred to the agreement, calling it historic and noting that it had elevated bilateral relations to their highest level.

Taken together, these developments reveal a different picture. Baku is not simply strengthening its connection with Kazakhstan as a key Caspian partner; it is simultaneously deepening ties with Kyrgyzstan, a country located much farther from the Caspian and closer to the Chinese direction of Central Asia. In this way, Azerbaijan is expanding its presence in the region not only along the East–West axis, but also deeper into Central Asia.

This matters because Central Asia is gradually ceasing to be merely a source of transit cargo for Baku. It is becoming a distinct political and economic direction. For Central Asian states, meanwhile, Azerbaijan is no longer simply a country on the opposite shore of the Caspian. It is becoming one of the most natural gateways to the Caucasus, Türkiye, and European markets.

This is why Aliyev’s presence in Bishkek should be viewed in conjunction with his visit to Uzbekistan just days earlier. The state visit to Tashkent on August 23–24 and participation in the SCO summit in Kyrgyzstan on August 31–September 1 may appear to be two separate events, but politically they are connected. In the first case, Baku was strengthening relations with one of Central Asia’s largest states; in the second, it was using a multilateral platform bringing together virtually all of the region’s key players. As a result, Central Asia found itself at the center of Azerbaijan’s foreign-policy activity within the space of a single week.

This also explains why the SCO is particularly useful for Azerbaijan at this stage. The organization provides Baku with an opportunity to engage not only with China and Russia, but also with India, Iran, Central Asia, and invited partners. This is especially important at a time when Eurasian transport routes are being reshaped and states are increasingly looking not for a single “ideal” route, but for several alternative directions.

Against this backdrop, Aliyev’s meeting with Pezeshkian carries much greater significance than simply demonstrating good relations between two neighboring countries. Iran is simultaneously Azerbaijan’s southern neighbor, a potential transit partner, and a country through which an entirely different transport logic runs — the North–South route. During the Bishkek meeting, Pezeshkian separately thanked Azerbaijan for its support and humanitarian assistance to Iran during a difficult period and expressed Tehran’s interest in expanding relations with Baku. Aliyev, for his part, stressed the need to resolve the situation around Iran through peaceful means and negotiations.

Behind these diplomatically restrained formulations lies a very concrete interest. For Azerbaijan, it is crucial that its southern border not become a source of persistent instability precisely at a time when Baku is trying to develop several transit directions simultaneously. Any serious destabilization in Iran would affect not only bilateral relations, but the wider regional logistics system — from trade to energy.

But the significance of Iran becomes even clearer when Aliyev’s meeting with Modi is considered alongside it. The official announcement of the meeting was unusually brief: on September 1, Aliyev and the Indian prime minister exchanged views on the bilateral agenda. The conversation took place on the sidelines of the “SCO Plus” meeting.

The brevity of the official statement does not justify interpreting the encounter as evidence of any dramatic shift in Baku–New Delhi relations. But it does provide grounds for examining the meeting in a broader context. India is interested in Central Asia, but its geographical access to the region is more complicated than China’s. Iran represents one possible route northward for India, while the Caspian and Azerbaijan form part of a broader regional transport map. India therefore inevitably encounters the same geography in which Azerbaijan is seeking to consolidate its position.

This creates one of the most interesting connections revealed by the Bishkek summit: China and India may compete with one another, but both have their own reasons to be interested in Central Asia; Central Asia needs access to external markets; Iran is one of the southern transport links; and Azerbaijan sits at the intersection of the Caspian and Caucasian directions.

Consequently, it is in Baku’s interest not to become part of either a Chinese or an Indian geopolitical orbit. It is far more advantageous to remain a country through which different economic interests can flow.

The same logic explains the significance of Aliyev’s meeting with Erdoğan. Türkiye represents the western extension of the same geography. Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states can move cargo to the Caspian; Azerbaijan provides the crossing to the western shore; and Türkiye opens the route further toward Europe.

But with the emergence of new projects in the South Caucasus, this system could potentially become both more complex and more powerful. Azerbaijani–Turkish relations in the transport sphere are therefore no longer simply a matter of bilateral alliance. They are increasingly about how efficiently the entire chain from Central Asia to Europe can function.

Aliyev and Erdoğan met in Bishkek precisely against the backdrop of this broader transformation. The two sides reaffirmed the strategic nature of their relations and expressed satisfaction with their further development. At the same time, Türkiye sent another important signal in Bishkek. Erdoğan stated that Türkiye was prepared to consider deeper engagement with the SCO, while emphasizing that this would not mean abandoning its relations with the West and NATO.

For Azerbaijan, this is a particularly interesting development. If Türkiye does expand its presence in Eurasian institutions, Baku gains an additional opportunity not simply to connect Central Asia and Türkiye geographically, but also to link different diplomatic spaces. In that case, the Azerbaijani–Turkish partnership becomes part of a broader architecture in which Turkic cooperation, the SCO, and Western markets do not necessarily exclude one another.

This is precisely why the overly simplistic formula that “Azerbaijan is turning East” should be abandoned. It does not explain what is actually happening.

If Baku were genuinely choosing an eastern camp, it would be difficult to explain the parallel development of relations with the United States and the emergence, in February 2026, of a Charter on Strategic Partnership that specifically identifies the Middle Corridor, TRIPP, energy, digital infrastructure, and investment as areas of cooperation.

In practice, the opposite is happening: Azerbaijan is simultaneously increasing the number of its external connections and seeking to ensure that they intersect on Azerbaijani territory. This is the defining feature of the country’s strategy.

This is also why Aliyev’s interaction with Vladimir Putin matters, despite its brevity. The two presidents did speak on the sidelines of the summit, although they did not hold a separate full-scale meeting. Following a difficult period in Russian–Azerbaijani relations, the mere preservation of direct contact indicates that Moscow and Baku have not closed the channel of political communication.

Another important shift becomes visible here. Azerbaijan is no longer building its regional policy around relations with a single external center. Russia remains an important neighbor, but alongside it are Türkiye, Central Asia, Iran, China, India, the United States, and Europe. This does not mean abandoning Moscow. It means that the scale of Azerbaijani foreign policy itself has changed.

The Armenian direction is becoming even more important within this system. Aliyev’s meeting with Pashinyan in Bishkek demonstrates how far the normalization process has moved beyond the framework of purely bilateral security. The two leaders discussed the 2025 Washington peace summit, the joint declaration, and the initialling of the agreed text of a peace agreement.

But what is particularly important is that practical outcomes of peace were also identified: Azerbaijani petroleum products being supplied to Armenia, the transit through Azerbaijan of grain and other goods from third countries, and the development of trade relations.

This is no longer symbolic diplomacy. If the key indicator of the Armenian–Azerbaijani process was previously whether or not a document had been signed, a different criterion is now emerging: whether economic ties between the two countries actually begin to function. In the long term, these ties may be what makes peace irreversible.

This is where the Armenian track becomes directly connected to both the Middle Corridor and TRIPP. If the South Caucasus gradually opens up to trade and transport following a peace agreement, Armenia could cease to be a dead-end territory and become part of a larger regional network.

For Azerbaijan, this would mean an additional connectivity option with Nakhchivan and Türkiye; for Armenia, new trade routes; for Türkiye, more direct communication with Azerbaijan and Central Asia; and for external investors, a potential new market for infrastructure projects.

The peace process between Baku and Yerevan is therefore connected not only to security, but also to the way the new transport map of the South Caucasus will be structured.

As long as peace remains merely a political agreement, its sustainability depends primarily on the political will of the parties. Once real goods, investments, and infrastructure projects begin to move through it, many more actors acquire a direct interest in preserving it.

And this brings us back to the SCO. The organization itself does not resolve the Armenian–Azerbaijani issue, the challenges facing transport routes, or the competition between China and India. But it creates a space in which all these processes can intersect.

In Bishkek, Azerbaijan was simultaneously talking to Kazakhstan about the Caspian and transport connectivity, to Iran about regional stability, to Armenia about the practical outcomes of peace, to Türkiye about the alliance, to India about the bilateral agenda, and to Russia — at least briefly — through direct political contact.

Therefore, the main object of analysis is not the SCO itself, but the network of relations that Baku projects onto this platform. And this network has a clear geography. These directions are not united by a single organization. They are united by Azerbaijan as a geographical hub. That is why, for Baku, the more important question is not its formal status within the SCO, but its ability to turn participation in different formats into concrete economic advantages.

This is where the main risk lies. Geography alone does not generate dividends. A country can sit between China and Europe and still remain merely a transit territory. To turn geographical position into influence, Azerbaijan needs to ensure that an economy develops around its routes: logistics hubs, processing, exports, insurance, banking services, digital infrastructure, energy projects, and manufacturing.

The next stage of the competition over the Middle Corridor will therefore not be fought solely over container volumes. The central question will be where value is actually created.

In other words, if cargo simply crosses Azerbaijani territory, the country receives transit revenues. If warehouses, processing facilities, manufacturing, insurance, banking operations, and export companies develop around that cargo, the economic impact becomes far more substantial.

The real test of Azerbaijan’s strategy will therefore be its ability to move from being a transit territory to becoming a regional economic hub.

The energy dimension is particularly important in this regard. Azerbaijan is already seeking to connect transport connectivity with energy, including through green-energy projects linking Central Asia, the Caspian, the Caucasus, and Türkiye.

In the future, the same geography could support several flows simultaneously: goods, electricity, data, and investment. This is precisely why the Bishkek summit served as a kind of geopolitical X-ray. It revealed not where Azerbaijan is “moving,” but how dramatically the zone of its simultaneous engagement has expanded.

That is why the true outcome of Bishkek should not be measured by how close Azerbaijan has moved toward the SCO. It should be measured by how many different geopolitical and economic lines now converge in Baku.

The Bishkek summit should therefore be understood not as an episode of Azerbaijan’s eastern reorientation, but as a demonstration of the country’s emerging role in Eurasia: from a state located at the intersection of routes, Baku is seeking to become a state without which those routes cannot fully connect.