Armenia’s parliamentary elections are taking place at one of the most complex political and geopolitical moments in the country’s modern history. Against the backdrop of ongoing discussions over Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization, constitutional reform, relations with Russia, and the deepening of ties with the European Union, the vote is being viewed not merely as a contest for political power, but as a choice regarding the country’s future strategic direction.

International observers and regional stakeholders are closely monitoring developments in Yerevan, as the outcome of the elections may have implications far beyond Armenia itself, potentially influencing the broader dynamics of the South Caucasus.

The campaign has been marked by high voter turnout, intense competition between the ruling authorities and the opposition, mutual accusations of electoral irregularities, and ongoing debates regarding Armenia’s foreign policy orientation. Issues such as the peace process with Azerbaijan, the future of relations with Russia, prospects for Western integration, and possible constitutional amendments have become central topics of public discussion.

In an interview with the CASPIA Analytical Center, Armenian political analyst and social sciences researcher Hrant Mikaelian shared his assessment of the current political landscape and the potential scenarios that may unfold following the elections.

Elections as a moment of uncertainty: Are the opposition’s chances increasing?

According to Mikaelian, voter turnout during the election process was notably high, a factor that objectively worked in favor of opposition forces and increased their chances of success.

The analyst noted that before voting began, he viewed the chances of the ruling authorities and the opposition as roughly equal, estimating the race at fifty-fifty. However, as new information emerged throughout election day, the likelihood of an opposition victory appeared to increase significantly.

Is a shift in the political balance possible?

Discussing the prospects for a genuine change in Armenia’s political balance, Mikaelian emphasized that much will depend on the margin separating the main contenders.

If the opposition secures victory by only a narrow margin, the current authorities may attempt to challenge or overturn the outcome through political, administrative, or other mechanisms. Conversely, if the opposition wins by a substantial margin, opportunities for such efforts would diminish considerably, and at some point the authorities would likely cease attempting to contest the result.

At the same time, Mikaelian does not anticipate rapid or revolutionary transformations. In his view, even if new political forces come to power, changes will be gradual and will not immediately affect the entire state apparatus. While the likelihood of political change has increased, he does not expect it to be radical in nature.

Coalition politics: stability as the primary challenge

Addressing the possibility of forming a stable coalition government in the event of an opposition victory, Mikaelian argued that such a scenario is entirely plausible.

However, maintaining cohesion within a coalition composed of three or even four political forces would represent a significant challenge. Ensuring long-term stability, he noted, would require consistent political management and sustained institutional cooperation over several years.

Post-election risks: from questions of legitimacy to political confrontation

Mikaelian identified narrowly contested results as the principal source of potential post-election instability.

If the opposition loses by a small margin, it may refuse to recognize the outcome, citing the extensive use of administrative resources during the campaign. Conversely, if the ruling authorities lose by a similarly narrow margin, they may seek to challenge the results, arguing that outcomes at several polling stations could alter the overall picture.

At the same time, Mikaelian considers the possibility of annulling the elections through Armenia’s Constitutional Court to be considerably less likely. In his assessment, the Court would be unlikely to support such a move.

Armenia and Russia after the elections: stabilization or further deterioration?

Analyzing the future of Armenian-Russian relations, Mikaelian outlined two fundamentally different scenarios.

Should the opposition come to power, relations between Yerevan and Moscow are likely to stabilize. While he does not expect an immediate improvement, he believes tensions could gradually decrease.

If the current authorities retain power, however, relations may experience only a brief period of stabilization before deteriorating again, as Armenia would remain within the broader framework of geopolitical confrontation.

According to Mikaelian, the opposition would seek to move Armenia away from this logic. Nevertheless, he argues that external actors—particularly Western countries, but increasingly Russia as well—continue to draw Armenia into a wider geopolitical rivalry.

The Western vector: continuation, suspension, or adjustment?

Commenting on the possibility of a stronger integration trajectory toward the European Union and the United States, Mikaelian argued that a victory for the incumbent authorities would likely ensure the continuation of Armenia’s current Western-oriented course.

Should the opposition prevail, this policy would not necessarily be reversed, but its further development would likely be frozen. In that case, Armenia’s relations with Western institutions would probably remain at their current level without major new advances.

Mikaelian also suggested that Western actors may react negatively to an opposition victory and could exert political and informational pressure on a new government. As an example, he pointed to developments in Georgia after 2012, where similar dynamics emerged shortly after the change of power.

The role of former Karabakh elites in Armenia’s political landscape

Discussing the influence of former Karabakh elites, Mikaelian noted that many of their former leaders are no longer active participants in Armenia’s political life, while some remain in detention in Azerbaijan.

Among those who continue to play a role in Armenian politics, former president Robert Kocharyan occupies a special position. According to Mikaelian, Kocharyan’s political weight can be measured relatively accurately through the election results, which are expected to give his political bloc approximately 10–12 percent of the vote.

Karabakh Armenians as an electoral factor

Mikaelian also addressed the participation of Karabakh Armenians in the elections.

According to his assessment, Armenian authorities have not granted citizenship and voting rights to a significant portion of displaced Karabakh Armenians. Roughly 40 percent of those who remained in Armenia are currently eligible to vote, while approximately 60 percent do not possess voting rights.

Although he does not expect their votes to be fully consolidated behind any single political force, Mikaelian believes that the majority of those eligible to participate are likely to vote against the current government, while distributing their support among different opposition parties.