Former FSB Director and presidential aide Nikolai Patrushev recently stated that the deaths of hostages during the 2002 Nord-Ost theater siege were caused by the “confusion and lack of coordination of emergency services,” while insisting that the FSB units involved in the operation “performed professionally.” At the time, Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) was headed by Sergei Shoigu, who was removed from his position as Minister of Defense in May 2024.

Viewed not as a historical comment but as a political signal, Patrushev’s statement appears highly revealing. Nearly a quarter of a century after the Nord-Ost tragedy, the question arises: why has the former FSB chief suddenly decided to explain in detail who was responsible for the deaths of the hostages? This is particularly noteworthy because, for years, he consistently defended the actions of the security services without drawing attention to the role of EMERCOM.

What Stands Out?

First, Patrushev is effectively revisiting one of the most sensitive operations of the Putin era. In doing so, he appears to shift responsibility for the tragic outcome away from the security services and toward emergency response agencies.

Second, Sergei Shoigu becomes an indirect target. Formally, Patrushev is speaking about EMERCOM, but everyone understands who headed the ministry at the time.

Third, these remarks come after Shoigu’s dismissal from the Ministry of Defense and amid continuing military difficulties in Ukraine.

Why Does It Matter?

Since the beginning of the war, the Russian elite has largely operated under a principle of collective responsibility. Publicly, members of the ruling establishment avoided assigning blame to one another. Failures were attributed to the actions of Ukraine, the West, or external circumstances—anything but mistakes made by specific representatives of the system. However, as challenges accumulate, this approach appears to be changing.

Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory have become increasingly routine. Moscow and the surrounding region are no longer perceived as untouchable rear areas. Questions persist regarding the effectiveness of air defense systems. The economy faces mounting structural constraints, high interest rates, and labor shortages. Even within the government, disagreements are becoming more visible over who should bear responsibility for ongoing problems. In such an environment, the search for accountability inevitably begins.

Shoigu as a Convenient Target

Following his departure from the Ministry of Defense, Shoigu found himself in an unusual position. He retained high formal status but lost control over one of the key resources of the Russian political system—the military. Almost immediately after his dismissal, a series of corruption investigations and personnel purges began within the defense establishment. This has made Shoigu a convenient figure onto whom responsibility for both past and present failures can be shifted.

Significantly, criticism is no longer confined to the wartime period. Events that occurred more than twenty years ago are now being revisited. This is a classic feature of bureaucratic infighting: political opponents are linked to as many controversial decisions from the past as possible. In effect, Patrushev is sending a message to the elite that the failures did not originate within the FSB but rather within institutions associated with Shoigu.

The Curious Absence of Nabiullina

Another notable symptom is the continuing speculation surrounding the absence of Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina from public view. Even if there is nothing extraordinary behind these rumors, the very fact that such discussions are taking place reflects growing nervousness within the system.

At a time when economic growth is increasingly driven by military spending and inflationary pressures remain elevated, the position of the Central Bank chief has become politically sensitive. Whereas the economic bloc was once viewed primarily as a technocratic institution, it is increasingly becoming part of the broader struggle over who will ultimately be held responsible for future economic difficulties.

Under such circumstances, any prolonged absence of a key official naturally generates speculation about disagreements within the elite.

What Is Happening Inside the System?

This does not necessarily indicate a split within the ruling establishment in the classic sense. Rather, it appears to signal the beginning of a process in which elite groups are seeking to insulate themselves from one another. Each center of influence is gradually constructing its own narrative of events.

Security officials explain failures as the result of mistakes by civilian agencies. Military figures point to shortcomings in industry and economic management. Economic policymakers emphasize the effects of sanctions and wartime spending. Regional authorities seek to distance themselves from decisions made at the federal level. Patrushev’s remarks are significant precisely because they fit into this broader pattern.

In this context, the most important aspect of Patrushev's remarks is not his assessment of the events of 2002, but the emergence of a public search for blame within Russia's ruling elite itself. When one of the most influential figures in the security establishment unexpectedly revisits the Nord-Ost tragedy 24 years later and effectively points to Shoigu's agency as the source of the problem, it looks less like a historical discussion and more like an episode in an ongoing power struggle within the Kremlin.