Following the end of the Karabakh conflict, the South Caucasus has entered a period in which the central question is no longer who controls a particular territory, but rather what the region’s new security architecture will look like. At the same time, these changes are unfolding unevenly: while Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia are each developing their relations with external centers of power in different ways, the region’s unresolved conflicts continue to remain the key factor shaping the political and economic dynamics of the South Caucasus.
Georgia occupies a special place in this evolving landscape. On the one hand, thanks to its geographical location and access to the Black Sea, it remains the most important link connecting the South Caucasus with Europe. On the other hand, it is precisely in Georgia that the contradiction between the country’s aspiration for European integration and the continuing Russian military presence in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region is most clearly visible. Against the backdrop of deteriorating relations between Tbilisi and the West and the ongoing transformation of the regional balance of power, the question of Georgia’s future role has become particularly significant.
In an interview with CASPIA, Georgian analyst Badri Belkania, who specializes in conflicts in the South Caucasus, international security, and Russian policy in the post-Soviet space, discussed whether the era of Russian dominance is truly coming to an end, which actors are competing to shape a new balance of power in the South Caucasus, why the conflicts surrounding Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region should not be regarded as “frozen,” and what prospects lie ahead for the region amid a changing international environment.
– Many experts argue that the era of Russian dominance in the South Caucasus is coming to an end. Do you agree with this assessment, or is Moscow’s influence merely evolving into less visible but more flexible mechanisms?
– I agree that Russia’s dominance and influence in the South Caucasus are declining. However, I would not yet say that this era has come to a complete end. I believe we are still quite far from such a reality. Russia’s role is weakening in two main directions.
The first is Azerbaijan, which has almost completely left Russia’s sphere of influence. I do not see any realistic prospect of Russia restoring the level of influence over Baku’s foreign policy that it once possessed.
The second direction is Armenia. Although Armenia is still far from making a definitive break with Moscow, it has taken significant steps in that direction, particularly after declaring its intention to pursue membership in the European Union and effectively freezing its participation in Russian-led organizations such as the CSTO and the CIS. Armenia’s foreign policy reorientation is also evident in the rhetoric coming from both sides. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and other Armenian officials openly criticize Russia and express disappointment with Moscow’s policies, while Russian state media and pro-Kremlin propagandists have effectively been given free rein to launch increasingly harsh attacks against Pashinyan, including personal ones.
Armenia is politically distancing itself from Russia. At the same time, the economic ties built over decades between the two countries remain sufficiently strong, meaning that this process will be long and painful. Armenia has been excessively dependent on Russia in many areas, particularly in the economic sphere, and the process of economic diversification will not be easy. The large Armenian diaspora in Russia also plays a significant role, objectively continuing to keep Armenia within Russia’s orbit.
In my view, the so-called Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) has become a symbolic indicator of Russia’s declining influence in the region, just as the peace agreement between Yerevan and Baku, reached through the mediation of the United States rather than Moscow, which had traditionally served as the principal mediator between the two sides.
– Against this backdrop, how would you assess the situation in Georgia?
- We observe a completely different trend in Georgia, where the deterioration of relations between Georgia and the West works to Russia’s advantage. Moscow also possesses substantial leverage over Georgia by occupying two of its regions: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian troops are stationed only 40 kilometers from Tbilisi, creating a constant sense of insecurity for the Georgian state. This reality significantly limits Georgia’s strategic room for maneuver, while Moscow employs the full spectrum of instruments: from hard power, including its military presence, to soft power, including anti-Western propaganda, to keep the country within its sphere of influence. The current intensification of Russia’s annexation policy in the Tskhinvali region is yet another manifestation of this strategy.
Thus, Russia’s position in the South Caucasus is undoubtedly weakening. Nevertheless, Moscow continues to regard the region as an organic part of its own sphere of influence. I have no illusions that Russia will voluntarily abandon these positions without a fight. These efforts are already clearly visible, and in the case of Georgia they remain, for the time being, highly successful.
– If Russia continues to concentrate most of its attention on Ukraine over the coming years, who, in your opinion, will fill the emerging vacuum of influence in the South Caucasus?
– It is evident that the West is seeking to strengthen its position in the South Caucasus. The region’s importance for Europe continues to grow, both in terms of its transit potential and its resources. In this regard, Georgia has traditionally held the leading position among the three South Caucasian states, having been granted EU candidate status and long regarded as the principal partner of both the United States and Europe in the region. However, this situation is gradually changing, and it now appears that Armenia is beginning to assume that role.
Nor should we overlook such influential players as Turkey and China. Turkey has historically maintained strong positions in the South Caucasus, and following the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, Turkey and Armenia have also gained an opportunity to reshape their bilateral relationship. The South Caucasus is now experiencing a unique historical moment that offers genuine prospects for regional cooperation, and I hope that the countries of the region will make the best possible use of this opportunity.
I do not believe that China will be able to fully fill any potential vacuum of influence, as it remains geographically and culturally quite distant from the region. As for Beijing’s economic interests, they are fairly obvious. China views the South Caucasus as important both from an economic perspective and in terms of transport connectivity with the Western world. Our region can, in turn, use this interest to advance its own objectives.
Overall, I regard the strengthening of the West’s role and the weakening of Russia’s influence as a positive development for the region. At the same time, I believe it is a mistake for the countries of the South Caucasus to constantly look for external powers to fill every emerging vacuum. The region possesses considerable potential through closer cooperation among its own states and has the capacity to build a regional economy that will not require outside "vacuum-fillers," but rather strong, reliable, and equal partners.
– Against the backdrop of multiple global crises, the issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have largely disappeared from the international agenda. To what extent does this create the risk of entrenching the current status quo?
– Unfortunately, I have to agree with the premise of the question. The issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have indeed almost disappeared from the international agenda. On the one hand, this is understandable, as the world is currently consumed by larger and more active conflicts, above all the war in Ukraine, which occupies a significant share of international media attention. More recently, the confrontation between the United States and Iran has added another major source of global concern.
The conflicts in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region are often described as "frozen conflicts." However, this is not an entirely accurate academic term, and as a conflict researcher I try to avoid using it whenever possible. These conflicts are not frozen, they are living political processes. They involve the daily struggles of people living in these territories and the adjacent areas, internally displaced persons, and other groups affected by the conflict. They involve the continuous violation of their rights and their human dignity.
The political developments unfolding in these regions are equally alarming. Russia is steadily increasing its pressure on both Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. In May, Moscow signed a new agreement with the de facto authorities in Tskhinvali, under which Russia effectively obtained the ability to install its preferred candidate as the de facto president of the Tskhinvali region, even if that individual has no connection to the region whatsoever and does not even possess its so-called citizenship.
Almost immediately after the agreement was signed, it was implemented in practice. The incumbent and "elected" president of Tskhinvali, Alan Gagloev, resigned, and was replaced by North Ossetian politician Marat Kambolov, who had previously had no connection to South Ossetia and had served in various government positions in Russia. In Georgia, this move was widely viewed as another stage of annexation. Unfortunately, such a significant development failed to provoke an adequate international response.
Russia is also increasing its pressure on Abkhazia, where, unlike in the Tskhinvali region, Abkhaz society has retained considerably greater autonomy in making political decisions. Naturally, this does not suit Moscow, which seeks to completely neutralize independent political actors in Abkhazia. All of these developments are unfolding simultaneously and demonstrate that the conflicts in these regions are by no means "frozen." On the contrary, they continue to evolve actively. Regrettably, this dynamic has recently developed to the detriment of the Ossetian people, the Abkhaz people, and, of course, the Georgian people.
– Do you see any real prospects for changing the situation around Abkhazia and South Ossetia over the next five to ten years, or is the current configuration likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future?
– I believe that in the coming years Russia will continue to strengthen both its influence over and its pressure on these two regions. It will seek to secure the adoption in Abkhazia of those laws that Abkhaz society was previously able to block through mass protests and public resistance.
Russia has merely taken a short tactical pause by changing its approach toward Sukhumi. Instead of the tougher methods employed by the previous curator of these territories, Dmitry Kozak, Moscow is now relying on the softer and more engaging approach of the new curator, Sergey Kiriyenko. However, this represents only a change in tactics, not in objectives. Russia’s goals remain exactly the same. Moscow will continue pursuing what it has long sought in Abkhazia: legislation facilitating the unrestricted operation of Russian businesses, restrictions on independent media and civil society, the lifting of the ban on foreign ownership of private property and land, and other similar measures.
As for the Tskhinvali region, today it already closely resembles another constituent entity of the Russian Federation, albeit without formal annexation. If, based on its geopolitical and regional calculations, Russia decides that the appropriate moment has arrived, the Tskhinvali region will already be fully prepared for such a step politically, legally, economically, and even in terms of personnel. Developments there are moving much faster, and significant changes may begin not in five or ten years, but within the coming months.
Regardless of how events surrounding Ukraine develop, I see absolutely no willingness or intention on the part of the Kremlin to make any concessions to Georgia on the issues of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region.
– How has the perception of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia changed within Georgia? Has there been a shift from an emotional approach toward a more pragmatic understanding of long-term conflict resolution?
– Georgian society’s attitude toward these conflicts remains unchanged in several fundamental respects.
First, the overwhelming majority of Georgians are convinced that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are territories of Georgia and that, sooner or later, Tbilisi’s control over them must be restored. Second, and no less importantly, this must happen exclusively through peaceful means. On both of these issues, there is broad public consensus regardless of political affiliation.
The main obstacle, of course, remains Russia, which has the least interest in any rapprochement between Abkhazians and Georgians, or between Georgians and Ossetians. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that even if Russia’s influence were to disappear tomorrow, this would only facilitate the resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts, it would not resolve them completely. Many unresolved issues would still remain between these peoples, and neither the Abkhaz nor the Ossetians currently see their future within the Georgian state.
This is precisely where Georgia faces its greatest challenge. It must become such an attractive state that Abkhazians and Ossetians themselves would want to reconsider their relationship with Georgia and ultimately prefer the Georgian future over the Russian alternative.
Personally, I believe that one of the most important components of this process is Georgia’s democratic and economic development, as well as its accession to the European Union. The EU remains one of the few political structures that has succeeded in maintaining lasting peace while effectively protecting the rights of national and ethnic minorities over a long period of time. However, this is only one important element, and by itself it is far from sufficient. Geopolitics and broader regional dynamics will also play a decisive role.
– In recent years, Georgia’s relations with the European Union and the United States have gone through a difficult period. To what extent has this affected Tbilisi’s ability to serve as a regional security hub and mediator?
– Indeed, Georgia’s relations with Europe and the United States have deteriorated significantly. Political dialogue between the current Georgian government and the European Union has effectively broken down, while the previous U.S. administration suspended its strategic partnership with Tbilisi. The European Union continues to criticize the Georgian authorities for democratic backsliding and human rights violations, whereas the Georgian government rejects these accusations and, in turn, criticizes Brussels.
The Georgian government has been attempting to improve relations with Donald Trump’s administration, but so far there has been no noticeable progress in that direction. There have been certain contacts and several statements from the U.S. side, yet these appear to be largely diplomatic and protocol-driven rather than indicative of any genuine improvement in bilateral relations.
For a significant part of Georgian society, this is an extremely painful development, as numerous public opinion surveys consistently show that the overwhelming majority of Georgians support integration with Western institutions. Moreover, this foreign policy course is enshrined in Georgia’s Constitution, which was adopted under the very same Georgian Dream party that is currently in power. It was also under the present government that Georgia achieved tangible progress toward European integration. However, following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the country’s foreign policy course and official rhetoric changed dramatically, triggering a political crisis and ongoing mass protests.
Despite the current situation, it is absolutely clear to me that no South Caucasus-wide initiative can be truly effective without Georgia’s participation. Geography alone makes this unavoidable: it is through the Black Sea that the South Caucasus is connected to the Western world, and among the region’s three states, only Georgia has direct access to it. That is precisely why the deterioration of Georgia’s relations with the West is so unfortunate, it deprives not only Georgia itself, but the entire region, of tremendous opportunities.
– If we compare the South Caucasus of 2019 with today's region, we can see that virtually every key element of the regional security system has changed: the balance of power, Russia’s role, Turkey’s position, the importance of transport corridors, the status of Karabakh, and the nature of Western engagement. Are we witnessing not simply another stage of regional transformation, but the emergence of an entirely new security model whose consequences will shape the political dynamics of the South Caucasus for decades to come?
– It is obvious that developments in the South Caucasus are unfolding very rapidly. The settlement of the Karabakh conflict has opened an entirely new chapter in the region’s history, creating genuine opportunities to reset and rebuild relations among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, something that, until very recently, seemed impossible not only from the perspective of contemporary politics, but even from a historical standpoint. This is indeed a new reality and a new regional order that provides an excellent foundation for future development and peaceful coexistence.
I know that Georgian society views these developments with great hope. However, as long as Georgia’s own conflicts remain unresolved, it is premature to speak of lasting stability and irreversible peace in the region. They remain a permanent time bomb, preventing both Georgia and the South Caucasus as a whole from realizing their full potential for development.
– Experts are increasingly discussing the concept of fragmented security, whereby different countries in the region rely on different external centers of power. To what extent is such a model applicable to the South Caucasus, and does it make the region more resilient or, on the contrary, more vulnerable to external crises?
– The conflicts and confrontations that emerged largely as a result of the ethnic engineering and colonial policies of the Soviet Union plunged the South Caucasus into a state of almost continuous warfare for decades. Even today, we still do not know the region’s true potential because we have never seen the South Caucasus free from conflicts, wars, and confrontation.
As soon as the Karabakh conflict was resolved, new opportunities for development immediately began to emerge: prospects for Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization, the so-called Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), and new transit initiatives. We even reached the point where, against the backdrop of Russia’s economic and energy pressure on Armenia, Azerbaijan expressed its readiness to supply natural gas to Armenia. Just a few years ago, such a scenario would have been virtually unimaginable.
Therefore, when we speak about the region’s potential, we are inevitably forced to assess it within very narrow parameters, because at present the South Caucasus still faces far more problems than opportunities. Territorial disputes remain a particularly serious obstacle. They deter foreign investment, undermine economic activity both within individual states and across the region as a whole, and weaken people's confidence in a stable future.
We have never seen the South Caucasus as a free, stable, and interconnected region. I am convinced that once such a moment arrives, the South Caucasus will possess every prerequisite to become one of the world's most attractive regions for international trade.
Reducing excessive dependence on external actors is, of course, a legitimate objective for any state. However, reducing dependence should not be confused with dismantling relations with partners. Our region has every opportunity to achieve sustainable economic development while cooperating with strong trading partners who are no less interested in the South Caucasus than we are interested in them.
In my view, at least three conditions are necessary for this to happen. First, Russia's influence in the region must continue to decline. Even if it is impossible to eliminate it completely, it should be reduced to the greatest extent realistically achievable. Second, the South Caucasus should fully embrace its role as a bridge connecting East and West, capitalizing on its unique geopolitical position. Third, the countries of the region must deepen their partnership with one another. Encouragingly, the foundations for such cooperation are already becoming increasingly visible today.
Only if these three conditions are met will the South Caucasus be able to move beyond being merely an arena of geopolitical competition and instead become an independent center of economic cooperation, connectivity, and long-term regional stability.