The signing of a 27-year agreement between Kazakhstan and Iran on the construction of Kazakhstan's own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas represents a development whose significance extends far beyond the scope of bilateral cooperation. In essence, it marks the establishment of a long-term infrastructural foothold for Kazakhstan along the southern route, reflecting a transformation in the transport strategy of Central Asia and signaling the region's transition toward a new model of participation in international logistics networks.
The project demonstrates Astana's determination to reduce its dependence on traditional transit routes, diversify its export and import flows, and establish the country as an independent logistics player connecting Eurasia with the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Middle East. The creation of its own terminal is not merely an expansion of trade cooperation with Iran; rather, it constitutes the development of a long-term overseas infrastructure asset that will enable Kazakhstan to independently manage part of international transport flows.
At the same time, the project's success will depend not only on its economic viability but also on a number of external factors. These include the development of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the international sanctions regime imposed on Iran, the security situation in the Middle East, and competition with other Eurasian transport routes, above all the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor). It is precisely the combination of these factors that will determine whether the new terminal can become one of the key components of the emerging transport architecture of Eurasia.
Over the past several years, Kazakhstan has consistently pursued a policy aimed at strengthening its transport autonomy. Whereas the country's export flows had previously been directed primarily toward the northern route and Russian infrastructure, changes in the international political and economic environment after 2022 significantly accelerated the search for alternative transport corridors. Under these new circumstances, the diversification of the country's transport system has become not only an economic priority but also an essential element of Kazakhstan's national strategy for ensuring the resilience of its foreign trade.
Within this strategic framework, Bandar Abbas is becoming for Kazakhstan not merely a foreign port but a strategic component of its own transport architecture. For the first time, the focus is not on utilizing existing foreign infrastructure or leasing warehouse facilities, but on constructing a logistics complex that Kazakhstan will build and operate for twenty-five years following the completion of construction. For Kazakhstan, this marks the beginning of a new stage in which the country seeks not only to facilitate transit across its own territory but also to participate directly in the management of international supply chains.
The choice of Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas can hardly be considered accidental. It is Iran's largest container port, through which a significant share of the country's foreign trade passes. Owing to its location on the coast of the Persian Gulf, it provides direct access to the Indian Ocean and serves as one of the principal hubs connecting Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Russia, South Asia, the Gulf states, and global maritime shipping routes.
For Kazakhstan, this creates several strategic opportunities simultaneously. First and foremost, the country gains its own access to international maritime routes without relying exclusively on northern transport corridors. This substantially broadens the geographical scope of Kazakhstan's foreign trade and creates additional opportunities for expanding economic ties with India, the Gulf states, East Africa, and Southeast Asia.
Equally important is the fact that Kazakhstan will gain the ability to control part of its export infrastructure beyond its national borders. Ownership of its own terminal will allow the country to independently organize cargo handling, manage logistics operations, and improve the efficiency of transport processes. At a time of intensifying competition among international transport corridors, control over infrastructure has become one of the principal factors determining a state's logistical competitiveness.
The project is of particular significance in the context of the development of the International North–South Transport Corridor. In recent years, this route has gradually evolved from what was largely a political initiative into a genuinely functioning transport system whose importance continues to grow. The global transformation of international trade, the security crisis in the Red Sea, periodic disruptions to shipping through the Suez Canal, and the growing desire of states to diversify logistics chains have made this corridor one of the most promising routes for Eurasian transportation.
The establishment of Kazakhstan's terminal in Bandar Abbas will significantly strengthen the Central Asian segment of this transport corridor. Kazakhstan will be able to independently control part of the logistics chain, reduce transaction costs, improve the predictability of deliveries, and enhance the quality of transport services. Over the long term, this has the potential to substantially increase the corridor's attractiveness for international carriers while reinforcing Kazakhstan's position as one of the key participants in Eurasia's transport system.
The defining feature of Kazakhstan's contemporary transport policy is its deliberate rejection of dependence on any single transport route. Recent years have clearly demonstrated that geopolitical crises, sanctions, and disruptions to global supply chains can rapidly alter the established configuration of international trade. Under these conditions, the resilience of the national economy depends to a large extent on the state's ability to utilize multiple alternative transport corridors simultaneously.
For this reason, Kazakhstan is simultaneously developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor), investing in the modernization of the ports of Aktau and Kuryk, expanding railway connections with China, deepening transport cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia, and now establishing its own infrastructure base along the southern route through Iran.
As a result, a model of what may be termed multiple transport resilience is gradually taking shape. Its principal characteristic lies in the fact that potential disruptions along one route can be offset through the use of alternative corridors. Such a strategy significantly enhances the flexibility of Kazakhstan's national logistics system while reducing its dependence on external geopolitical risks.
Despite the project's evident strategic potential, its implementation will depend on a number of factors capable of significantly affecting its overall effectiveness. Above all, this concerns the continuing high degree of international uncertainty surrounding Iran. Although transport and logistics cooperation with Tehran continues to develop, the sanctions regime remains one of the principal constraints on long-term investment. Any tightening of sanctions could complicate international financial transactions, cargo insurance, the involvement of foreign operators, and the use of certain technologies required for terminal operations. As a consequence, the project's economic efficiency could ultimately fall short of initial expectations.
No less important is the condition of the transport infrastructure along the route itself. The existence of a modern terminal does not automatically guarantee high throughput across the entire logistics chain. Fully realizing the project's potential will require further modernization of the railway networks of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran, improvements to border infrastructure, the digitalization of customs procedures, and closer coordination among the transport authorities of the three countries. Otherwise, bottlenecks along individual sections of the route could significantly reduce the competitiveness of the new corridor.
Competition among various international transport corridors will also influence the project's prospects. Despite growing interest in the North–South Corridor, it continues to compete both with the Middle Corridor through the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus and with traditional maritime shipping routes via the Suez Canal. The choices made by logistics companies will ultimately depend on transportation costs, delivery times, security conditions, and the operational reliability of each route. Consequently, Kazakhstan will need not only to build modern infrastructure but also to ensure a consistently high standard of logistics services.
An additional risk factor remains the broader security situation in the Middle East. Bandar Abbas is located in close proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most strategically sensitive maritime chokepoints. Any escalation of regional tensions could affect shipping costs, insurance premiums, and the volume of cargo traffic. Although these risks are geopolitical in nature and largely beyond Kazakhstan's control, they will inevitably be taken into account by international carriers when selecting transport routes.
For a more in-depth examination of the issue, we requested the official position of the Ministry of Transport of the Republic of Kazakhstan. According to the Ministry's press service, the construction of Kazakhstan's own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port is regarded as one of the country's strategic projects, fully aligned with its long-term national priorities for the development of the transport and logistics sector.
The Ministry emphasizes that ensuring direct access to the markets of the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Africa is of strategic importance for Kazakhstan. The establishment of a dedicated terminal will guarantee priority cargo handling for Kazakh exporters, thereby improving the efficiency of foreign trade operations and strengthening the competitive position of Kazakh businesses in international markets.
The Ministry further notes that this initiative forms part of a broader state strategy aimed at creating an integrated domestic and international terminal network for Kazakhstan. This strategy encompasses the development of logistics infrastructure along the entire length of Eurasian transport routes, from the terminal in the Chinese port of Lianyungang to terminal facilities in the Black Sea region and across Europe. According to the Ministry's plans, by 2028 the combined capacity of Kazakhstan's terminal network is expected to increase from the current 2 million TEUs to 2.7 million TEUs, reflecting the government's consistent policy of expanding the country's presence within international transport infrastructure.
Commenting on the role of the Bandar Abbas terminal in the development of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the Ministry stresses that the facility's location on the shores of the Strait of Hormuz is of strategic importance. The terminal will provide consolidation and cargo-handling services for Kazakhstan's exports immediately before their entry into global maritime trade routes, thereby enhancing the efficiency of logistics operations and strengthening Kazakhstan's position within the international freight transportation system.
The Ministry also points out that the project is fully consistent with the National Development Plan of the Republic of Kazakhstan through 2029. The document identifies the development of multimodal transport, including the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor), as well as the expansion of freight transportation along the International North–South Transport Corridor, among the key priorities of Kazakhstan's national transport policy.
According to the Ministry, Kazakhstan's geographical location at the heart of Eurasia creates unique opportunities to establish seamless logistical connectivity between East and West, as well as between North and South Asia. Consequently, the country's transport policy is focused not on developing a single transport corridor, but rather on building a comprehensive, multi-vector transport system capable of ensuring the resilience of international transportation and expanding Kazakhstan's transit potential.
The Ministry reports that the effectiveness of the North–South Corridor has already been demonstrated in practice. During the first six months of the current year, container traffic along the China–Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran route more than tripled, reaching 7,500 TEUs. To further attract cargo flows, the railway administrations of the participating countries annually extend preferential transit tariff arrangements, setting rates at $0.12 per container-kilometer for 20-foot containers and $0.15 per container-kilometer for 40-foot containers. According to the Ministry, the terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port will become an important transshipment and cargo consolidation hub, primarily serving the commercial interests of businesses.
Particular attention is also paid by the Ministry to the interaction between different international transport corridors. The Ministry does not regard the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) and the North–South Corridor as competing routes. On the contrary, it argues that the two corridors perform different functions within a single Eurasian transport system. The Middle Corridor is primarily oriented toward facilitating transit between China and Europe, whereas Shahid Rajaee Port provides the North–South Corridor with direct access to the Indian Ocean. This functional specialization allows the two routes to complement rather than compete with one another for cargo flows. Moreover, the existence of multiple alternative corridors enables freight transportation to be rapidly redirected in the event of disruptions or restrictions affecting any particular route.
Assessing the broader significance of the project, the Ministry of Transport emphasizes that the development of overland transport corridors has the potential to generate additional economic benefits for Kazakhstan while expanding the country's opportunities for international trade. At the same time, the Ministry adopts a balanced position regarding the broader redistribution of global trade flows, noting that maritime shipping remains more cost-effective than overland transport. Consequently, in the Ministry's assessment, it is still premature to speak of a fundamental shift in global trade toward land-based transport corridors. Instead, Kazakhstan is pursuing the development of an integrated transport system in which maritime and overland routes complement one another, thereby enhancing the resilience, flexibility, and efficiency of international logistics.
According to Kazakh expert and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Zhanat Momynkulov, the decision to construct Kazakhstan's own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port reflects a qualitative shift in the country's transport strategy. Whereas Kazakhstan previously built its export model primarily around the extraction of raw materials and the use of transport infrastructure in neighboring states, Astana is now gradually moving toward the creation of its own overseas logistics network. As the expert explains, Kazakhstan has already invested substantial resources in developing its domestic infrastructure, including railways, the ports of Aktau and Kuryk, and dry ports on the border with China, but outside its borders it has largely relied on the infrastructure of other countries. The Bandar Abbas project represents a transition to a new model in which Kazakhstan seeks to participate directly in shaping international transport routes while strengthening cooperation with Europe, China, Iran, Pakistan, India, Turkey, and the countries of the Middle East.
The expert points out that the construction of the terminal, together with the opening of Kazakhstan's Consulate General in the strategically important area of the Strait of Hormuz, indicates the country's intention to gain, for the first time, the ability to participate in the management of one of the world's key international logistics hubs. According to Momynkulov, this approach has long been employed by countries such as China, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey, as competition among states is increasingly determined not only by trade volumes but also by their ability to control individual components of global logistics chains.
In Zhanat Momynkulov's assessment, the significance of the project extends far beyond bilateral cooperation between Kazakhstan and Iran. The establishment of Kazakhstan's own terminal will strengthen the country's position within the International North–South Transport Corridor, expand export routes toward the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Africa, and gradually transform Kazakhstan's role in the global economy. Whereas Kazakhstan previously functioned primarily as a user of international transport corridors, it is now beginning to become one of the actors shaping them. The expert notes that annual trade between Asia and Europe exceeds US$1 trillion, while the countries of Central Asia continue to increase investment in transport infrastructure, viewing logistics as one of the key determinants of long-term competitiveness.
Discussing the long-term nature of the 27-year agreement with Iran, Momynkulov emphasizes that infrastructure projects of this scale are always designed with a time horizon measured in decades. In his view, such a timeframe is dictated primarily by economic logic rather than by current political circumstances. Governments and sanctions regimes may change, but geography remains constant. Iran, as Kazakhstan's neighbor in the Caspian region and the provider of Central Asia's shortest overland access to the Indian Ocean, retains its strategic importance regardless of fluctuations in the international environment. At the same time, Momynkulov stresses that Kazakhstan is not relying exclusively on the Iranian route. Should serious constraints arise, Astana is also considering alternative projects, including the development of transport routes through Afghanistan to Pakistani ports, as well as the potential use of Chabahar Port.
Analyzing the project's impact on the International North–South Transport Corridor, the expert argues that port capacity often plays a decisive role in determining the efficiency of transport routes. According to him, Kazakhstan's own terminal will enable the country to independently manage cargo handling operations, reserve capacity for domestic exporters, reduce container processing times, and lessen dependence on the commercial decisions of foreign terminal operators. Nevertheless, Momynkulov does not believe that the project will trigger a rapid redistribution of cargo flows. Rather, it is likely to enhance the corridor's competitiveness gradually by improving its overall reliability. Following the crisis in the Red Sea and disruptions to traffic through the Suez Canal, the reliability of supply chains, rather than transportation costs alone, has become one of the principal factors influencing the choice of logistics routes.
In Momynkulov's view, the ongoing changes can no longer be described merely as a diversification of Kazakhstan's transport policy. Instead, he argues, the country is gradually developing a comprehensive multi-vector logistics strategy. Whereas the concept of multi-vectorism was previously associated primarily with Kazakhstan's foreign policy, it is now becoming increasingly evident in the country's economic strategy as well. Kazakhstan is simultaneously developing its western direction through the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus, its southern route through Iran, its eastern corridor through China, and its northern connection through Russia. Such a model makes it possible to redistribute cargo flows whenever constraints arise along individual routes and is consistent with the practices of the world's leading economies. The expert also highlights the strategic importance of Shahid Rajaee Port itself. The majority of Iran's container traffic passes through this port, while its location at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz provides direct access to the world's principal maritime shipping lanes.
Assessing the impact of international sanctions against Iran, Momynkulov acknowledges that they create serious, but not insurmountable, constraints. The principal risks concern international banking transactions, cargo insurance, the operations of major global shipping companies, and the potential application of secondary U.S. sanctions. However, in his opinion, sanctions do not make the project impossible to implement. Rather, they increase operating costs and necessitate the use of more flexible financial mechanisms, including expanded settlements in national currencies, cooperation with regional banks, and the involvement of carriers that already operate on Iranian routes.
The expert places particular emphasis on the emergence of a new Eurasian transport architecture. He considers it a mistake to portray the International North–South Transport Corridor and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) as competing initiatives. In his assessment, the two corridors serve different segments of global trade and are capable of reinforcing one another. Modern global logistics, he argues, is no longer based on a single transport route but on a network of interconnected corridors, where resilience is achieved through the availability of alternative delivery options. It is precisely for this reason that Kazakhstan seeks to integrate simultaneously into several international transport systems.
In conclusion, Zhanat Momynkulov argues that the success of the project will depend on Kazakhstan's ability to consistently develop its transport, digital, and trade infrastructure, maintain its multi-vector foreign economic policy, and adapt effectively to an evolving international environment. Only under these conditions, he concludes, will the terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port become not merely another infrastructure facility, but an important instrument for strengthening Kazakhstan's position as one of the principal logistics hubs of Greater Eurasia.
According to political scientist and expert at the Ablai Khan Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages, Murad Shamilov, Kazakhstan's decision to invest in the construction of its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Iran should be viewed not only as a major infrastructure project but also as an important component of the country's emerging model of foreign economic policy. The expert notes that, for decades, the states of Central Asia were compelled to rely on transport infrastructure whose development largely depended on the political circumstances of other countries.
Shamilov attaches particular importance to the long-term nature of the 27-year agreement with Iran. In his view, projects of this scale cannot be assessed through the prism of current political developments or a single electoral cycle. Instead, they are designed on the basis of long-term expectations regarding the evolution of global trade and international transport connectivity over the next two to three decades. For this reason, he argues, the agreement should be regarded as evidence that Astana views Iran as one of the region's key transport partners regardless of changes in the international environment.
The expert also places special emphasis on the choice of Shahid Rajaee Port. According to Shamilov, it is Iran's largest container port, strategically located at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most important maritime trade chokepoints. This geographical position provides Kazakhstan with the shortest access to the Indian Ocean while creating additional opportunities to expand trade with the Persian Gulf states, India, Pakistan, and the countries of East Africa. In the expert's assessment, this will reduce cargo delivery times, lower transportation costs, expand alternative logistics routes, and enhance the competitiveness of Kazakhstan's exports.
Analyzing the project's impact on the International North–South Transport Corridor, Murad Shamilov argues that the establishment of a Kazakh terminal has the potential to reshape the corridor's operational configuration by enabling a more efficient distribution of container flows. Until now, a substantial share of cargo traffic has been concentrated along specific sections of the transport network, resulting in infrastructure bottlenecks and longer delivery times. According to the expert, the new terminal will make it possible to redistribute cargo flows more flexibly across different routes, thereby improving the overall efficiency of freight transportation amid growing trade between Russia, Central Asia, Iran, India, and the Persian Gulf states.
According to Oral Toga, a Turkish expert in international relations and Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Iranian Studies (IRAM), Kazakhstan's decision to build its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Iran should be viewed within the context of Iran's long-term strategy, under which Tehran has, for more than two decades, sought to transform its unique geographical position into a source not only of economic revenue but also of political resilience.
The expert notes that Iran has consistently pursued the objective of turning its territory into a key transit link connecting Central Asia, Russia, and global maritime trade routes. The greater the volume of international cargo passing through Iranian territory, the stronger the interest of neighboring states in preserving the country's stability and ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of its transport infrastructure.
It is within this strategic framework, Oral Toga argues, that the agreement with Kazakhstan should be understood. In his assessment, the establishment of Kazakhstan's own terminal at the southern end of the International North–South Transport Corridor provides the corridor's eastern branch with something it has long lacked—a permanent infrastructure anchor in whose successful operation Kazakhstan itself has a direct stake.
Toga points out that both Kazakhstan and Iran have repeatedly expressed their intention to increase freight volumes along the North–South Corridor to 20 million tons annually. At the same time, he stresses that this figure should still be regarded as a strategic objective rather than a reflection of current realities. According to the expert, actual freight volumes along the corridor amounted to approximately 3.5 million tons last year. Nevertheless, he believes that the overall trajectory of development is fully consistent with Iran's long-term transport strategy.
According to Toga, the development of transit routes represents one of the few sustainable sources of revenue for Iran that is not directly dependent on the Western financial system or Western markets. Consequently, virtually every transport agreement concluded by Tehran with Russia, China, India, or the countries of Central Asia simultaneously contributes to strengthening the resilience of the Iranian economy under conditions of international sanctions.
Kazakhstan, however, is participating in the project for entirely different reasons, the expert emphasizes. For Astana, the principal motivation is the diversification of transport routes and securing the shortest possible access to the Indian Ocean, thereby reducing dependence on any single transit corridor.
In Toga's view, the project is not a partnership aimed at circumventing sanctions, but rather the result of converging strategic interests between the two countries. It is precisely this alignment of interests that makes the initiative significantly more sustainable over the long term. At the same time, he reminds that the sanctions regime continues to have a substantial impact on the project's implementation. Restrictions complicate access to financing, increase cargo insurance costs, and limit the participation of major Western logistics companies. In addition, security-related risks affecting transport infrastructure remain a serious concern.
The expert places particular emphasis on the strategic importance of Shahid Rajaee Port. According to him, the port is already Iran's principal logistics hub rather than merely a potential center of future development. It handles nearly half of Iran's total foreign trade, approximately 85% of the country's container traffic, and around 70% of its transit cargo.
At the same time, Toga argues that the key issue is not the port's infrastructure capacity but its ability to provide reliable operations for international partners. On the one hand, its advantages include its strategic location near the Strait of Hormuz, its well-developed railway connections, and the emergence of a foreign terminal operator. On the other hand, significant security-related challenges remain.
The expert recalls that following the major explosion in April 2025, which killed dozens of people and injured more than a thousand, as well as the subsequent military hostilities in the vicinity of Bandar Abbas, the port's operations encountered serious constraints. Additional pressure has resulted from damage to railway infrastructure and transport interchanges leading to the port.
For this reason, Toga believes that Shahid Rajaee Port possesses virtually all the characteristics required to become a major logistics hub linking Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean except for one critically important condition: a stable and secure operating environment.
Assessing the impact of the current regional instability on Kazakhstan's project, Toga stresses that the consequences of the conflict are already evident. According to him, the agreement was signed during a ceasefire, but hostilities resumed shortly thereafter, resulting once again in restrictions on maritime navigation and strikes targeting railway junctions and transport infrastructure around Bandar Abbas. In the expert's opinion, these developments now constitute the principal investment risks associated with the project, affecting insurance premiums, financing conditions, force majeure provisions, and the overall economic viability of construction.
At the same time, Toga highlights an important aspect of the situation. Despite the military conflict, Kazakhstan has not abandoned the project and has continued its implementation. According to the expert, this demonstrates that the countries of the region regard the North–South Transport Corridor as a long-term strategic undertaking and expect its development to continue after the current crisis has ended. He believes that conflicts of this nature are unlikely to derail such infrastructure projects altogether; rather, they may delay implementation, reduce the initial scale of construction, and simultaneously increase regional interest in developing alternative routes, particularly the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.
Speaking about the prospects for international cooperation, Oral Toga notes that the necessary institutional mechanisms are already in place. He recalls that the Ashgabat Agreement, in force since 2016, brings together Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Oman. In addition, cooperation continues to develop within the framework of railway agreements involving China, Türkiye, and the Central Asian states, while bilateral transport initiatives between Iran and Turkmenistan are also advancing. The expert further notes that as early as 2023, Uzbekistan announced its intention to establish its own terminal and warehousing infrastructure at Chabahar Port in Iran. In his opinion, Kazakhstan's project could serve as a model that other Central Asian countries may eventually choose to follow.
According to Oral Toga, the importance of Central Asia in Iran's foreign policy has increased significantly in recent years. The reasons, he argues, are primarily structural in nature. It is in this direction that Iran can offer its neighbors something that is objectively essential for all countries in the region the shortest access to open maritime trade routes. Moreover, Central Asia has become an important component of China's westward trade strategy and remains a region where Tehran does not face direct confrontation with its principal geopolitical rivals.
At the same time, the expert emphasizes that the future pace of transport development will depend less on decisions made in the capitals of Central Asia than on the broader security situation in the Persian Gulf. As long as the Strait of Hormuz remains an area of heightened military and political tension, the southern section of the transport corridor will continue to be the principal factor determining the speed at which the broader Eurasian transport architecture develops.
According to Mohmmad Hossein Masoumzadeh, Senior Research Fellow in the International Department of the Iranian think tank Governance & Policy Think Tank (GPTT), the agreement between Kazakhstan and Iran on the construction of a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port can indeed be regarded as part of Tehran's broader strategy to enhance the resilience of its economy under sanctions. At the same time, the expert emphasizes that explaining Iran's transport policy solely through the lens of sanctions would be a serious oversimplification.
According to Masoumzadeh, sanctions are not the root cause of Iran's current transport strategy; rather, they serve as a catalyst for processes driven by far more fundamental factors, namely the country's geographical position, its economic interests, and its long-term geopolitical objectives.
The expert notes that even in the absence of sanctions, a country with Iran's territorial scale, population, natural resources, and regional influence would naturally seek to become the principal transport bridge connecting Central Asia, Russia, the South Caucasus, and the countries of the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the Indian Ocean. Under such circumstances, the development of transport corridors would primarily pursue the goals of economic growth, transit revenue generation, and the strengthening of Iran's geoeconomic influence, rather than serving merely as an instrument for countering external pressure.
At the same time, Mohmmad Hossein Masoumzadeh acknowledges that sanctions have significantly accelerated the implementation of this strategy. Restrictions on oil exports, banking operations, insurance, shipping, foreign investment, and access to advanced technologies have compelled Iran to intensify cooperation with neighboring countries, Eurasian partners, and transport corridors that are less dependent on Western financial and logistics institutions.
It is within this context that the expert views cooperation with Kazakhstan. In his assessment, the partnership simultaneously contributes to expanding Iran's trade and economic ties with the countries of Central Asia and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), increasing revenues from transit and logistics services, reducing dependence on a limited number of transport routes, strengthening regional economic connectivity, and improving the resilience of national supply chains during periods of crisis.
According to Masoumzadeh, it is precisely this geographical reality that creates Iran's natural interest in transforming its transit potential into a source of economic growth, regardless of the state of its relations with the West. The landlocked countries of Central Asia require multiple routes to global maritime trade networks, and Iran objectively provides one of the shortest and most efficient gateways to southern ports.
At the same time, India has a strategic interest in using Iranian territory to gain access to Central Asia and Russia while bypassing Pakistan, whereas Russia benefits from the opportunity to connect its transport networks with the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean through shorter routes. Consequently, the expert argues, transport cooperation among Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and India is based primarily on enduring geographical logic rather than solely on the sanctions agenda.
In Masoumzadeh's view, the agreement with Kazakhstan has two distinct dimensions. On the one hand, it genuinely helps Iran reduce its vulnerability to sanctions by expanding regional trade and creating alternative transport corridors. On the other hand, the project forms part of Iran's national strategy to establish itself as one of the principal transport and logistics hubs of Eurasia. Thus, the expert emphasizes, Iran's strategic objective is not so much to circumvent sanctions as to transform its advantageous geographical position into a tangible economic asset.
Masoumzadeh assigns a particularly important role to Kazakhstan within this strategy. He points out that Kazakhstan is the largest economy in Central Asia, one of the region's leading producers of grain, metals, mineral resources, and energy commodities, and a member of the Eurasian Economic Union. Like Iran, Kazakhstan seeks to avoid dependence on a single export route and is simultaneously developing transport corridors through Russia, China, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, Türkiye, and Iran.
At the same time, the expert stresses that a favorable geographical location alone does not guarantee the success of a transport project. Geography merely creates potential opportunities, whereas the choices made by shippers are ultimately determined by the commercial competitiveness of a route. If transportation costs prove excessive, customs procedures remain lengthy, tariffs lack predictability, or delivery times become unreliable, cargo flows will inevitably shift toward alternative corridors.
For this reason, Masoumzadeh argues that in order to transform cooperation with Kazakhstan into a sustainable long-term competitive advantage, Iran must complete the construction of missing railway segments, expand the capacity of ports and border terminals, reduce cargo handling times, establish a transparent tariff policy, digitalize customs procedures and transport documentation, introduce regular container services, develop reliable mechanisms for financial settlements and cargo insurance, and ensure a stable regulatory and investment environment. According to the expert, these priorities remain essential regardless of the existence or absence of international sanctions.
