As we commemorate the historic victory of Azerbaijan Armed Forces emerging as victorious on the battlefield while demonstrating inspirational courage on November 2020, in their efforts of liberating Shusha (from Armenian military occupation that lasted twenty-eight and a half years), the Republic of Azerbaijan has emerged as the fulcrum of regional economic development strategy and transport corridors that are vital to South Caucasus and Central Asian nations; as the world is navigating new geopolitical realities. To address some of the contemporary geopolitical complexities in the outskirts of Europe, I have conducted an extensive interview with Tamilla Mammadova, one of Baku’s renowned journalists whose research is focused on the economic transformation of Central Asia, South Caucasus and greater Eurasia. Tamilla Mammadova is widely published in the Caucasus region, Uzbekistan and other nations of Central Asia and Europe.
Tamilla Mammadova is a journalist and analyst in the field of international politics and economics with over 10 years of professional experience. She specializes in covering Azerbaijan’s foreign economic relations, international energy policy, and cooperation with the EU countries, Republic of Türkiye, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Member States, and the South Caucasus region. She is an invited expert at the CASPIA analytical center, where she prepares white papers, conducts research and interviews with leading international experts and European government leaders. At the same time, she works at the Azerbaijan State News Agency (AZERTAC) as Head of the Society Department. The following is an interview that I conducted with Tamilla Mammadova on June 29th, 2026.
Q: How would you characterize the transformation of the South Caucasus after the 2020 Karabakh War? Can we say that the era of “frozen conflicts” has come to an end?
Tamilla Mammadova: In my view, the most significant change after 2020 is not that borders or the balance of power have shifted. What has fundamentally changed is the region’s underlying logic. For nearly three decades, the South Caucasus was held hostage by conflict. Today, for the first time, there is a real opportunity for conflict to cease being the defining factor shaping the region’s future.
I would actually frame the question differently. Rather than asking whether the era of “frozen conflicts” has ended, we should ask whether the era of frozen development has come to an end. For decades, the conflict obstructed transport connectivity, constrained economic cooperation, and prevented the South Caucasus from fully capitalizing on its strategic geographic location. In this sense, the 2020 war transformed not only the political landscape but also the region’s economic trajectory.
As a result, competition is no longer primarily about territory. The real contest today is over who will shape the South Caucasus’ new economic architecture. Success will belong not to those who make the strongest political claims, but to those capable of offering the region a viable and sustainable model of development. This is why transport corridors, energy connectivity, digital infrastructure, and trade have become central elements of the broader geopolitical landscape.
It is in this context that Azerbaijan’s role is evolving. Following the restoration of its territorial integrity, Baku faces a fundamentally different challenge. While the previous phase focused on restoring sovereignty, the current one is about shaping a new regional agenda. Azerbaijan is no longer concentrating solely on security issues. It is advancing initiatives designed to transform the region’s dynamics, including the development of the Middle Corridor, the modernization of transport infrastructure, the expansion of energy cooperation with Europe, and stronger connectivity with Central Asia. This reflects a transition from a reactive foreign policy to one driven by strategic initiative.
However, one important aspect is often overlooked. Many assume that the end of a war automatically brings peace. History suggests otherwise. What follows is a struggle over the quality of peace. It is during this period that it becomes clear whether military outcomes can be translated into a stable political order. If they cannot, the conflict tends to re-emerge in new forms—through diplomatic rivalry, economic competition, or geopolitical confrontation.
For this reason, the coming years will be decisive. If the peace process is reinforced by tangible economic cooperation—through new transport routes, investment, and regional development projects—the South Caucasus will, for the first time, have the opportunity to become a region of cooperation rather than a permanent zone of crisis. The choices made today will shape the region’s trajectory for decades to come.
Q: How realistic is it to speak of a new regional security architecture, and what principles could it be based on?
Tamilla Mammadova: In my view, it is still too early to speak of a fully established security architecture in the South Caucasus. The region is in a transitional phase: the old mechanisms have largely lost their effectiveness, while the new system has yet to evolve into a stable and sustainable framework.
More importantly, however, the very concept of security is changing. It is no longer viewed solely through a military lens. Increasingly, security is being shaped by economics—through transport routes, trade, energy, and infrastructure. This represents a fundamental shift. When countries are economically interconnected, the cost of conflict rises significantly. As a result, regional stability begins to rest not only on the balance of power but also on mutual economic interdependence.
Looking ahead, several core principles are likely to underpin any future regional security architecture. The first is the recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity as the fundamental basis of regional order. Without this foundation, any agreement remains fragile and vulnerable to renewed instability.
The second is the development of genuine economic connectivity among the countries of the region. Here, it is important to distinguish political declarations from practical realities. The focus should not be on rhetoric but on tangible projects—railways, energy corridors, transport infrastructure, and trade flows—that create everyday interdependence.
The third is a gradual shift from externally managed crisis response toward greater regional ownership and responsibility. External actors will undoubtedly remain engaged, but their role is likely to evolve—from acting as arbiters and crisis managers to supporting processes that are increasingly driven by regional stakeholders themselves.
Within this framework, Azerbaijan has adopted an active and, importantly, pragmatic approach. Rather than relying on abstract security concepts, Baku has prioritized infrastructure and energy initiatives that help create a new network of regional connectivity. This is a significant point: in this model, security is built not primarily through political declarations but through physical infrastructure and economic integration.
At the same time, it would be a mistake to assume that stronger economic ties automatically eliminate strategic competition. Competition does not disappear—it simply becomes more sophisticated and less visible. Whereas in the past it centered on territorial disputes and political influence, it is increasingly shifting toward competition over strategic transport routes, transit corridors, logistics hubs, and the key nodes through which the region’s major economic flows pass.
Q: How has the balance of power in the South Caucasus changed since 2020, and which actors have strengthened their influence?
Tamilla Mammadova: Since 2020, the balance of power in the South Caucasus has become less stable and considerably more complex. Previously, the regional order was relatively straightforward: it revolved around entrenched conflict lines that largely defined regional politics. Today, that structure is evolving, with a single axis of confrontation giving way to multiple layers of strategic competition.
The first major change is that the region itself has become more autonomous. The South Caucasus states are no longer acting solely within externally driven geopolitical frameworks; they are increasingly shaping their own agendas focused on transport connectivity, energy, and regional cooperation. The second change is the growing importance of economic and infrastructural influence. Power is now determined not only by military capabilities but also by the ability to shape transport routes, attract investment, and influence trade flows.
In my view, Azerbaijan has strengthened its position by moving beyond a security-centered agenda toward a broader regional role. Following the restoration of its territorial integrity, Baku has emerged not only as a key actor in the regional balance of power but also as one of the principal drivers of new economic and transport connectivity across the South Caucasus.
Armenia, meanwhile, is undergoing a process of redefining its regional role. Domestic political dynamics—including elections and public debate—are increasingly influencing foreign policy decisions. The country faces the challenge of adapting to a regional environment in which economic integration and transport connectivity are becoming more important than traditional military configurations.
Georgia continues to play a crucial role as the South Caucasus’ primary transit hub. Most of the region’s connections with international markets pass through Georgia, and this function is becoming even more significant as transport and logistics projects continue to expand.
As for external actors, their roles have also evolved, although in different ways. Turkey has significantly strengthened its position, primarily through its close strategic partnership with Azerbaijan and its active participation in regional transport and energy initiatives. Today, its influence extends well beyond politics into infrastructure, logistics, and economic connectivity.
The European Union has expanded its economic presence, particularly through energy cooperation and its growing interest in alternative transport and supply routes. However, its influence remains largely economic rather than geopolitical, with the EU acting more as an economic partner than as the principal architect of the region’s political order.
Russia remains an important security actor, but its role has become more complex and less predictable than before. While it continues to be a significant regional player, its ability to shape the South Caucasus’ strategic agenda is no longer as dominant or uncontested as it was prior to 2020.
Iran also remains an important regional stakeholder, particularly with regard to transport connectivity and transit. Its influence is rooted primarily in geography and its strategic position within regional communication and trade networks.
Overall, the South Caucasus is no longer a region defined by a fixed balance of power. Instead, it is becoming a dynamic geopolitical space where influence is increasingly determined through competition over infrastructure projects, transport corridors, economic integration, and regional connectivity.
Q: To what extent does the bilateral peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia remain autonomous, and to what extent is it shaped by external actors?
Tamilla Mammadova: Compared with previous decades, the internal dynamics of the peace process have changed significantly. Whereas negotiations were once largely driven by external mediators and their political frameworks, the center of gravity has shifted decisively toward direct bilateral engagement. Today, it is Baku and Yerevan that are leading the negotiations, working directly on the text of the peace agreement and negotiating the fundamental parameters of a future settlement.
That said, the process is not entirely autonomous. External actors continue to influence the broader political environment in which a future agreement will be implemented, even if they play a less direct role in shaping its substance.
The United States has emerged as one of the most active external stakeholders, promoting regional connectivity and infrastructure integration, including discussions surrounding transport links and transit arrangements. The European Union has primarily acted as a source of political support and international legitimacy, helping to reinforce the credibility of the peace process. Russia retains a degree of influence through its longstanding regional presence and its ties with Armenia, although its role is less decisive than in previous years. Turkey, for its part, remains Azerbaijan’s strategic ally and has strengthened Baku’s position by supporting regional integration, transport connectivity, and post-conflict economic cooperation, further reinforcing Azerbaijan’s role as one of the key actors shaping the region’s emerging architecture.
As a result, a hybrid model is taking shape. The substance of the peace agreement is being determined primarily through direct dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia, while external actors are influencing the broader implementation framework, international support mechanisms, and the political environment surrounding the process. This makes the negotiations more resilient and less dependent on traditional mediation than in the past.
Looking ahead, the most likely scenario is continued progress toward the formal signing of a peace treaty, followed by the gradual institutionalization of bilateral relations. If the current regional dynamics persist, the bilateral format is likely to become increasingly consolidated, while the influence of external mediators over the content of negotiations will continue to diminish. Their role, however, is likely to remain important in providing international support, political backing, and broader guarantees for the implementation of any future agreement.
Q: What are the main sources of instability and risk to regional security today?
Tamilla Mammadova: The principal risks to regional security today stem less from the likelihood of a new large-scale war than from the incomplete nature of the post-conflict settlement. Until a comprehensive peace agreement is signed and implemented, the potential for localized crises, political tensions, and periodic escalations will remain.
A second important factor is Armenia’s domestic political landscape. Political polarization, pressure from opposition groups, and the continued presence of revisionist sentiments could complicate the implementation of existing understandings and slow the normalization of relations between the two countries.
Another significant source of uncertainty is the geopolitical competition among external powers. The South Caucasus remains a region where the interests of Russia, the United States, the European Union, Iran, and Turkey intersect. Any intensification of rivalry among these actors has the potential to affect the regional agenda and complicate the broader peace process. At the same time, long-term regional stability will depend on ensuring that the peace process is increasingly driven by the parties themselves rather than by external geopolitical competition.
The reopening of regional transport links is another critical issue. From Azerbaijan’s perspective, enhanced regional connectivity is one of the essential foundations of sustainable peace. The development of new transport corridors expanded trade, and broader economic cooperation can significantly reduce incentives for confrontation by creating tangible mutual interests. Conversely, delays in implementing these projects risk prolonging political uncertainty and limiting the benefits of normalization.
Overall, the South Caucasus appears to be gradually transitioning from a model centered on military confrontation toward one based on economic interdependence. If this trajectory continues—and if a comprehensive peace agreement is concluded and effectively implemented—economic integration is likely to become the most important pillar of long-term regional stability and security.