Since the end of February 2026, the conflict between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other has entered a dangerous phase of open large-scale confrontation that is already extending beyond the Middle East. Coordinated air and missile strikes on key facilities in Iran have targeted military, energy, and infrastructure sites, including strategic nuclear facilities. Despite statements suggesting the operations may soon end, hostilities have continued for more than ten days, and the parties demonstrate readiness for further escalation, including the possible use of weapons of mass destruction.

Reports indicate serious damage to Iranian nuclear facilities and the presence of highly enriched uranium that could potentially be used to produce nuclear weapons. At the same time, strikes on civilian infrastructure, including medical institutions, have been recorded, creating significant humanitarian risks and threats to the civilian population. Against the backdrop of these events, the South Caucasus region is drawing particular attention. The potential spread of the conflict to neighboring countries, primarily Azerbaijan, is becoming a real possibility.

CASPIA presents an interview with Iran researcher Ali Shahin.

- How do you assess the current political situation in Iran, and what are the main problems the system is currently facing?

- Following the death of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, Ali Khamenei, as a result of a joint strike by Israel and the United States, an atmosphere of deep uncertainty and transition has been established in Iran. Although the “Velayat-e Faqih” system contains a mechanism for the rapid transfer of power, society may face serious polarization. Khamenei’s death has become an event of enormous magnitude: despite the nationwide mourning declared in the country, there are also groups openly celebrating what has happened.

His death has seriously shaken the authoritarian structure of the regime; however, it is still premature to speak of an imminent change in the political system. Key institutions of the regime, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, remain powerful and influential.

Political and social fragmentation is growing in the country. Opposition-minded groups inside Iran are celebrating Khamenei’s death, calling it the “end of religious despotism,” while conservative circles are mourning and calling for revenge. While the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is trying to fill the emerging power vacuum, the struggle within the elite between hardliners and more moderate forces is intensifying.

The main problem currently facing the system is precisely this vacuum of leadership and authority. It not only provokes internal instability but also increases the country’s vulnerability to external interference, accelerates economic decline, and disrupts coordination with Iran’s regional allies. The regime is attempting to maintain control through rhetoric of revenge. However, the resulting power vacuum could also provoke new protest movements within the country.

- How have the growing regional tensions, particularly the attacks on Tehran and the killing of the Supreme Leader, affected Iran’s internal stability?

-Recent events have seriously shaken Iran’s internal stability. It is one of the most serious crises for the regime since the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Khamenei’s death has caused a sharp division within society. On one hand, opponents of the regime perceive what is happening as a “moment of freedom.” In Tehran and other major cities, scenes of celebrations can be observed at night - people go out into the streets, dance, and chant slogans.

On the other hand, conservative segments of society are experiencing deep mourning. Thousands of people dressed in black gather in central squares of Tehran, religious chants of “Allahu Akbar” are heard, and calls for revenge are voiced.

Such polarization increases the risk of street clashes and internal unrest. Security forces are patrolling cities in an attempt to suppress both protest actions and celebratory gatherings of the opposition.

The attacks on the capital have effectively paralyzed civilian life. Streets are empty, internet disruptions are occurring, and many elements of everyday life have come to a halt. Iranian state media have declared Khamenei a “martyr” and announced a 40-day national mourning period, while simultaneously attempting to mobilize the population through rhetoric of revenge. The role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is increasing noticeably, although this may also intensify internal contradictions and complicate efforts to fill the power vacuum.

An additional factor of pressure is the situation around the Strait of Hormuz. Its closure could seriously weaken Iran’s economy, as oil exports have practically stopped and the flow of cash has sharply decreased. If the war continues for a prolonged period, internal instability may become practically inevitable.

- How has Khamenei’s death affected the morale of Iran’s leadership and its military operations?

- Khamenei’s death became a powerful shock both for the country’s leadership and for society. For a long time, there was a belief that Khamenei was practically untouchable. Even during the 12-day war, when Israel reportedly knew his location, strikes were carried out against other members of the Iranian elite but not against Khamenei.

In addition, the presence of Mossad agents within the country has intensified the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust among the highest elites. This has created psychological pressure and a sense of internal crisis.

From a military perspective, the situation has also become more complicated. Targeted killings of high-ranking representatives of the Iranian leadership by the United States and Israel have disrupted the chain of command.

The destruction of key command centers of the Iranian armed forces has reduced the effectiveness of military operations. In attempting to fill the emerging power vacuum, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may increase its influence. However, this may also provoke internal conflicts and slow decision-making.

Moreover, Israeli operations against groups allied with Iran after the events of October 7 have significantly weakened them. Therefore, in the current war between the United States/Israel and Iran, these forces are no longer capable of providing Tehran with the level of support they once did.

- How is Iran’s military strategy being formed under conditions of missile and drone attacks?

- After the attacks by the United States and Israel, Iran appears to have revised its military strategy, drawing lessons from previous conflicts. Under the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a strategy of rapid, continuous, and multi-directional retaliatory strikes has been adopted.

The goal of this strategy is to exhaust the enemy’s defense systems, increase pressure on regional allies of the United States and Israel, and ensure the continuation of operations even in the event of the loss of leaders.

After the attack, Iran responded almost immediately with a rapid and unexpected strike. This was intended to catch the opponent off guard and simultaneously demonstrate to the domestic audience the regime’s ability to resist.

The retaliatory strikes are directed not only against Israel but also against American military facilities in the Persian Gulf and allies of the United States. In this way Iran is attempting to force the United States and Israel to defend themselves on multiple fronts and distribute their resources.

At the same time, Tehran has abandoned the classical tactic of “swarm attacks” and shifted to constant launches of missiles and drones over a 24-hour period. The aim is to physically and psychologically exhaust the opponent’s missile defense systems, such as Patriot.

- How do you assess the consequences of the drone attack on the Nakhchivan for regional security in the South Caucasus, and could this incident become the beginning of a broader escalation involving neighboring states and energy routes?

- Assessing the drone attack on the territory of Azerbaijan, particularly on the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, on March 5, 2026, from the perspective of regional security, it can be said that this incident simultaneously demonstrates the chaotic nature of the current Iranian crisis and the potential risk of escalation in the South Caucasus.

The attack targeted the passenger terminal of Nakhchivan International Airport and an area near a school in the village of Shekerabad, as a result of which four civilians were injured. Azerbaijan confirmed that the drones were launched from Iranian territory based on radar data, analysis of debris, and eyewitness testimony.

Azerbaijan established that the attack originated from Iranian territory; however, Iran stated that it had no involvement in the attack and claimed that it was a “false flag” operation.

Based on this, the incident can be viewed as an attempt to extend the current war into the South Caucasus. The geographical position of Nakhchivan, squeezed between Iran and Turkey, allows the attack to be interpreted as a strategic “warning” or deterrent move.

Iran has long perceived Azerbaijan’s close military and intelligence ties with Israel as a “threat from the north.” The attack can therefore be viewed as a practical manifestation of this perception.

At the same time, the current leadership crisis in Iran has increased the chaotic nature of decision-making processes. In conditions where the central chain of command has been partially disrupted and regional units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may act more autonomously, a small-scale drone operation against Nakhchivan could have been carried out without the direct approval of the highest leadership - for example, by overly initiative local or mid-level commanders.

However, this attack can also be seen as the materialization of Iran’s longstanding warnings that “Azerbaijan should not turn into a base for Israel.” Therefore, it can be said that the probability of chaotic decision-making is high, but at the same time the attack may also have been intended to send a strategic “signal” - these two factors do not exclude each other.

Azerbaijan classified the attack as a “terrorist act,” placed its army on full combat readiness, summoned the Iranian ambassador, recalled diplomatic personnel, and suspended cargo transportation at the border with Iran.

Given the geographical vulnerability of Nakhchivan, any retaliatory step could directly make Nakhchivan a target and lead to Turkey’s involvement. This could trigger a domino effect in the South Caucasus: tensions around the Zangezur corridor could intensify again, Armenia’s positions could strengthen, and Russia’s mediating role in the region could weaken.

From the perspective of overall stability, this incident represents the first serious signal that the war in the Middle East could spread to the Caucasus, increasing pressure on energy routes (for example, the Baku – Tbilisi - Ceyhan oil pipeline) and on regional alliances (the Azerbaijan – Israel - Turkey axis).

- What is the potential risk of the conflict spreading to neighboring countries such as Azerbaijan, especially considering the possible use of chemical or nuclear weapons and damage to Iranian nuclear facilities?

- The war is beginning to take on an increasingly harsh character. In their attempts to bring each other to their knees, the sides are effectively ready to consider any means. In this context, in addition to the weapons and missiles already being used, there may even arise the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, and in an extreme case even nuclear weapons. Although such a probability remains low, it cannot be completely ruled out, and such scenarios are beginning to be discussed.

In addition, serious damage to Iranian nuclear facilities has been reported, which in itself creates significant risks. It is precisely in this context that statements by President Donald Trump have been made.

It is also important to take into account that Azerbaijan is a direct neighbor of Iran. Any potential threat related to the use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in Iran, as well as possible leaks from damaged nuclear facilities, could inevitably affect neighboring countries.

Therefore, it can be assumed that the government of Azerbaijan, closely monitoring the development of the current conflict, is aware of the possible risks and may have begun taking appropriate precautionary measures.