The geopolitical configuration spanning the space from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Caspian Basin is undergoing a profound transformation. The weakening of previous mechanisms of regional balance, protracted conflicts in the Middle East, rising tensions around Iran, and the redistribution of energy and transport routes have effectively erased rigid boundaries between regions. Under these circumstances, states located at the intersection of several geopolitical spaces are gaining disproportionate importance—not due to military might, but due to their ability to manage energy flows, logistics, diplomacy, and security.
In this framework, Azerbaijan occupies a unique position. Geographically located between the South Caucasus and the Middle East, it is simultaneously embedded in processes affecting Russia, Turkey, Iran, Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Azerbaijan is a key element of the energy architecture linking the Caspian Sea with European and Middle Eastern markets, as well as a vital hub of land and sea corridors of strategic importance for Eurasia. These factors give Baku sustainable international influence, regardless of the current situation.
At the same time, the regional environment around Azerbaijan is becoming increasingly fraught with risks. The Iran-Israel standoff, instability in Syria, the long-term internal instability of the Iranian state, and competition among major powers for influence in Eurasia are creating scenarios in which neutrality and passivity are no longer viable strategies. Under these circumstances, the key resource is not formal membership in alliances, but the ability to flexibly balance, prevent escalations, and maintain strategic autonomy.
It is against this backdrop that Azerbaijan is increasingly emerging as a state whose role extends beyond its local agenda. Its importance is determined not by individual decisions, but by a combination of factors: geography, energy, transit, military deterrence, and diplomatic maneuverability. This makes Baku an important element in the emerging regional architecture, where stability depends not on the dominance of a single center of power, but on precise calculations and the ability to maintain balance in a context of increasing uncertainty.
CASPIA presents an interview with American expert Giorgio Cafiero, CEO of Gulf State Analytics, and visiting associate professor at Georgetown University.
- How do you assess Azerbaijan's current role in the Middle East's geopolitical architecture, and why is Baku becoming an increasingly significant player in the region?
-As a country situated at the intersection of the South Caucasus and the Middle East, Azerbaijan’s role in the region is one of a strategic connector and energy stabilizer which takes a pragmatic approach to regional security issues. Azerbaijan has become more of a player in shaping dynamics in the Middle East rather than simply observing or reacting to regional developments. Baku’s engagement with post-regime change Syria and its unique position vis-à-vis Israel-Iran hostilities speak to Azerbaijan’s important position as a Muslim-majority former Soviet republic situated along the Caspian basin, Russia’s southern flank, Iran’s northern border, and eastern Turkey. The leverage that Baku has when it comes to energy transit, trade corridors, and NATO’s geopolitical competition with Russia contributes to Azerbaijan’s high levels of influence on the international stage.
-What are the main factors that have made Azerbaijan a link between the South Caucasus and Middle Eastern powers?
-Through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor, Azerbaijan has had much success in leveraging energy to advance its geopolitical and geo-economic interests. As the state which connects the Capsian basin to markets in Europe and Israel through Turkey, Azerbaijan has helped Europe achieve greater energy diversification beyond Russia and Middle Eastern countries. Baku’s energy cooperation with Israel and other countries has cemented Azerbaijan’s role in the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy landscape in manners that bolster Baku’s clout.
-You have repeatedly spoken about the multi-vector nature of Azerbaijan's foreign policy—how do you see the balance between relations with Israel, Turkey, Iran, Russia, and the West?
-With President Ilham Aliyev at the helm, Azerbaijani foreign policy has been, above all else, pragmatic. Rather than entering geopolitical blocs, Baku has demonstrated its ability to take advantage of economic opportunities when and where they arise and approach other countries with diplomatic flexibility. Put simply, Azerbaijan’s multi-vector foreign policy and diversification of partners have been aimed at achieving security guarantees and economic growth while maintaining high levels of autonomy that prevent Baku from being under the shadow of any single foreign country. In short, Azerbaijan’s balanced relationships with Israel, Turkey, Iran, Russia, Europe, and the United States have been about strategic agency and maximizing Baku’s options.
-In light of the recent joint Azerbaijani-Iranian military exercises “Araz 2025,” can we talk about a change in the nature of bilateral relations? What is behind this cooperation?
-I did not read Araz 2025 as necessarily any major shift in Azerbaijan’s approach to relations with Iran. But the military exercises underscored how Azerbaijan chooses to cautiously and pragmatically cooperate with Iran, an immediate neighbor which maintains a complicated relationship with Baku. It is no secret that real tensions have significantly impacted Baku-Tehran relations in recent years and I believe that Araz 2025 signals a determination on the part of both Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic to thwart scenarios whereby suspicions, misunderstandings, and grievances can lead to a more serious set of issues in bilateral affairs.
-To what extent does strengthening ties with Israel influence Azerbaijan’s positioning in relations with key Middle Eastern players?
-Going back to the 1990s, Azerbaijan has had a special relationship with Israel. Although officials in Baku do not agree with certain aspects of Israeli foreign policy, Azerbaijan does see preservation of its relationship with Tel Aviv as important to its national interests. Nonetheless, this partnership with Israel is a sensitive issue when it comes to Baku-Tehran relations and one that Azerbaijani officials navigate cautiously when engaging with the wider Arab-Islamic world. At the same time, Azerbaijan’s good relations with Israel and the relatively new Syrian government have given Baku some degree of opportunity to serve as a bridge between Tel Aviv and Damascus.
-How likely is it that regional conflicts in the Middle East (for example, Iran-Israel) will escalate into a direct threat to the security of the South Caucasus and Azerbaijan?
-Such a troubling outcome would not be inevitable. But it is a risk that the leadership in Baku can’t dismiss as minor. If Iran perceives Azerbaijan as aligned with Israel in manners that threaten the Islamic Republic’s vital interests, tensions between Tehran and Baku could escalate and Azerbaijan might find itself under increasingly intense pressure from Iran that could take various forms. Additionally, under an extreme scenario of state collapse in Iran, it must be appreciated that Azerbaijan, like all countries that share land borders with Iran, would need to deal with the potential challenges of refugee flows into its territory along with other destabilizing spillover effects.
-In the event of a significant escalation in the Middle East, which geopolitical and military alliances could protect Baku from external pressure?
- In such a scenario, Azerbaijan would probably seek to avoid being too dependent on any one foreign power. Nonetheless, I believe that Turkey is Azerbaijan’s security partner of greatest value and that in the event of such a crisis in the Middle East, officials in Baku would turn to Ankara for protection. At the same time, Turkey’s relationship with Russia and Iran could slightly complicate the overall picture for Azerbaijan depending on how developments concerning Moscow and Tehran unfold.