Today, the South Caucasus finds itself at the intersection of several interconnected geopolitical transformations. The war between Israel and Iran, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the weakening of traditional centers of power, the growing influence of Türkiye and the Gulf states, and intensifying competition over strategic transport corridors are collectively transforming the region from the periphery of global politics into one of the key hubs of the emerging Eurasian order.
Iran occupies a central place in this transformation. The country's future has become a focal point where the interests of major global and regional powers increasingly converge. Whether Tehran retains its status as an independent center of power, becomes integrated into a new system of regional alliances, or faces deeper internal and external destabilization will shape not only the balance of power in the Middle East but also the future of security, economic development, and the transport architecture of the South Caucasus.
At the same time, the logic of international competition is evolving rapidly. While military security dominated the geopolitical agenda just a few years ago, logistics, energy security, and control over strategic transit corridors have now become equally decisive factors. The Middle Corridor is gradually evolving from a regional infrastructure initiative into one of the most important pillars of the economic security architecture of both Europe and the wider Eurasian region.
CASPIA presents an interview with Bako Kheladze, a Georgian expert in international relations and security affairs specializing in Iran, the South Caucasus, and Eurasian geopolitics.
— Following the recent escalation between Israel and Iran, the security architecture of the Middle East has changed significantly. What long-term consequences of these developments are already being felt in the South Caucasus?
-Although the South Caucasus remains a relatively stable region that has not been directly affected by military hostilities, it is by no means insulated from the broader consequences of the conflict in the Middle East. This is particularly relevant for Azerbaijan, a strategic partner of Israel, and Armenia, which has traditionally maintained close relations with Tehran.
Iran’s ultimate fate will be decisive in shaping the new regional security architecture. For Armenia, a strong Iran serves as a desirable geopolitical counterbalance to the dominant influence of Azerbaijan and Türkiye. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, is concerned that Iran’s collapse or transformation into a failed state could trigger a new wave of regional instability and generate multiple security threats.
Viewed from a broader regional perspective, the continued instability in the Persian Gulf has heightened international awareness of the South Caucasus’s potential as a critical transport and connectivity hub. This presents the region not only with significant economic opportunities but also with the prospect of enhanced security.
— Many observers argue that a new system of regional alliances is gradually emerging. To what extent does Iran remain an independent center of power, and to what extent is it being forced to adapt to a new geopolitical reality?
-We are currently witnessing the emergence of new regional alliances. An independent center of power is gradually taking shape around Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, and Egypt. At the same time, there are increasing indications of growing strategic convergence among Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States.
Despite considerable internal and external pressure, Tehran continues to engage actively with its regional neighbors. This is particularly evident in its relations with Pakistan, which plays an important mediating role in U.S.-Iran tensions, as well as Bahrain, one of the key states located near the Strait of Hormuz.
However, as long as the conflict continues and its trajectory remains unpredictable, it would be premature to draw conclusions about the future alliances Iran may join. One thing is clear: the outcome of the current war will determine whether Iran preserves its status as an independent center of power or is compelled to enter the orbit of one of the emerging regional blocs.
— Russia has traditionally viewed the South Caucasus as part of its sphere of influence. Today, however, its capabilities are significantly constrained. In your opinion, who stands to benefit most from this shift in the balance of power?
-First and foremost, the states of the South Caucasus themselves. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s regional policy largely relied on a strategy of "divide and rule," implemented through the deliberate encouragement of both domestic and interstate conflicts. This approach cost the South Caucasus more than three decades of instability, thousands of lives, and billions of dollars in economic losses.
Today, however, the region’s unique geographical location and its growing potential for transport connectivity have attracted unprecedented interest from Europe, China, and the countries of Central Asia. As Russian influence continues to decline, these international actors—along with global corporations and investors—are gaining greater confidence to pursue long-term strategic engagement. Ultimately, this will contribute to the accelerated development of the entire region.
— You have repeatedly argued that Iran’s relations with the countries of the South Caucasus are becoming increasingly pragmatic. What currently defines Tehran’s policy toward Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia? Where are its principal red lines?
-Despite differences in their foreign policy priorities, Georgia and Iran observe clearly defined mutual red lines. Their relationship is based on a tacit understanding: Tbilisi refrains from participating in anti-Iranian coalitions, while Tehran consistently respects Georgia’s territorial integrity. This principle remains the cornerstone of bilateral relations.
Relations between Iran and Armenia, however, are considerably more complex and multilayered. Beyond the historically influential Armenian community in Iran—whose rights are protected by the country's Constitution—this partnership is founded on shared strategic interests, particularly in containing the growing influence of the Turkic states, above all Azerbaijan.
In contrast, relations between Baku and Tehran remain strained. One of the enduring sources of tension is Azerbaijan’s close strategic partnership with Israel, Iran’s principal regional rival.
At the same time, Azerbaijan presents Tehran with a particularly complex challenge for two key reasons. First, Iran is home to a large ethnic Azerbaijani population. Second, Azerbaijan enjoys strong military support from Türkiye. For these reasons, Tehran seeks to avoid escalation along its northern border, especially under the current circumstances.
— Following the signing of the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, new economic opportunities are emerging in the region. How does this change Iran’s strategic thinking?
-Tehran has consistently opposed the implementation of the Zangezur Corridor, viewing it as an attempt to deprive Iran of direct land access to Armenia and as a violation of Armenian sovereignty. This position was articulated most clearly by former Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, who stated: “Armenia’s security is Iran’s security.”
Iran’s concerns regarding the proposed route intensified further after the direct involvement of the United States, which introduced the initiative under the new name Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).
— To what extent could the war in the Middle East and instability around the Strait of Hormuz accelerate the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route?
-If the war in Ukraine served as the catalyst for the development of the Middle Corridor, the broader instability in the Middle East—particularly the possibility of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz—has further underscored its strategic importance for connectivity between East and West.
As a result, both the South Caucasus and Central Asia have witnessed a significant increase in infrastructure projects, foreign investment, and high-level diplomatic engagement.
However, this geopolitical momentum will not last indefinitely, as armed conflicts inevitably come to an end. Therefore, the countries along these transit routes must seize the current window of opportunity to build infrastructure capable of ensuring not merely a temporary advantage driven by crisis conditions, but long-term competitiveness against traditional trade corridors.
— The European Union increasingly views the Middle Corridor as a key element of its economic security strategy. Do the interests of the EU and the countries of the region converge, or are there fundamental differences between them?
-For Europe, access to the Caspian region’s energy resources and Central Asia’s strategically important critical raw materials is essential for maintaining its industrial and economic competitiveness.
This is why the European Union remains the largest foreign investor in the development of the Middle Corridor. For Brussels, the route is not only a vital trade link connecting Europe with China, but also a direct gateway to the Caspian’s energy resources and Central Asia’s critical minerals.
The current disagreements between Georgia and the European Union are temporary in nature, as Georgia needs Europe just as much as Europe requires a reliable and stable Georgia to fully realize the strategic potential of the Middle Corridor.
— Following recent developments, many analysts speak of a reassessment of Iran’s foreign policy priorities. In your view, which directions will become most important over the next five years? Could Iran evolve from a geopolitical competitor to regional transport initiatives into a full-fledged participant, or do existing contradictions still make such a scenario unlikely?
-As I have already noted, it would be premature to speculate about Iran’s future while the current war is still ongoing.
That said, Iran possesses an exceptionally advantageous strategic geographical position, well-developed infrastructure, abundant and inexpensive energy resources, a competitive labor force, and centuries of experience serving as one of the region’s principal transit corridors.
Nevertheless, as emphasized earlier, future developments will ultimately depend on the final outcome of the current conflict.
— If the sanctions regime against Iran remains in place, how will this affect logistics between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Europe?
As before, such a scenario would further strengthen the strategic importance of the Middle Corridor while simultaneously reducing the significance of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
Moreover, it would weaken the prospects for alternative transport routes designed to connect Central Asian states with Pakistan’s seaports through Iranian territory.
— We are witnessing several interconnected developments simultaneously: Russia’s declining role, Türkiye’s growing influence, the European Union’s increasing interest in the Middle Corridor, tensions surrounding Iran, and the gradual restoration of economic ties within the South Caucasus. Which of these factors do you believe will have the greatest impact on the region over the next decade?
-All of the developments you mentioned are, to a considerable extent, consequences of two ongoing wars: the war in Ukraine and the conflict surrounding Iran. As long as these conflicts remain unresolved, the situation may change dramatically more than once, and the trajectory of both regional and international developments may undergo substantial adjustments.
These are two of the most significant geopolitical conflicts of our time, and they will profoundly shape the future international order and the emerging balance of power across Eurasia. Their consequences have the potential to alter virtually everything—from the direction of international transport corridors to, potentially, even existing state borders.