CASPIA presents an interview with Armenian political scientist and expert on interethnic relations Arnold Stepanyan, Head of the Civic Movement “Multinational Georgia,” Co-Founder of the Assembly of Tbilisi Armenians and the Center for Multiethnic Resources for Civic Education, who has many years of experience working in the fields of minority rights protection, civil society, and interethnic dialogue.

– Today, the South Caucasus is formally speaking about peace and the unblocking of communications. But does this mean that the societies of the region are genuinely ready for peace? Can a political agreement between states move ahead of public psychology, and what happens when politicians sign a peace agreement that society has not yet internally accepted?

– A political agreement almost always comes ahead of society’s psychological readiness for peace. And that is normal. Politicians can sign a document in a single day, based on pragmatic considerations, the balance of power, or external pressure. But society cannot change overnight, as if by decree, its perception of a neighbor—one shaped over several generations and compounded by military defeat, the deaths of thousands of young people, and the loss of territories that it regarded as its own.

Despite this, I believe there is clear progress in Armenian society in understanding reality without the illusions it has lived with for the past couple of centuries. The desire of a significant part of active citizens for peace with neighboring countries and long-term development is well reflected in the outcome of the latest parliamentary elections in Armenia.

– Could it be said that the main tragedy of the South Caucasus is that all the peoples of the region know their own historical pain all too well, but know far too little about the history of their neighbors’ pain? Can such one-sided historical memory serve as the foundation for sustainable peace at all?

– One can live indefinitely within the logic of defeat, in which case any agreement will be perceived merely as a temporary respite. Or one can say: we do not have to agree with the past in order to begin building the future.

There are already tangible signs of a new reality: trade, transit, and discussions about communications. But psychological normalization will proceed much more slowly. Sustainable peace requires long-term work because it must become embedded not only in political documents, but also in people’s consciousness.

– After 2020 and 2023, not only did the political map of the region change, but many assumptions about what the future of the Armenian people would look like were also shattered. How profound is this psychological rupture? Is Armenian society genuinely reconsidering its strategic assumptions today, or is it still simply trying to come to terms with defeat?

– After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenian society became accustomed to believing that security could primarily be ensured through a military-political alliance, an external protector, and the preservation of the status quo around Karabakh. The events of 2020 demonstrated that this structure no longer worked. The events of 2023 definitively closed that previous historical chapter.

Today, Armenian society is indeed experiencing a profound post-traumatic process. Part of society is trying to rationalize the defeat by searching for external or internal culprits and continues to hope for revanche. Another part is genuinely beginning to reconsider its previous strategic assumptions.

But this reassessment is proceeding slowly and painfully. It is confronted by the powerful inertia of earlier myths. Therefore, it is still too early to say that Armenian society as a whole has already reconsidered its strategic assumptions. Rather, it is still processing the defeat, and this process has not yet crystallized into a single new strategy.

However, the demand for such a reassessment is clearly becoming more visible among citizens of the Republic of Armenia.

– In Armenia, there is often talk of external security guarantees. But has Armenian political thinking not spent too long revolving around the question “Who will protect us?” instead of asking “How can we ourselves become an actor in regional politics?”

– Yes. This is one of the most painful problems of Armenian political culture. Armenian political thought has indeed long built its security concept around an external guarantor. Over time, this approach created dependency and effectively led to the transfer of a significant degree of agency to an external power, reducing Armenia’s own role to choosing a protector.

Today, political elites and an active segment of Armenian society are increasingly speaking about the need to transform political culture and strengthen Armenia’s agency in regional politics. Fundamental issues are being discussed, including a realistic assessment of the country’s own resources, readiness for compromise, and the ability to build multilateral relations without falling into a new form of dependency.

This is a difficult transition, and it is far from complete. But the very fact that such a discourse has become part of public and political life is already a sign of progress.

– As someone representing the Armenian community in Georgia, you observe the region not only from Yerevan. In your view, what do the people of Armenia and Azerbaijan fundamentally fail to understand about each other precisely because they view the conflict exclusively through their own national narratives?

– Existing national narratives are not only the product of historical memory; they are also, to a significant extent, the consequence of more than a century of imperial “divide and rule” policies.

One-sided historical memory is indeed one of the region’s greatest tragedies. The reproduction of an image of the other as the sole culprit, while seeing oneself exclusively as the victim, prevents the establishment of fundamental peace between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

Armenians often do not understand how deeply the loss of territory in the 1990s was perceived in Azerbaijani society—as a national catastrophe, an expulsion, and an unhealed wound. For many Azerbaijanis, the return of these territories is not simply geopolitics; it is about restoring justice and returning home.

Azerbaijanis, for their part, often do not understand that for Armenians, the issue of Karabakh was not merely a territorial dispute but was perceived as a question of the physical security of the Armenian people. Therefore, Armenian society viewed control over the territory primarily as a security guarantee rather than as an imperial project.

We are still far from recognizing that our neighbor also has its own pain and its own reasons for remembering. This does not mean equating guilt or suffering. But recognizing that the other also possesses its own historical memory and trauma is essential to recognizing their humanity.

Moreover, both sides often fail to see that there are different voices within each society. In Armenia, there are those who are ready for peace even at the cost of territorial concessions, and those who regard this as betrayal. Azerbaijan also has different positions: from those who see the future in normalization to those who view victory as a basis for continued pressure.

– Can the Armenian diaspora become a bridge between Armenia and neighboring states, or does its political role today, on the contrary, often make it harder for Yerevan to adapt to the new regional reality? Where is the line between preserving national memory and allowing the political influence of the past to shape the future?

– The diaspora has played an enormous role in preserving Armenian identity, language, and historical memory. It is also an important financial, cultural, and political resource.

However, part of the diaspora, particularly those communities whose identity has been shaped around the memory of the genocide, tends toward maximalism, viewing issues of genocide recognition and territorial questions as fundamental and non-negotiable. At times, this conflicts with Yerevan’s pragmatic interests, as Armenia is compelled to seek a modus vivendi with its neighbors.

At the same time, the diaspora can become one of the key resources of a new Armenia—economically, intellectually, and diplomatically. But it cannot be an alternative government. An Armenian diaspora representative living outside the region can afford to take a more maximalist position. A resident of Armenia has to think about what will happen tomorrow morning.

Therefore, the diaspora has every right to preserve memory, but state policy must be based primarily on the interests of the citizens of the Republic of Armenia.

And in answering the question of whether the diaspora is a bridge or an obstacle, I would say: it depends on whether it helps Armenia move forward or tries to govern its present from the past.

– If a final peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan were signed tomorrow, what would remain the most difficult issue after its signing: borders, communications, security, or perhaps people’s psychological readiness to recognize each other as neighbors rather than historical adversaries?

– The most difficult issue would be people’s psychological readiness to recognize each other as neighbors. Borders can be demarcated, roads can be opened, and security mechanisms can be established. But if, in people’s minds, the other remains a “historical adversary,” any technical solution will remain fragile.

A peace treaty is a document. Neighborly relations are an attitude. And an attitude is built over years: through education, contacts, economic interdependence, and the gradual recognition of the other’s humanity.

Therefore, after the treaty is signed, the second stage of peace will begin—social normalization.

Trade may prove even more important here than impressive political declarations. When people begin to see their neighbor not as an abstract enemy but as a businessperson, driver, engineer, tourist, or partner, the image of the enemy gradually fades. This is precisely why opening communications has not only economic but also psychological significance.

– Following Nikol Pashinyan’s latest statements, there is an impression that Yerevan is simultaneously trying to distance itself from Moscow while maintaining working relations with Russia. Is this genuinely a new model of Armenian-Russian relations, or an attempt by Yerevan to return to the old system, but on its own terms?

– I would not describe what is happening as a return to the old system, even on anyone’s terms. Rather, it is a transition from a relationship between an ally and a protector to one between pragmatic partners. The extent to which this pragmatism will endure in the future remains to be seen.

For now, Yerevan is largely succeeding in pursuing a policy of diversification without completely severing relations with Moscow. This is not so much a new model as an attempt to reduce dependence while maintaining access to the Russian market, energy supplies, and, to some extent, existing security mechanisms.

The problem is that Russia perceives this policy as a manifestation of disloyalty. Moscow had long been accustomed to relations in which Armenia acted as the junior partner, and effectively as the dependent side. Therefore, Yerevan’s attempts to pursue a more independent policy cause irritation.

– Can we say that Moscow is gradually learning to perceive present-day Armenia not as an ally that must be kept within its orbit, but as an independent partner? Or does the Russian political elite still think in terms of Yerevan’s former dependence on Moscow?

– The Russian political elite still largely thinks in terms of spheres of influence and loyalty.

For Moscow, Armenia was for a long time part of the post-Soviet space that was expected to follow the course of Russian policy. Therefore, Moscow is still not fully prepared to perceive Armenia’s independence as the norm and to treat it as an equal partner that may have interests of its own that do not coincide with Russia’s.

This does not mean that Moscow will not engage pragmatically with Yerevan. But the paternalistic perception of Armenia as a dependent partner has not yet disappeared completely.

– Could the current tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan indirectly improve Armenia’s negotiating position? If Baku and Moscow are forced to reassess their relationship, does this give Yerevan additional room for maneuver?

– Theoretically, yes. But I would be very cautious about how much Armenia would want to use this space against Azerbaijan. Returning to the old model of waiting for an external actor to create a favorable situation is no longer part of Armenia’s strategy. The Armenian people have stepped on that rake before, and more than once.

It seems to me that Armenia has embarked on a course of creating its own value for different centers of power and pursuing a policy in which favorable geopolitical circumstances do not necessarily have to be used against its neighbors.

Moreover, there are signs in the statements and actions of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan that the political elites of both countries are gradually moving away from the role of instruments in someone else’s geopolitical confrontation.

Furthermore, there are indications that both Yerevan and Baku are interested in preventing economic blackmail from Russia and in not allowing external actors to exploit Armenian-Azerbaijani differences for their own interests.

In this sense, Armenia’s new room for maneuver is emerging not so much because of deteriorating relations between Moscow and Baku, but because of Armenia’s own gradual transition from a policy of dependence to a policy of agency.

– What is Russia trying to preserve in the South Caucasus at any cost today: military-political presence, economic influence, transport routes, energy assets, or the ability to influence political processes?

– Russia is primarily trying to preserve its ability to remain one of the principal arbiters of regional politics in the South Caucasus. The main objective is not to lose its status as a power without which key decisions concerning the South Caucasus cannot be made.

Military-political presence, economics, energy, and transport are instruments of a broader objective. But in terms of priorities, I would highlight two areas.

The first is maintaining the ability to influence the political elites of all three countries and, consequently, regional political processes, as well as restoring leverage over the post-conflict order.

Moscow’s main objective is to prevent the emergence of a pro-Western or pro-Turkish axis without Russian participation. In Armenia, this is reflected in attempts to prevent Yerevan from making a definitive turn toward the West. In Azerbaijan, it is reflected in balancing between pressure and partnership so that Baku does not fall completely into Turkey’s orbit. In Georgia, it is reflected in efforts to slow the pace of European integration.

The second area is maintaining maximum influence over the region’s transport geography and communications and, consequently, retaining the ability to control major transport routes and flows.

For Russia, it is critically important that new transport routes, particularly those running through Armenia and Azerbaijan, do not emerge entirely without its participation and do not become channels for strengthening Turkey and the West. An ideal scenario for Moscow would be one in which the unblocking of communications takes place through territory under its control or with its participation and monitoring, as envisaged by the 2020 trilateral statement.

Losing influence over future transport corridors would mean the emergence of a logistics link between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Central Asia that is independent of Russia. This would significantly weaken Russia’s position not only in the South Caucasus but also in Central Asia.

– How irreversible is Armenia’s shift from Russia toward the West? If Armenia continues rapprochement with the EU, which Russian levers of influence will remain the most effective?

– Armenia has already chosen its direction of movement, but it has not yet crossed the point beyond which a reversal would become impossible. If Yerevan continues integrating with the EU, Moscow will retain several significant levers.

First and foremost, there is the economy and trade. This will probably remain the most effective instrument. Russia can restrict access for certain Armenian goods to its market, intensify administrative inspections, or use the mechanisms of the Eurasian Economic Union as an instrument of pressure. We are already seeing certain indications of such an approach.

Energy remains an important area. Russian involvement in Armenia’s energy sector is still significant. Therefore, gas prices, supply terms, and control over infrastructure could potentially be used by Moscow as instruments of pressure or negotiation. However, this lever is also gradually weakening as Armenia diversifies its energy relationships. Here, judging by recent statements by the leaders of the two countries, Azerbaijan could potentially play an increasingly important role.

The labor market and migration should not be overlooked either. The Russian labor market is important for Armenia. A significant change in the conditions governing the stay of Armenian citizens in Russia, or a reduction in remittances from Russia, could create socioeconomic pressure on the Armenian authorities. Moscow has already used a similar instrument in its relations with Georgia.

A more subtle instrument is informational and political influence. Moscow continues to support political forces and social groups opposed to the current Armenian government’s course, while also promoting narratives about the “loss of a traditional ally” and the West’s inability to provide security for Armenia. However, there is a paradox here: excessive pressure could produce the opposite effect and, instead, accelerate Armenia’s departure from the Russian orbit.

The Eurasian Economic Union should also be considered separately as one of the most systemic levers. Armenia remains part of the Russian-centered economic system, while potential EU membership creates a serious contradiction with its membership in the EAEU. Moscow is already making it clear that it considers movement in both directions problematic.

At the same time, I would not overestimate Russia’s capabilities. Russia can indeed impose serious costs on Armenia, but it is much more difficult for Moscow to force Yerevan to change its strategic course. Today, Armenia has the ability to compensate, to one degree or another, for most of Russia’s levers—and that is precisely what it is doing.

If Moscow uses economic instruments too aggressively, Armenia gains an additional incentive to seek alternative markets. If Russia restricts communications, Yerevan accelerates its search for alternative routes. If political pressure intensifies, it may strengthen public support for the Western direction.

Therefore, Moscow faces a kind of dilemma: the harder it tries to hold on to Armenia, the faster it may lose it.

– Much is said today about Russia losing influence specifically in Yerevan. But could Moscow compensate for this not through influence over the Armenian state itself, but through influence over the space around it—through Georgia, diasporas, economic ties, information networks, and regional communications? In other words, if Russia stops controlling the center, might it try to control the periphery?

– Yes, such a strategy is entirely possible, but I would not simply call it “control of the periphery.” As Yerevan’s dependence on Russian influence declines, the space around Armenia becomes increasingly important. Georgia is particularly significant because a substantial portion of Armenia’s external transport and trade opportunities currently pass through Georgian territory. Therefore, for Moscow, influence over regional communications may be no less important than direct leverage over Yerevan.

In addition, Russia retains opportunities for influence through trade, energy, labor migration, and business ties. Moscow also continues to promote certain sociopolitical narratives through social media, media outlets, bloggers, political communities, and transnational networks.

Another area is attempts to more actively involve Russia’s Armenian diaspora in the sociopolitical life of Armenia. So far, this policy has not produced any significant results for Moscow.

At the same time, the most important element of influence over the space surrounding Armenia remains communications. However, Russia is no longer competing in an empty space; it is facing other centers of power. Therefore, achieving Moscow’s maximum objectives in this sphere is far from guaranteed.

– Could it be enough for Moscow simply to prevent Armenia from becoming a fully integrated element of Western security and transport infrastructure? In other words, might Russia’s objective not be to make Armenia pro-Russian, but to prevent it from becoming definitively pro-Western? How realistic is such a scenario?

– If we look pragmatically at Russia’s strategy, Moscow does not necessarily need to make Armenia “pro-Russian” again. It may be enough to prevent Yerevan from becoming a fully integrated element of Western political, transport, and especially military-security infrastructure.

The most likely Russian strategy today is not to return Armenia to the past, but to prevent it from crossing a certain strategic line.

Of course, this does not mean that Russia is abandoning the use of all available pressure mechanisms to achieve the greatest possible return of Armenia to its orbit. But I think the lack of prospects for an exclusively maximalist approach toward Yerevan is becoming increasingly apparent even in Moscow.

– Until recently, Russia was needed by Armenia not only as a state, but also as a function: security, market access, energy, transit, and mediation. Today, these functions are gradually being divided among different actors. Is this not a much more serious problem for Moscow than Yerevan’s formal political shift?

– From Moscow’s perspective, this could indeed be a more serious problem than Yerevan’s formal political shift. If Armenia previously needed Russia as a single source of a whole range of functions, Yerevan now needs individual functions that Moscow used to provide. This means that each of them can be replaced or diversified.

That is why I would say that Moscow’s main problem is not simply losing an ally, but losing its indispensability. And that is much deeper.

If Russia simply ceases to be Armenia’s political ally, theoretically, relations could be restored if the government or external circumstances change. But if Russia ceases to be necessary for the functioning of specific areas of the Armenian state, restoring its previous level of influence in the future will be significantly more difficult.

– What if Armenia’s main Russian dependency is no longer where we usually look for it? We are accustomed to talking about Russian gas, trade, and migration. But which dependency on Russia is the most underestimated today?

– In my view, the most underestimated dependency is not a particular resource or sector, but a system of interconnections built over decades—in other words, institutional and infrastructural dependence. It cannot be eliminated through a single political decision.

For decades, Armenia was integrated into certain rules, infrastructure, standards, business networks, and economic chains. Replacing them requires not only a political decision but also a lengthy institutional transformation.

Therefore, Armenia’s strategic task is not to replace one dependency with another, but to create a system in which no single external actor can simultaneously control Armenia’s security, energy, trade, transport, and human connections. Only then will political agency become a reality rather than a declaration.

– Does Yerevan today have the ability to use its own dependence on the Russian market as a tool to put pressure on Moscow? For example, if Armenia gradually begins redirecting trade flows, investment, and logistics, could this create economic costs for Russia itself?

– Yes, but the possibilities here are quite limited. The direct damage to Russia from redirecting Armenian trade would be relatively small—the economies of the two countries are not comparable in scale.

However, under sanctions, Armenia has become an important channel for Russia in terms of parallel imports, payment transit, and circumventing some restrictions. If Yerevan begins tightening controls over re-exports and aligning more closely with Western sanctions regimes, Moscow would face certain operational costs: logistics would become more complicated, payment arrangements more difficult, and alternative routes would have to be found.

But this raises the main question: what would the cost be for Armenia itself? Moscow still possesses the ability to impose more effective economic restrictions on Yerevan. Therefore, Armenia can use its own economic dependence as a tool of pressure on Moscow only very cautiously and gradually.

– If Armenia is gradually moving out of Russia’s orbit, while Georgia remains critical to regional logistics, could the Georgian direction become the place where Moscow attempts to compensate for the loss of its Armenian leverage?

– Yes, but not as a direct substitute for the Armenian lever. Georgia is becoming an increasingly important logistical direction for Moscow as Russian influence in Armenia declines. Russia is interested in preserving Georgia as a relatively neutral transit zone and may use political, economic, and informational instruments to this end, as well as reminders of its existing territorial leverage in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

However, this will not recreate the previous level of dependency. Georgia has its own system of interests and capabilities, and a significant part of Georgian society remains oriented toward a European future.

Therefore, Moscow may indeed attempt to use the Georgian direction to preserve its influence over regional logistics, but the possibilities for such a compensatory scenario are limited. Russia is also facing competition from Turkey, Azerbaijan, the EU, and other actors. Ultimately, competition over transport routes and communications is becoming one of the main arenas of the struggle for influence in the South Caucasus.